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Abstract
This dissertation examines the everyday work of schoolteachers in post-coup
Honduras from the theoretical perspective that they are individuals with a vested interest in
the state, who reflect upon their own experiences when carrying out the vital state service of
national public education, and while acting as leaders of the anti-coup National Front of
Popular Resistance. This movement emerged in response to the violent overthrow of the
country’s democratically-elected president in June 2009 and has since broadened its agenda,
calling for the ‘re-foundation’ of the Honduran state by rewriting the constitution.
Yet state formation occurs not only through such formal projects but also through
everyday activities. Based on extended ethnographic fieldwork in 2012 in the southern
Department of Valle, I explore how schoolteachers from one region act upon their visions for
what the Honduran state could be, while navigating the first full school year during reforms
to the education sector that aim to decentralize and privatize the country’s national public
education system, while disciplining teachers and reducing their already meagre salaries and
benefits. This anthropological study of state formation, based on the contradictory ways that
people engage governing policies and state projects, illuminates how schoolteachers actively
reject the neoliberal spirit of these reforms, even though they are the people responsible for
implementing these policies in practice. By comparing and contrasting the experiences of
teachers working in rural and urban areas, whose schools must now compete among
themselves for funding from municipal governments and private entities, I examine how
teachers seek solutions to the unequal distribution of education resources, while defending
the validity of state services in general, even when the post-coup government has reduced its
own commitment to that project.
This research challenges understandings of the state as a monolithic entity by asking
who is responsible for policy implementation, and how do they approach their work when
they disagree with the policies they are supposed to implement. I suggest that ethnographic
research can illuminate the contradictory nature of state projects, and argue that popular
resistance to neoliberal governing policies in post-coup Honduras is also occurring from
within the state.
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1

Schoolteachers and the State

1.1 Introduction
The Spanish translation of the title of my doctoral research project – ‘La Política
de Los Maestros Hondureños: Agentes del Estado Retan el Estado’ – usually caught the
attention of my research participants when I presented them with my letter of information
and consent. The idea of calling schoolteachers in Honduras ‘state agents’ and suggesting
that they ‘challenge the state’ seemed to resonate with the experiences of many people,
despite the fact that my analytical term, state agents, is not something teachers
themselves use to describe their positions. Some chuckled and commented that it was a
clever title; almost everyone asked if I had a pen they could borrow to sign the form. But
one high school economics teacher took particular interest in my title and shared with me
his reactions:
‘Agentes del Estado’ – that’s interesting! Look here [he says to his colleague] –
look at what this gringo is saying about us…. Let me tell you something about the
relationship between the state and the magisterio [the teachers’ professional
1

association] here in Honduras. We teachers have always had problems with the
state…. We are the largest public gremio [guild] in this country, and that means
that we’re capable of bringing the entire national public education system to a
stop…. The magisterio isn’t afraid of any government! We’re the real deal! We
are conscious that the state needs us – every country needs to educate its citizens.
That’s why the state eventually gives in…. But as ‘agentes,’ as people, right, we
are always in some fight with the state – new governments come in and don’t
respect the laws that we, as a gremio, have passed…. That’s why we ‘challenge
the state’ [pointing to my title]. We protest on the streets because they don’t
respect the laws…. No government has ever gotten along well with the

1

All translations in this thesis are my own.
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magisterio, not even that of Mel Zelaya. It’s been better with Liberal [Party]
governments, but still, always problematic. The state sends in the armed forces to
break up our marches. But in the end they know that they need us. We are the
ones working to form citizens in order to enrich Honduras. We know this. In fact,
nosotros también somos parte del estado [we too are part of the state]. The state
needs an education system. That’s why they need us – this government can’t just
get rid of all teachers. That’s why the golpistas [coup mongers] are so afraid of
us! They know that we’re not afraid. So they respond by persecuting us – because
of our politics. These guys know we’re the backbone of the Resistencia and
LIBRE Party. But we are not afraid…. We are still here in our schools everyday
2

conducting classes – fighting and teaching at the same time.

This is a thesis about the everyday work of Honduran schoolteachers, their roles
in transforming governing policies toward education, and their positions as leaders of a
nation-wide political movement and political party that promise to bring radical changes
3

to policies of governance and state practices in post-coup Honduras. It is based on
ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Honduras during the 2012 school year – three years
after the military coup of 28 June 2009. Since the coup’s rupture of Honduras’
democratic system, the country has experienced both a deepening of neoliberal state
projects (in often violent and militarized ways) and an unprecedented level of popular
mobilization – first to demand the reinstatement of President Manuel ‘Mel’ Zelaya and
later expanding to promote a series of visions for ‘re-founding’ Honduran state and
society. The Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular ‘La Resistencia’ FNRP (National
Front of Popular Resistance), and its allied political party, the Partido de Libertad y

2

Interview, 15 May 2012.
In this thesis I use the term ‘policy of governance’ or ‘governing policy’ to refer to legislation that affects the
population, and ‘state practices’ to refer more generally to broader activities of the Honduran state over time (which
can take place during different governments).
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Refundación LIBRE (Freedom and Re-foundation Party), have successfully forged a
nation-wide revolutionary spirit unlike anything experienced in recent Honduran history.
The Resistencia continues to raise political consciousness about a host of national social
and political issues, moving well beyond its initial goal of reinstating Mel to challenge
4

the neoliberal status quo, which was experienced since well before the coup itself, but
has been intensified by post-coup policies of governance.
Under the post-coup regime of Porfirio ‘Pepe’ Lobo (Jan. 2010 – Dec. 2013),
government funding for basic public services was drastically reduced, negatively
affecting the majority of the Honduran population who were already struggling to meet
their basic subsistence needs. This doctoral research project examines one particularly
revealing case in point: the 2011 passing of new laws for the education sector which aim
to decentralize and privatize the country’s primary and secondary education system,
while demanding new academic standards, disciplining schoolteachers, and reducing
their already meagre salaries and retirement benefits.
While the maintenance of any public school has always been a local struggle in
Honduras (and the central government has not been able to fund all aspects of education),
in the past schoolteachers considered the central offices of the Ministry of Education a
practical source from which to secure funding to cover basic infrastructure projects. Now
however education funding is being transferred from the central Ministry offices in
Tegucigalpa to departmental (provincial) and municipal governments, with new laws that
require different schools to compete among themselves for these local government funds,

4

In the following chapter I expand upon what the neoliberal status quo has meant in Honduras.
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and to solicit additional funding from private organizations such as transnational
corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and philanthropists.
In order to be competitive in this new funding system, school administrators need
to show that they are using the funds in an effective manner to complete necessary
construction projects, and to design new types of academic programs that the reforms
require, such as the teaching of computer literacy and English. The central government
can then reward those schools that are successful under this new model with additional
transfers of money to their local sponsors, or punish those that are not, by threatening to
fire any teachers who lose in the race to secure local funds, and by closing down smaller
schools whose enrolment numbers have not increased in recent years or whose students
have a higher failure and drop-out rate (something my research participants confirmed
was already underway in 2012). These unprecedented reforms aim to dismantle social
policy achievements for public education gained through Honduran schoolteachers’
labour struggles over the last half-century.
In this introductory chapter I describe the theoretical perspectives that orient my
approach to the work of schoolteachers and the anthropological study of the state. Here I
connect the larger questions and central arguments presented in this thesis with on-going
scholarly debates and broader research questions in political anthropology, the
anthropology of the state, and the anthropology of education. I then explain the research
methods used in this study, and describe how I came to conduct ethnographic research on
Honduran state formation and political culture and the circumstances that facilitated my
work with Honduran schoolteachers in the post-coup political context.

5

1.2 Theorizing the Work of Schoolteachers in Honduras
My assertion that schoolteachers in Honduras are ‘state agents’ might seem rather
strange, at first appearance, given that they are frequently targeted by members of the
national police and armed forces – people who are perhaps more commonly understood
as ‘state agents.’ My conscious employment of this analytical term to describe Honduran
teachers arises from the fact that they work directly for the Ministry of Education, and
yet, they are more than simply government employees.
Schoolteachers are responsible for carrying out national public education and
implementing the latest governing policy toward that undertaking. They realize (make
real) the state modernity project of training a labour force and forming state subjects –
influencing what citizens should know, believe, and be able to do (see Levinson 2005 for
an analysis of how teachers in general aim to do this). Within and beyond the confines of
the school, teachers produce certain kinds of state effects that make the state relevant for
the populations with whom teachers work. In Honduras, teachers are recognized locally
as having the privilege and responsibility of delivering a state service that the population
actively seeks out, and which every citizen is required by law to undergo until she or he
completes the ninth grade or reaches 16 years of age. Teachers verify that the populations
with whom they work are complying with their legal obligations to undergo formal
education. They matriculate Honduran youth from various backgrounds as students in
public schools, while verifying their identities and those of their parents by demanding
state-administered health records and birth certificates (which they later photocopy and
stamp with formal seals for official records). For all of these reasons, teachers represent
state authority in certain contexts, albeit in a more benign manner than the armed forces
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or national police (also see Wilson 2001 for an example of how schoolteachers can
represent state authority in Andean Peru, and Luykx 1999 for an example of how teachers
in Bolivia are trained to do just this by producing citizens). The analytical term ‘front-line
state agents’ thus seems to capture the nature of schoolteachers’ positions and everyday
work activities in Honduras.
This is however only one aspect of the equation. In addition to their daily labour
in the name of the state, the other important characteristic of Honduran schoolteachers is
that they occupy highly ambiguous positions as workers in Honduran society. On the one
hand they are recognized as salaried professionals – individuals whose education
credentials and life achievements exemplify the benefits that the national public
education system can offer. On the other hand, however, in many parts of Latin America
schoolteachers are also members of the underpaid working class who must sell their
labour in order to subsist (some examples include Arnove 1997; Gill 2000; Luykx 1999;
Wilson 2001). While most Honduran teachers experience standards of living slightly
higher than the populations with whom they work (especially in the rural context), they
also face serious financial consequences whenever they are not paid completely and
punctually. In summary, many schoolteachers in Honduras struggle on a regular basis to
meet their basic subsistence needs.
Schoolteachers also perform the duties of local intellectuals. In Honduras they are
recognized as having the authority and responsibility to think and comment publicly on a
variety of regional, national, and international current events and ongoing political
debates. They are known as highly mobile individuals whose daily work requires that
they travel and become acquainted with a range of urban and rural communities. This
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means that Honduran teachers become familiar with the customs and livelihood strategies
of various kinds of communities beyond their own places of origin, work, and residence.
Such frequent travel also implies that they often forge and maintain personal and
professional relationships with a range of people in distant regions of Honduras, and even
in neighbouring Central American countries (which they frequently visit for
conferences).
Honduran teachers are thus not only front-line state agents, but also workers with
rather ambiguous statuses. As they reflect upon their own lived experiences with the
national public education system, their profession, and the state in general, they develop
political opinions about their everyday work, different kinds of governing policies, and
state practices. Yet teachers’ formal political positions as an organized gremio do not
always correlate with those of whichever government is in power, due in large part to the
contradictory nature of their positions. Teachers are in charge of providing state services
that most governments in Honduras cannot fund – or choose not to fund – to the extent
that schoolteachers themselves consider adequate for them to properly fulfill their duties.
Yet teachers are the front-line state agents who bear the burden of explaining these
shortcomings to disgruntled students and students’ parents, who often see teachers as
representatives of education policies and all the shortcomings of the public education
system.
Even in situations of scarce resources, teachers know that a range of decisions
about how to fund public education are available, and teachers reflect on what they

5

While in numerous other national contexts schoolteachers also advocate for more government funding, as the
ethnographic examples that follow make clear, in Honduras the central government no longer takes responsibility for
funding very basic needs of schooling in the context of poverty.
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believe to be politically possible based on their own lived experiences with the education
system (as both recipients and producers), drawing upon examples of what previous
Honduran governments have done and what they observe in neighbouring countries.
Teachers’ professional associations do have established formal procedures that
allow them to contribute to the design of national public education policies, although this
is not without sacrifice and political struggle. Whenever schoolteachers determine that
the government in power is not considering their suggestions (or worse yet, is not
respecting the existing laws), it is common for the magisterio to take up political causes
that bring teachers into direct conflicts with that government. This most commonly
results in Honduran teachers withholding their labour – refusing to conduct classes –
through paros (work stoppages) and nation-wide strikes, which bring the national public
education system to a standstill, as the high school economics teacher so emotionally
described in the quote that introduces this chapter. As he reminds us, schoolteachers
comprise the largest gremio of public workers in Honduras, and they are one the state
depends upon, both because schoolteachers work to create a productive labour force and
form loyal state subjects, but also because they deliver a state service that the Honduran
population actively seeks out.
This teacher’s comments allude to the fact that no government in the modern
Honduran state has ever been able to do without such vital work. As this thesis
demonstrates, Honduran schoolteachers are keenly aware of this reality, and use it to their
advantage as they navigate through these new laws, selectively implementing aspects of
them while also challenging the deepening of neoliberal policies.

9

1.3 Contributions to Existing Literature in Anthropology
6

When we think about resistance against neoliberal state projects it is easy to
imagine individuals from different popular sectors protesting on the streets in
disagreement with these development strategies (see, for example, Anderson 2009;
Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Gill 2000; Sawyer 2004 as recent examples in the Latin
American context). These types of studies are indeed valuable. However, it is less
frequent that we ask how challenges to policies of governance and state practices (as well
as forms of accommodation and compromise) may also occur from within the state itself.
For instance, what happens when such resistance comes from the same individuals who
are responsible for implementing the very policies against which they protest?
This is precisely the situation of schoolteachers in Honduras, and in this thesis I
examine the research question: what are the processes through which front-line state
agents go about implementing policies with which they fundamentally disagree? A range
of literature in the social sciences that aims to study the state ethnographically has guided
my approach to exploring this question in the context of neoliberal education reforms in
Honduras. I have found particular inspiration in the work of political geographer Joe
Painter, who argues that:
passing legislation has few immediate effects in itself. Rather, its effects are
produced in practice through the myriad mundane actions of officials, clerks,
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In contemporary Honduras most people talk about resistance with a capital ‘R,’ meaning that it is done through the
FNRP ‘La Resistencia’ movement. However, one could argue that a ‘culture of resistance’ has existed in Honduras
since the colonial period and has since evolved (especially during the decade of the 1980s, as I allude to in Chapter 2
and 3). There are thus many Hondurans who have considered themselves ‘de resistencia’ since well before the
formation of the FNRP (as I describe was the case with Marlon, a teacher I introduce in Chapter 3). I am conscious,
therefore, of the different kinds of popular organizations that have engaged in resistance since well before the FNRP on
the one hand, and the kind of resistance (with a capital ‘R’) that occurs through the FNRP movement on the other (and
the ways in which they overlap). There are also actions that I, as an anthropologist, consider to be acts of resistance,
while my research participants may or may not have considered them as such.
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police officers, inspectors, teachers… and so on…. Thus, the outcome of state
actions is always uncertain and fallible…. This may seem obvious, yet it is
striking how infrequently the gap between state institutions’ claims about their
effectiveness and their actual effects is recognized in academic state theory (2006:
761).
These insights are highly relevant for understanding the Honduran education reforms and
more broadly for studying the state ethnographically. Here I show how Honduran
schoolteachers reject the neoliberal spirit of new education policies, even though they are
the front-line state agents responsible for implementing the laws in practice.
Painter’s comments point us toward an understanding that there are essentially
two different sets of processes at play in the kind of policy reform examined in this
thesis. On the one hand we could pose productive questions about initial policy formation
– all that goes into passing policies into legislation. Among other bureaucratic
administrative procedures, in the present case this includes variables such as pressures
from international financial institutions to reorder governments’ budgets and cut funding
for public services in order to make loan payments. On the other hand however, as
Painter identifies, there is the question of what happens after the law is passed, and how
exactly (or even if) the policy is implemented in practice. In this thesis I am more
interested in studying this second set of processes. This focus emerges out of the
ethnographic data I was able to collect among teachers, since while they do not write the
laws they do realize them on the ground. Studying how front-line state agents approach
implementing policies is also a fruitful, although limited, arena of the anthropological
study of the state. As anthropologist Alan Smart correctly points out, we continue to
know more about policies themselves (as they are written in legislation), than we do
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about the processes through which they are implemented in practice:
The massive output of policy analyses far exceeds the quantity of studies on the
implementation of government policies. In a parallel sense, the practices of
frontline state officials are understood much less than are policy formation
processes (2002: 344).

One of the arguments that I make in this thesis is that an ethnographic approach to the
work of state agents can illuminate the often contradictory nature of their mandates, and
reveal exactly how (and the extent to which) policies of governance are implemented.
The present task is thus an exercise in studying how people responsible for policy
implementation make the decisions that they do. How do schoolteachers make sense of
the various pressures they face in their everyday work lives? How do they understand the
shifting – often quite unstable – post-coup political environment, and to what extent does
this inform their interpretations of new governing policies? In exploring these
anthropological questions, I have found the work of Tara Schwegler to be useful. Her
study of Mexican state officials reveals how these state agents actively seek to interpret
and “assess the lay of the political land by reading the explicit and implicit signals… in
order to align themselves with the administration’s priorities” (2012: 23). While
Schwegler’s work differs in focusing on Ministry-level officials who actively align
themselves with the regime in power, her analysis has inspired me to ask how Honduran
schoolteachers are ‘reading’ the post-coup political landscape as they interpret the
meaning of the reforms, determine in what ways these new laws affect them, and make a
series of difficult decisions. Schwegler has identified a fruitful approach to studying how
front-line state agents implement policies of governance and to revealing all that goes
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into such an endeavour. As she concludes:
Too frequently, the question of governance and how it is accomplished has been
reduced to institutions or ideologies, concrete actors or abstract rationalities. At
the risk of sounding too conciliatory, there is good ethnographic evidence to
support the contention that governance, in fact, is multidimensional, negotiated
within government institutions, within society, and between government and
society. It does not reside permanently in any one of these nodes, but is constantly
moving in and through them. A focus on political labor enables the anthropologist
to capture the complex positionality of political actors and, consequently, to
systematically unravel the multiple layers of governance (2012: 43).

Recent anthropological studies of projects of governance have aimed to capture
their multidimensional and negotiated nature to which Schwegler alludes. That is, rather
than assuming that there is a single process of state formation, such literature emphasizes
that there are a variety of processes of governance in different historical and social
contexts, and that state formation does not begin and end with formal political projects or
obvious examples of state power, but with everyday activities in which people’s
subjectivities change over time and in different contexts (see, for example, Clark 2012b;
Gill 2000; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Heyman 1995; Heyman, ed. 1999; Krupa 2010;
Nordstrom 2004; Nugent 2001, 1999; Ong 2006; Painter 2006).
How, then, should the state be treated when attempting to understand such
processes from an ethnographic perspective? How should an anthropology of politics
proceed without reifying the state, while studying both the idea of the state and the
system it produces (Abrams 1988: 82)? In this doctoral dissertation I follow the
theoretical insights of Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, who have argued that:
One of the most promising avenues… is to disaggregate the state into the
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multitude of discrete operations, procedures, and representations in which it
appears in the everyday life of ordinary people. By treating the state as a dispersed
ensemble of institutional practices and techniques of governance we can also
produce multiple ethnographic sites from where the state can be studied and
comprehended in terms of its effects, as well as in terms of the processes that
shape bureaucratic routines and the designs of policies (2001: 14).
I believe this is a very productive way of approaching the anthropological study of
the state – of state effects and processes that shape bureaucratic routines through the
particular ethnographic site of schoolteachers’ everyday work. Moreover, an
ethnographic approach to the work of state agents can illuminate the often contradictory
nature of their mandates when we consider the question of who is responsible for
implementing policies on the ground. This line of research is still limited, especially for
Latin America (but, as notable exceptions, see Clark 2012; Nugent 2001; Wilson 2001).
By illuminating the ways in which resistance to various governing projects also occurs
from within the state itself, this thesis challenges understandings of the state as a
monolithic entity. Here I aim to reveal exactly how, and the extent to which, these
policies of governance are implemented in practice. In so doing this study contributes to a
body of literature in the social sciences that aims to denaturalize ‘the state’ and highlight
its variability through time and across geographic space. It follows a tradition in
anthropology that sees the state as multi-faceted, made up of different kinds of
institutions and actors, who often have contradictory visions and goals. This seems to be
an especially productive way to study the state ethnographically in contexts of neoliberal
economic reforms.
Neoliberalism is a form of governance that aims to curtail state-sponsored
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services and programs, turning them over to the private sector. In Latin America it has
been associated with creating a better climate for attracting foreign investment through
the understanding that this ‘opening up’ of the economy will stimulate the ‘free market.’
Cutting basic social services from the state’s budget is also one of the primary methods
by which international financial institutions have argued indebted countries can pay down
their development loans – resulting in coercive agreements that require they cut such
services. In this sense, the current neoliberal reforms to the education sector in Honduras
can be seen in the context of similar attempts to reform the education systems of other
Latin American countries (see for instance Gershberg [1999] on decentralization and
education reforms in Nicaragua, and compare with Puiggrós ed. [1999] on the effects of
neoliberalism on education policies in Latin America broadly). In their edited volume on
these processes as they were emerging in Latin America, Carlos Alberto Torres and
Adriana Puiggrós have argued that:
Today, some Latin American states aim at just providing basic education to the
majority of the population, and in some countries such as in Peru, this is not even
the case. Drastic reduction in public schools funding, and growing out-of-pocket
costs for parents increase inequalities. New fees are charged for services that
previously were free, including access to libraries, exams, salaries for teachers in
special subjects…. Decentralization, including transferring schools from the
federal to the municipal system, leaves many poor provinces and local municipal
authorities in charge of a system of education where they lack the appropriate
material, financial and even human resources. Some even claim that this
transference of schools from federal to municipal authority condemn many
educational systems to poverty. In some cases, funds are released only after an
assessment of the efficiency of the establishments, or when mechanisms for
nationally centralized systems of control of the teaching profession are
established, paradoxically, in the context of increasingly decentralized public
education systems (1997: 18).
The processes that Torres and Puiggrós describe resonate with the current reforms
in Honduras. Neoliberal education policies and attempts to decentralize the schooling
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system are thus nothing new to the region broadly or even to Honduras. In fact, different
attempts to create semi-private schools already occurred in Honduras during the 1990s
(which I refer to in Chapter 5). Up until the 2012 school year, however, the Honduran
magisterio had been able to sustain their centralized, (mostly) publicly-funded education
system. It was not until after the June 2009 coup and the deepening of neoliberal policies
that this changed in Honduras.
Under the philosophy of neoliberalism, individuals and local communities are
encouraged to take responsibility for meeting their own basic needs without the
assistance of the state. Through a discursive framework of efficiency, self-regulation, and
accountability (values that might well resonate positively with a range of people),
proponents of neoliberalism argue that it is the best way to achieve financial well-being.
Yet neoliberalism has also been associated with dangerous and poorly-paid working
conditions, and tremendous increases in poverty and social inequities. Geographer David
Harvey offers a comprehensive definition of neoliberalism that is most useful for our
purposes in this thesis:
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The
role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to
such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of
money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and
functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if
need be, the proper functioning of markets. Futhermore, if markets do not exist (in
areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental
pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary (2005: 2).
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In the process of ‘opening up’ and ‘de-regulating’ the economy in the name of the
‘free market,’ it is toward the latter part of Harvey’s conceptualization that I would like to
direct our attention. In a manner congruent with what Harvey recognizes, recent literature
in anthropology has shown that neoliberal policies do not eliminate government all
together (cf. Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Fitting 2011; Ong 2006; Sawyer 2004). Rather, in
their efforts to create an economic environment favourable to foreign investment,
neoliberal development strategies depend upon a state and a particular type of
government capable and willing to engage in such policies.
The privatization of state-managed industries and services – from oil extraction
and water delivery, to health care and education – involves a series of decisions by policy
designers and front-line state agents alike. In this thesis I have therefore chosen to use the
term ‘neoliberal state projects’ to capture the fact that privatizing Honduras’ education
system is not an isolated case (much less an inevitable or unavoidable process that
necessarily controls Honduras) but rather it is part of a broader project that still depends
upon state institutions and state actors.

7

By focusing on how teachers navigated through these neoliberal reforms to the
national public education system in Honduras and took on new responsibilities not
previously associated with their mandates, this research also fits into a growing body of
literature which aims to analyze new sets of hierarchies and forms of governance
whereby authorities from the private sector and state agents of different positions are
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In a similar manner, anthropologist Keri Brondo (2013: 10) uses the term “re-regulation” (instead of merely ‘deregulation’) to refer to Honduras’ neoliberal agrarian legislation and its effect on Garífuna populations.
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taking on new governing tasks not previously associated with their jobs (cf. Li 2009;
Millar & Rose 1990; Rose 1999; Smart 2002, 2001).
The case of contemporary Honduras differs from countries undergoing processes
of the expansion of state services, involving larger central governments and more
investment in public sector jobs. However, the language of ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ states does
not capture the complexity of forms of governance, as suggested by recent literature on
neoliberal governmentality (see, for instance, Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Ong 2006), or
the variable degrees of resilience, governability, and effective results that various state
institutions achieve at different historical moments. While certain state institutions (such
as the Ministry of Education) have been ‘weakened,’ others (such as the armed forces and
national police) have arguably gained resilience and reasserted their power in post-coup
Honduras.
My focus on how teachers view their own work in the context of shifting
approaches to the state modernity project of national public education also connects with
an emerging line of research in the anthropology of education that aims to study teachers’
knowledge and actions (see, for example, Batallán 2002; Gill 2000; Luykx 1999;
Padawer 2002; Wilson 2001 for illustrative examples in the Latin American context). The
majority of literature in the sub-field has nonetheless focused on the broad study of
students’ differential experiences with schooling, to understand how different class,
gender, ethnic, racial, national, and linguistic backgrounds have influenced students’
experiences with formal education (see, for example, Candela 2005; Foley 1996;
González 2010, 2009; Hamann 2003; Hervé 2008; Hicks 2007; Hornberger 2005, 2003;
Jacob 1993; Kirkendall 2002; Koyama and Gibson 2007; Ladson-Billings 2005;
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Levinson 2007, 2005, 2001, 1996; McCarty 2005a, 2005b Ogbu 1998, 1981; Ong 2004;
Wortham 2008, 2003).
To a lesser extent the sub-field of the anthropology of education has also focused
on the different pedagogical strategies for teaching a range of ideologies to a specific
group of people, with the goal of understanding the differences between what is taught
and what is actually learned (see, for example, Anderson-Levitt 2003; Banks 2004;
Bottery 2000; Burbules and Torres 2000; Cole 1974; Eddy 1985; Erickson 2006, 2002,
1993; García 2005; Gee 2005; Hahn 1998; Hall 1999; Huff 2007; Lave 1991; Levinson
and Holland 1996; Levinson and Sutton 2001; Lindo-Fuentes and Ching 2012; Melgarejo
2002; Padawer 2008a, 2008b, 2007, 2002; Parker 2004, 2003; Pelissier 1991; Rival 1996;
Rockwell 2007, 2005; Skinner 1996; Spindler 2006; Splinder, ed. 2000, 1997; Stevick
and Levinson 2007; Willis 1981 [1977]).
While these topics of inquiry merit sustained anthropological research, and some
could very easily be imagined in distinct Honduran contexts of public schooling among
different cultural, ethnic, and linguistic minority groups, my research is very different
from these types of studies. Here I examine the experiences, opinions, and actions of
schoolteachers in order to understand post-coup policies of governance, state practices,
and the ongoing effects of the political crisis in contemporary Honduras. To be clear, I
am interested not in students’ experiences, or curriculum design or pedagogy, but
schoolteachers themselves; and not necessarily because of my interests in education per
se, but for the unique vantage point this offers to study the Honduran state
ethnographically in the post-coup political context, considering the nature of teachers’
work as front-line state agents and as the everyday leaders of the Resistencia.
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In this thesis I draw upon some of these other types of anthropology of education
studies for the purposes of comparing how the projects of decentralization and
privatization have been experienced in distinct contexts, especially in other Latin
American countries (e.g., Arnove 1997; Rockwell 1994; Vaughan 1997, 1982; Wilson
2001). Such research has suggested that while public education can be considered a ‘topdown’ state modernity project – and will at least attempt to train a labour force and act as
a mechanism of social control by integrating its participants, communicating ideas about
the nation, state, and citizens (influencing students with specific ideologies) – how
exactly this happens is highly variable, and dependent upon not only the country and
historical period in question, but also the geographic region within a given country. There
can thus be significant degrees of unevenness in what is referred to as ‘national public
education.’
Such variability and shifting degrees of strength and weakness among different
state institutions has also meant that the role of the central government in determining the
function of public education is variable. For instance, in revolutionary Mexico historians
have argued that the central government did not fund, and was not capable of
determining, what was taught (or how) in local schools (see, for example, Rockwell
2007, 2002,1996; Vaughan 1997, 1982). In specific contexts this might suggest greater
local control over curriculum, yet as neoliberal policies have shown (and as the Honduran
magisterio argues today), decentralization can also be associated with reduced funding
overall and increased inequity among schools, which negatively affects the working class
and students with fewer economic resources.
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In 2012 Honduran schoolteachers were seldom thinking about questions regarding
how to teach certain ideologies in the classroom, or how the decentralization project
might affect curriculum design and pedagogical strategies. As leaders of the Resistencia
political movement, I had suspected that they might be concerned with these matters (as
Rockwell shows, in different ways, was sometimes the case in revolutionary Mexico
[2007, 1996]). However, I found that my research participants were neither enthusiastic
about any potential opportunities to teach more local history, nor were they very
concerned about how the reforms might affect the content of what is taught and learned
in their classrooms in general (which is part of what makes this project different from the
other anthropology of education projects cited above). Instead, teachers in Honduras are
concerned first and foremost about questions of how to finance education. They are
struggling to meet the basic needs of schooling in the context of widespread poverty and
political uncertainty. They see the reforms as a retreat of the state’s responsibility to fund
the national public education system, and a quintessential example of the fast erosion of
basic public services since the June 2009 military coup.

1.4 Presenting the Reforms from Schoolteachers’
Perspective
The current conflicts between Honduran schoolteachers and the post-coup
governments that have come to power since the violent overthrow of Mel Zelaya are not
simply a matter of teachers asking for a higher salary or better benefits. Rather, Honduran
schoolteachers and their professional associations – the magisterio – are fighting to
defend pre-coup policy achievements passed into earlier legislation, by demanding that
post-coup governments respect those existing laws which they consider progressive and
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that teachers fought to achieve. The reforms aim to override those features of previous
laws that affect teachers’ own salaries, benefits, and working conditions. Moreover, the
reforms bring to the fore the question of whether or not the state should be responsible for
funding the national public education of its citizens, and if so, what exactly this should
entail.
The fact that in this thesis I refer to these reforms as measures that bring Honduras
toward a ‘decentralized’ and ‘privatized’ national public education system requires some
explanation. I am borrowing these descriptions of the reforms – especially the idea that
the reforms promote privatization – from Honduran schoolteachers themselves. In so
doing I am consciously presenting these new laws from a certain perspective, that of
Honduran schoolteachers (although as we will see, their views can be quite
heterogeneous). This practice goes beyond expressing the solidarity I have developed
with the Honduran magisterio. My fieldwork took place during the first school year in
which teachers were expected to abide by and implement these new laws. This meant that
I was learning about the reforms at the same time that teachers themselves were also
continuously endeavouring to make sense of these governing policies – an uneven and
sometimes difficult intellectual process for schoolteachers themselves as the significance
of this new legislation was not always clear to them (cf. Schwegler 2012).
When I would read an official document or law and ask one of my research
participants for clarification about what it meant, I would often find that she or he would
have similar questions, which would then provoke discussion among other teachers about
the significance of a particular article or section of a given law. When I would enquire
about teachers’ opinions or experiences with a certain aspect of these new laws, I would
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similarly find that they were already asking each other comparable questions, learning
from each other’s experiences. It soon became clear to me that Honduran teachers
themselves were struggling to understand these laws, and make sense of the political
environment in which they were working.
I found that teachers were learning about these new education policies not by
carefully reading the actual laws, but by talking with each other about what they
perceived to be the implications. When I asked teachers questions about particular
articles, they would often tell stories of what they or other teachers had experienced
because of the reforms, rather than cite these texts themselves. When teachers referenced
sections of a particular law, I would read through the text myself keeping in mind what
they had said about it. Throughout my fieldwork I carried around with me hard copies of
the laws, and would quickly read through different sections after conducting interviews
(in an effort to understand what teachers were referring to, and to formulate follow-up
questions). Teachers were aware that I had hard copies of the new laws with me and
would often comment to their colleagues that I was someone knowledgeable about the
reforms – even though I was trying to understand these policies from teachers’
perspectives, which required ethnographic enquiry, rather than just reading the laws
themselves. In this sense I became involved in the process through which my research
participants were coming to understand these new policies, as we interpreted these texts
together.
In disseminating my research findings, rather than simply announce the details of
every new law abruptly in this introductory chapter, I have consciously decided to bring
the reader to understand the specifics of the reforms through the ethnographic stories that
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follow. I am choosing to incorporate into my thesis the circumstances through which both
teachers and I were learning about these new laws to illuminate how teachers were
producing knowledge about this legislation among themselves, and taking a political
position on the reforms from their particular perspective as a gremio.
My aim with this writing technique is not to theorize ethnographic research so
much as to illuminate the dynamic processes by which Honduran schoolteachers
themselves navigated through the first year of the reforms. This approach is inspired
primarily by the nature of the realities that I encountered during fieldwork in Honduras in
2012. It is also informed by the general anthropological emphasis on understanding the
lived experiences of a particular group of people, and asking how they understand their
own positions based on the experiences they have had. Moreover, those understandings
also feed into their sense of how they should act in the world and more broadly what is
possible. In this thesis while I aim to present the Honduran education reforms from the
perspective of schoolteachers, I also focus on the heterogeneity of their opinions and
analyze the conflicts that exist among teachers.
In order for my approach to be effective, it is necessary to first explain what
Honduran teachers’ positions entail, and what other possible perspectives could have
been explored. For instance, the continuous disputes between the magisterio and different
governments in power are experienced differently from the perspective of students’
parents who seek to educate their children through this state service. The Sociedad de
Padres de Familia (society of [organized] student parents) has been a key interested party
in the Honduran national public education system, and correspondingly, a group of
people interested in supervising the behaviour of schoolteachers. Since long before the
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current reforms, Honduran teachers have had a somewhat conflict-ridden and volatile
relationship with students’ parents, who (for reasons not unique to Honduras) often
criticize teachers’ work, as well as broader processes associated with public education
that are not always within the direct realm of an individual teacher’s influence but are
nonetheless associated with their positions.
The dimensions of these conflicts are connected to the ambiguous nature of
schoolteachers’ positions in Honduran society. On one level, the profession of
schoolteacher still carries a good deal of prestige locally; parents recognize teachers as
capable community leaders who have made respectable life choices. On another level,
however, given that teachers have quite ambiguous positions as professional workers,
some parents express their sympathy with the fact that teachers are underpaid labourers,
while others consider teachers to be in a position of considerable privilege as salaried
professionals paid by the Ministry of Education. Such stable employment is relatively
uncommon in Honduras. Moreover, while other industries have produced private sector
jobs that have come and gone, the understanding locally is that as government
employees, teachers are in a better position to negotiate their wages and benefits over
time, given that the state will not disappear or re-locate. Such tensions between teachers
and parents intensify during moments of teacher-initiated paros and strikes, and it is
common for parents in Honduras to view teachers’ disputes with the government as
simply a matter of ‘teachers wanting more money.’
Regardless of any solidarity for teachers’ labour struggles that students’ parents
may or may not have, parents’ primary interest is, understandably, to ensure their
children have access to quality education throughout the entire school year. This inherent
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difference in positioning means that the Sociedad de Padres de Familia is usually the
first group of interested parties with whom teachers have conflicts during their labour
disputes with the Ministry of Education and the government in power. Different
Honduran governments, astutely aware of this reality, have sought to take advantage of
the positioning of students’ parents through the promotion of the idea that teachers, and
their pursuit of more money, are to blame for the shortcomings of the education system.
Students, the most direct recipients of this state service, are another group of
people whose standpoint is usually different from that of teachers. Organized students
have the power to withhold their own labour through student paros. This usually happens
in one of two ways: nation-wide student paros, which ultimately have to do with
students’ discontent with the extent to which education funding is satisfying their own
needs and desires; and student paros in particular schools, which usually result from
internal disputes between the particular teachers and students at the school in question.
Honduran teachers have generally been supportive of the first kind of paro, given
that students’ demands for more government funding for education are often compatible
with teachers’ own calls for more government funding. In fact, normal school students
(that is, high school students studying to become teachers) have led most nation-wide
student protests in Honduras. While there was solidarity among normal school and
university students with the magisterio and their critique of these neoliberal reforms,
there were no student-initiated nation-wide paros in Honduras against the reforms at the
time of my fieldwork, despite the fact that we have seen how powerful such movements
have been in other Latin American countries when protesting against neoliberal education
policies (see, for instance, Craib 2010 on students in Chile). This is surprising when we

26

consider that students are ultimately the primary targets of these neoliberal policies in the
long term. Their education system has been significantly altered from what previous
generations experienced. Honduran students are now being asked by the policy designers
(and even by teachers themselves) to contribute toward an education system that will
likely result in more unequal access to secondary schooling, and fewer employment
opportunities for poor students. Telling this story from the perspective of students, and
attempting to understand how their subjectivities are or are not influenced by these
reforms, would however also be a different kind of research project.
In addition to students and their parents, another group of people whose
perspective I am not presenting in this thesis is that of representatives from the Lobo
government and the designers of these neoliberal reforms. From their perspective (as
reflected in public expressions of it), the decentralization of education funding has to do
with making municipal governments take on the “responsibility of promoting education”
and to “adopt the adequate methods of coordination with corresponding education
authorities, so the right of citizens living in their territories to an education is effectively
carried out” (see Article 79, República de Honduras 2012). The new laws describe the
roles of community members, local businesses and NGOs in promoting the national
public education system in a way that, at first appearance, does not necessarily seem like
a bad thing. What does it mean, then, to say that these reforms are ‘decentralizing’ and
‘privatizing’ the national public education system? Given that less involvement from the
central government has, in other contexts, been viewed as a benefit for students, parents,
and even some schoolteachers, why exactly are Honduran schoolteachers so adamantly
against these particular laws?
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Although the reforms describe the supposed benefits associated with receiving
funding from the private sector, they do not explicitly state that the central government
will no longer fund education. Rather, they describe a process in which the central
government’s Ministry of Education transfers funds to regional governments, which are
in turn expected to formulate and operate their own budgets for school infrastructure
projects through a combination of these transferred funds and their own regional revenues
(see República de Honduras 2012).
Despite the fact that the new laws are written in a manner that renders the policies
non-political, this thesis demonstrates how Honduran schoolteachers identify several
problems with this scenario. First and foremost they remind us that departmental and
municipal governments in Honduras are already struggling to fund different types of
necessary infrastructure projects that their populations demand and they are required to
realize (such as the construction and maintenance of local roads, potable water and
sewage systems), without direct support from the central government. Teachers argue
that while richer neighbourhoods do not have as many problems with these basic
necessities, most municipal governments in Honduras are cash-strapped – sometimes
even in debt – and will therefore not be in a position to effectively manage yet another
local project.
In their articulations of the dangers of decentralization, teachers draw upon
previous examples of what has happened in Honduras when the central government has
left it up to municipal governments to deliver basic public services: they contract out to
private companies, which has resulted in more unequal distribution of resources. For
instance, I heard that even in San Pedro Sula (the country’s industrial centre), the
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municipal government privatized the potable water service, and the private company in
charge said it would not be profitable for them to deliver water to certain rural
communities. Teachers frequently talk of poor municipalities in need of financial
assistance from the central government in order to manage the public services they are
already in charge of delivering. Drawing on this kind of empirical evidence, teachers
have developed an argument about how in Honduras, the process of ‘decentralization’
means ‘privatization’ in practice, because municipal governments cannot manage such
responsibilities by themselves. For teachers it is thus not necessarily decentralization
itself that is problematic, but the fact that this implies asking private enterprises to
become the primary funders of what has formerly been a public (centralized) education
system. Given Honduras’ vast socio-economic inequities, teachers argue that this
scenario will lead to the rich benefiting from a situation that further marginalizes the
poor, a process they are most adamantly against.
Teachers recognize that the central government has also been responsible for
privatizing other basic services on a national level (and has been interested in privatizing
the national telecommunications and electric companies since the coup). However the
understanding among schoolteachers is that such privatization schemes are more likely to
succeed as decentralization is extended. They argue that this will especially be the case in
poorer municipalities, since residents in richer areas will not see the need to protest
against privatization in distant poorer areas. They argue that it is easier for the Honduran
population to come together as a whole and defend national public education if
everyone’s equal access to this basic public service is at stake (not just that of residents
from certain municipalities) – thus they see decentralization as a form of undermining
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both struggle and solidarity (and thus deeply political). This is the area of teachers’
discord with the reforms that most often conjures support among parents and students
alike.
The other major concern Honduran teachers have with the decentralization and
privatization project is the potential for funding for their own salaries to also come from
individual municipalities and private companies (from which they now already seek
financial support for their school infrastructure and academic programs). Convincing
disgruntled parents of the negative implications of this aspect of the reforms is more
8

difficult for teachers, especially since many parents view private schooling as a viable
alternative to an unstable public education system.
As of 2012, the education money allotted for departmental and municipal
governments to manage was not used to pay teachers’ salaries – the largest expenditure of
the national public education system. (During my fieldwork, teachers’ salaries still came
from the central offices of the Ministry of Education in Tegucigalpa.) Rather, the
transferred money is supposed to be used for all the other expenses that schools require,
such as infrastructure projects and education-based initiatives, for which different schools
must compete with each other to receive any of these funds. While this was the extent of
the decentralization process at the time of this research, teachers frequently mentioned
that they suspect municipal governments will also soon be in charge of paying their

8

This research project specifically sought the opinions and experiences of teachers who work in public schools, given
that the reforms primarily affect how the public school system is funded. Nevertheless, several of my research
participants had additional jobs in private schools, or had worked in private schools in the past. Teachers reflect upon
these experiences in the process of forming their opinions about the dangers of a privatized school system. They are
well aware that private schools pay teachers significantly less, and the owners do not hesitate to fire teachers who
attempt to organize paros or strikes. As one teacher told me: “All private companies exploit their workers. With the
direction of these reforms, soon we will all be screwed!”
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salaries as well. For teachers, the same logic behind how decentralization leads to
privatization also applies to their salaries.
Honduran schoolteachers are arguing that the decentralization and privatization of
funding will lead to more inequalities among different schools, and also among teachers
themselves. This understanding was explicit in teachers’ arguments that the Lobo
government was attempting to dissolve teachers’ professional associations with these
reforms and weaken the magisterio. From teachers’ perspective, their organizations
would no longer be able to conjure support for nation-wide labour struggles if their
salaries and benefits were no longer uniform. These understandings are based on previous
experiences in which different governments have in fact paid off teachers in select
9

regions as a strategic manoeuvre to end nation-wide strikes early, thereby creating
divisions within the magisterio and weakening their capacities to organize on a national
level. Under these conceptualizations of the dangers involved with the decentralization of
education funding, teachers who work in non-central regions of Honduras are particularly
vulnerable. The south is one such region, and in 2012 teachers there were asking: if
fellow teachers in other regions of the country are being paid completely and punctually,
and we are not, why would they risk their jobs with a paro or a strike just to support us?

1.5 Fieldwork: Locating the South in Contemporary
Honduras
Southern Honduras is an important field site for studying these recent changes to
funding the national public education system given that within Honduras this region is

9

One frequently-mentioned example of this practice was when the government of Ricardo Maduro paid off teachers in
the central department of Francisco Morazán during a nation-wide strike between June and August 2004.
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characterized by higher levels of poverty and population growth, and thus will likely not
be as competitive within the decentralized funding system. The departments of Valle and
Choluteca have been relatively marginal to broader processes of state formation in
Honduras historically, in part because government revenues have depended more upon
the export of silver ores from the central regions and bananas from the north coast.
This historical context is especially interesting for studying the effects of the
decentralization of education funds, as local elites and municipal governments of noncentral regions now have on the one hand, more autonomy in making decisions regarding
teachers’ role in public education (and how they are to successfully acquire those funds),
yet likely less funding overall to promote local priorities, given their peripheral economic
position. While as a nation-wide group of workers Honduran teachers criticize the
reforms and feel that they will be a step in the wrong direction for the country’s national
public education system, teachers in non-central regions – such as the south – arguably
face a much more immediate threat since they work in a region already known for its
relative poverty.
The Honduran south was characterized by privately-owned profit-oriented
domestic agricultural traditions, preceding the introduction of coffee, with marginal
integration into the country’s export economy since the colonial period. However, in the
environment of the internationally-financed development projects following the Second
World War, southern Honduras underwent rapid socioeconomic, demographic, and
ecological changes (Stonich 1991: 133). By the 1950s and 1960s the Honduran state
encouraged a specific type of economic growth in the southern region as a part of the
country’s expanding export economy. This has primarily consisted in producing crops for
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the US market. The infrastructure of Honduras’ only functional Pacific port facility, el
Puerto de Henecán in San Lorenzo, along with that of the Pan-American Highway
(which runs through the Honduran south, connecting El Salvador with Nicaragua) was
vastly improved through World Bank and Inter-Development Bank development loans
(Stonich 1991: 138). Prior to these changes, southern landowners and local capitalists had
been unable to respond to favourable economic conditions due to the lack of necessary
infrastructure and inputs such as transportation, markets, and credit (Stonich 1991: 138).
These development loans enabled the previous governments to make infrastructure
changes in the south to incorporate the region’s commodities into Honduras’ expanding
export economy. Those land-poor and landless peasants unable to produce enough for
their own subsistence needs became the new wage labourers in the south, involved in this
export economy as agricultural workers, usually by sending at least one family member
to work on the estates while others participated in subsistence farming.
As early as the mid-1950s, but especially in the 1970s, large foreign companies
began to compete with local capitalists for land and labour. From the 1950s through the
middle of the 1980s, the southern region produced cotton, livestock, and sugar for the
world economy, but by the mid-1970s – in part due to the decline in global prices for
these products – such commodities were replaced by sesame seeds, cantaloupe melons,
and non-traditional exports such as industrial shrimp farming (Stonich 1991: 138,139).
Southern Honduras did not experience population growth at as rapid a rate as the rest of
the country did from the 1940s. This was in part due to the higher rates of both infant
mortality and out-migration, but also because access to land was limited for small and
medium scale agriculturalists, and instead was dominated by large capitalist landholdings
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(Stonich 1991: 139). The region continues to have a marginal position in the national
economy.
Despite this history of marginality and continual relative poverty, in 2012 the
south was declared a ‘model region’ by the Lobo government for its potential to increase
production of export crops (including cantaloupe melons, watermelons, sugarcane, and
shrimp, as well as zucchini, jalapeños, and cashews – the kinds of enterprises from which
schoolteachers in the region are now expected to secure funding). The situation resonates
with what Aiwa Ong identifies as “zoning technologies” in Southeast Asia (2006).
In the Honduran south this is occurring in large part due to its strategic location of
access to the Pacific Ocean, El Salvador, and Nicaragua (see SEPLAN 2012). In its
‘national plan’ and ‘country vision’ the Lobo regime envisions Honduras as most
productive when divided into sixteen different ‘development regions’ (see Artículo 5,
SEPLAN 2009; República de Honduras 2004). Schoolteachers understand the project of
decentralization of education funding as connected to a broader project of the Lobo
regime to decentralize other aspects of the economy by having each of these regions
specialize in particular forms of production. Some teachers fear that this type of initiative
will eventually lead to an over-emphasis in education oriented toward training workers
for the specific type of export-processing zones that the Lobo government envisions.
Although in 2012 schoolteachers’ primary concerns were with funding for education and
not curriculum design, training students to work in the export industry is neither the type
of governing policies they agree with nor the kind of educational system they have sought
to forge. The specificities of how the Honduran schoolteachers I work with identified the
most problematic aspects of the reforms are partly a reflection of the region where they
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are working. The south is marginal economically, but the teachers who participated in my
study were not working with students of ethnic or linguistic minorities, as is
commonplace in departments such as the Bay Islands or La Mosquitia. Teachers in other
regions of Honduras may well have identified other areas of the decentralization project
as problematic, and for other kinds of reasons specific to the regions where they work.
Indeed, they may have even found that decentralization represented an opportunity to
make education there more culturally-relevant to their students; this was not the case in
southern Honduras.

1.6 Research Methods: Studying the Work of State Agents
For this PhD project I spent twelve months living in San Lorenzo, Valle,
conducting anthropological fieldwork among schoolteachers from January through
December 2012. The period of my fieldwork thus matched the Honduran school year,
which runs from the beginning of February through the end of November. I was therefore
in a good position to be able to observe how teachers navigated through the entire first
school year in which they were expected to abide by and implement these new neoliberal
education laws. When I arrived in January, teachers were already interpreting the implicit
and explicit messages of the Lobo government in their analyses of the education reforms.
They were worried about their job security, the cuts to their benefits, and what they
interpreted as largely unachievable goals to increase academic standards since the
government was not willing to pay the cost of such improvements. As teachers planned
the upcoming school year, it became clear to me that the best way to study these
processes was by accompanying my research participants in their daily routines – both at
formal work-related events and informal social gatherings.
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Since classes had still not begun in January, it was easy for me to seek invitations
to various types of social gatherings that teachers were engaged in during this vacation
period. I found that teachers were spending a good portion of their leisure time gathering
ideas from each other about what these reforms would mean for their everyday work. At
teachers’ homes and in public spaces – such as at the beach, at restaurants, in shopping
malls, and at market places – teachers looked to fellow teachers for advice on what they
planned to do during the 2012 school year. In this sense, teachers’ coordination of workrelated activities frequently happens in spaces beyond the actual school premises, while
‘off the clock.’ I therefore began my research on the everyday work of teachers in these
informal social gatherings, where teachers spent a surprisingly large amount of time
talking about and planning the various tasks they would do at their schools. Through
these initial conversations with teachers in informal social settings, I would receive
recommendations about whom I should interview and invitations to other gatherings
among teachers in the region. The news of my research project had begun to spread, and
teachers were enthusiastic about talking with me over food and drinks; I received far
more invitations to social gatherings than I had anticipated. While this practice remained
a vital aspect of my fieldwork throughout the year, I later realized (and was persuaded by
teachers themselves), that if I wanted to understand teachers’ work, I would have to
spend time with them at their formal places of employment, their schools.
Admittedly, I had initially underestimated how useful it would be for me to
develop a daily routine inside the premises of schools. I had assumed that the majority of
my participant observation would take place outside of schools, and I had only imagined
myself going to schools when the teachers I sought to interview told me it would be the
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most convenient place for us to talk. I was already aware that schools in Honduras are
fairly restricted areas (despite the fact that they are built on what is considered public
land, or property of the state). The properties of Honduran schools have brick walls,
barbed-wire fences, and armed security guards on the perimeters; students, students’
parents, and suspicious teachers on the inside. Since Honduran teachers are well aware
that their work is subject to public criticism, they are understandably wary of the regular
presence of outsiders in their places of work. While many visitors come and go,
individuals who have a regular presence at schools in Honduras are those who have
legitimate business there – usually in the form of some sort of financial benefit for the
school itself. ‘No es cualquiera que entra’ (it’s not just anybody who comes in) as
teachers in Honduras commonly say.
Even beyond Honduras, conducting ethnographic research in schools is
problematic. As education anthropologist Bradley Levinson puts it:
Methodologically and ethically… schools are difficult places to study. They
have gatekeepers from whom permission must be secured. They often require a
difficult negotiation of structurally opposed interests and alliances. Such
conditions may threaten the sustained observations and interviews needed to
construct a compelling interpretation of the effects of schooling. Thus, the model
of solitary ethnography makes the study of schooling more daunting… (1999:
599).

The fact that I had no intention of conducting research among students, the parents of
students, or any other interested parties in education except for teachers themselves
perhaps made this a little easier. The ‘gatekeepers’ welcomed me into their workplaces
because they understood what my research entailed; because I communicated to them my
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solidarity with their labour struggles; and because they knew that I would only be
conducting research among them and they could determine what information to share
with me.
School directors were the primary figures of authority from whom permission
needed to be initially secured and maintained throughout the school year. As school
administrators they were also individuals whose daily activities were of much interest to
me, given that they bear the majority of the burden if they as managers fail to secure the
funding required to maintain their schools.

10

I secured permission to conduct regular

research at two different schools, one in a rural community located roughly 15 kilometers
outside of San Lorenzo, and one in the city proper. This allowed me to compare and
contrast rural and urban settings, and to become exposed to many more schoolteachers
beyond my social networks in San Lorenzo. It also permitted observation and
participation in formal work-related meetings in which teachers would discuss their
various school projects and daily administrative tasks.
At both schools, teachers asked me to assist with teaching English classes (which
I had neither interest nor experience in doing, but I complied nonetheless because the
teachers with whom I worked believed it would be useful for them). In the rural setting
this consisted of helping to design and lead an extra-curricular ‘English club,’ while in
the urban setting I answered questions about grammar and vocabulary that English
teachers had, and would give lectures about English whenever asked to do so. On average
I spent two working days at each school per week. Whenever I committed to volunteer

10
Throughout this thesis I thus distinguish between general teachers and school administrators, who sometimes also
taught classes, but who were responsible for managing a staff. I refer to the latter as school directors or sub-directors,
whose positions are similar to principals and vice-principals in North America.
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with an English-teaching activity, I followed through with the exact schedule of that
obligation, coordinating between both schools such that there was no conflict between
my English volunteering activities. Aside from those commitments, however, it was
understood that I would come and go as my schedule permitted. (I quickly developed a
positive relationship with the security guards at both schools who would unlock the gates
whenever they saw me arrive.) Teachers at these two schools comprised the majority of
my total number of research participants (which in the end amounted to 38 individuals).
However, since I would often receive invitations to other events from schoolteachers who
did not work at these schools, it was understood that I would have a sporadic schedule
throughout the school year.
As educated professionals themselves who work in the area of education, my
research participants loved the fact that I hold university degrees. Overall they were
enthusiastic about being a part of my research process; they took an interest in what my
PhD degree requirements were, and frequently asked me what I planned to do upon
graduating. However, conducting fieldwork among professionals at their places of work
also implied learning when they seemed occupied with other tasks – sensing when it was
best to leave them to their work – and finding the methodologically-appropriate ways of
letting them know that in the meantime I was perfectly happy to sit by myself in the
courtyard with my pen and notebook in hand. Navigating through teachers’ work spaces
at these schools was a learning process in and of itself, and I explicitly told everyone that
I would never want to interrupt their duties. This meant that while on the school
premises, the moments in which I could sit down and talk with teachers were during
recess, over lunch, and during school-wide activities and celebrations, as well as at
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formal work-related meetings when I was invited to participate.
I also received invitations to accompany teachers from these schools to various
work-related events that occurred off the school’s premises, happening at least twice per
week (a reflection of how mobile teachers are in their everyday work). Honduran
schoolteachers often have meetings with supervisors, students’ parents, or other local
interested parties at locations other than their schools. Throughout the school year I
received invitations to travel with teachers who worked at these two schools as well those
who I had met previously through social gatherings. Most often this included: visiting
rural communities where their students lived, to participate in events such as soccer
matches, funerals and wakes, and celebrations of different kinds; going to regional
Ministry of Education offices in Nacaome, Valle, and magisterio-related offices in
Tegucigalpa; attending meetings between teachers and representatives of local businesses
(such as banks, law practices, and NGOs) when teachers’ interactions with these entities
were relevant to their work; and attending events at other schools in the region where
teachers gathered for assemblies of different kinds, and formal work-related meetings
with colleagues.
I also received invitations to attend university classes from some of my closest
research participants who were taking these courses in pursuit of undergraduate degrees
at the regional Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras UNAH (the National
Autonomous University of Honduras) campus in Choluteca, and the regional Universidad
Pedagógica Nacional Francisco Morazán UPNFM (Francisco Morazán National
Pedagogical University) campus in Nacaome. At these universities my research
participants introduced me to the course instructors who allowed me to present myself
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and my research project to the entire class. I was then granted permission to sit in on the
class and take notes about their conversations and class topics, although I only engaged a
few of the teachers present in further conversations as research participants.
These university classes were designed to teach Honduran schoolteachers how
the reforms would affect their work lives, including how to go about soliciting funds
locally. While I attended five different university courses periodically during my
fieldwork, in this thesis I draw upon two of these courses in particular: Macro-Educación
(Macro Education) from the UNAH, and Gestión y Administración Educativa (Education
Management and Administration) from the UPNFM. Throughout the year opportunities
for various activities arose at short notice, and I often received last-minute invitations to
travel somewhere with teachers. I determined that having access to a vehicle was
essential for me to conduct this kind of research, given that buses do not travel to many of
these rural locations, and taxi drivers are also unwilling to travel to the range of different
locations that I would visit during the course of one day. Having a car also made it
possible for me to offer to drive my research participants to various locations, which
presented new opportunities for me.
The nature of this type of anthropological fieldwork represents a significant
departure from the more place-bound ethnographies of a particular geographic
community. My research participants resided and worked throughout the Honduran south
– mainly in the Department of Valle, but also in parts of Choluteca. Some even lived in
the southern regions of the Department of Francisco Morazán, from which they would
commute south to their schools. Nearly all of my research participants had daily
commutes of more than a half-hour drive, in addition to their activities outside of the
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schools where they taught. In order to study teachers’ work ethnographically, I had to
keep up with their mobility and become quite mobile myself.
As with any ethnographic research project, the participants in my study do not
represent a random sample of Honduran schoolteachers. Rather, they are individuals who
expressed a particular interest in my project, who were eager to offer me their opinions,
and who were able to assist me in carrying out my fieldwork. I began the research by
talking with teachers who I already knew through previous experiences in the region. My
involvement in the Honduran south dates back to the summer of 2001. That year I
participated in a US-based volunteer program which partners with the Honduran offices
of the multinational NGO Save the Children. I spent the summer living with a host family
in a poor rural community in Valle, promoting the public health projects of the NGO,
learning Spanish, and participating in daily activities of community life.
In the summer of 2004 I returned to Valle to work directly with these NGO
officials in the Pacific port city of San Lorenzo and to supervise the projects of US
volunteers in four rural communities on the outskirts of town. During each of these
experiences I came to know some schoolteachers, as they are often the primary contacts
for NGOs and government agencies that attempt to deliver services in such rural
communities. Together we coordinated projects in their schools and in the rural
communities where the NGO worked. In so doing I became friends with several of these
teachers from the rural schools, many of whom lived in San Lorenzo proper.
It was through this initial network of teachers who collaborated with the NGO
that I was introduced to the Honduran woman whom I would later marry, herself a
normal school graduate and daughter of two schoolteachers in the region (who were quite
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well-known in the prime of their careers). As this relationship developed I returned
regularly to Honduras for personal visits, before deciding to do my MA thesis research
there during the summer of 2009. My research participants in that project were wideranging and included people who I had already known in San Lorenzo and the rural
communities where I previously conducted NGO work.
The unexpected events of that summer then led to an MA thesis on political
culture and the different lived experiences with, and varied perceptions of, the June 2009
coup. If I had not been part of a Honduran family at that time and someone who was
recognized as having enduring ties to the country, I suspect that people would have been
much less willing to speak freely to me about their views on sensitive political issues
(much less during a moment of sudden political change and considerable uncertainty).
Rather than merely an outside observer, I was working alongside my research
participants to try to understand together what the coup might mean to all of us.
My doctoral research project is an organic outgrowth of all my prior experiences
in the Honduran south. Methodologically my ability to gain access to the social and
political worlds of the schoolteachers whose lives I write about in this dissertation was
facilitated by my on-going kinship ties and my personal experiences of having lived
through the coup among Honduran family members in the south. I believe that my longterm involvement in the region facilitated the permission I was granted to conduct
research at these two schools, and the strong levels of trust that teachers have granted me
when sharing details of their work. Part of this has to do with my personal connections
(to a family of schoolteachers from the region), and previous NGO experience among
schoolteachers. However, the most important aspect of gaining the trust and enthusiasm
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of my research participants had to do with the fact that I was in Honduras during the
coup, and chose to express my support for the Resistencia movement rather than the
violent overthrow of President Mel Zelaya.
Neither I nor my research participants considered me to be a neutral outside
observer during my doctoral fieldwork. My background and previous experiences
influenced the types of relationships that I was able to form, and my own opinions and
perceptions of the events that took place. I cannot imagine conducting ethnographic
research into political phenomena in any other way, much less in polarized post-coup
Honduras, and especially not at the workplaces of well-known Resistencia leaders. In this
thesis I therefore explain, where appropriate, how my previous experiences and personal
connections, as well as my solidarity with the Resistencia movement, influenced the
types of relationships that I was able to cultivate among teachers. In Chapter 4, for
instance, I describe the details of how I came to do research at the rural school, a process
which illuminates not only my methodological approach, but some of the ways in which
Honduran schoolteachers are currently developing personal relationships with individuals
who they suspect might be able to assist them in some way.
Honduran teachers go about doing business and seeking local support for their
schools in the context of pressures they face to show local interested parties that they are
being innovative and resourceful. In this regard, they often saw my presence in their
schools during the first year of the reforms as advantageous. The fact that I was willing to
help (however minimally) with English teaching endeavours meant that my research
participants would often emphasize this aspect of my presence over others when
introducing me to their superiors from departmental Ministry offices and potential
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funders of different kinds. All teachers, students, and students’ parents who had a regular
presence at the school were aware of my research project among teachers, and intentions
to write a thesis about the Honduran magisterio as a student of anthropology in Canada.
At both schools I was formally introduced during school-wide assemblies and
formal meetings at the beginning of the school year. And I always answered completely
and honestly all questions that anyone had about my presence, even if that person was not
a schoolteacher. However, throughout the school year I left it up to my research
participants themselves to decide upon the most appropriate (and useful) ways to
introduce me to their superiors, visitors of various kinds, and local interested parties who
could potentially audit their work. Teachers thus often chose to introduce me to regional
political authorities, local business owners (as well as police officers and armed forces
personnel), as a ‘friend of the school’ who was helping to teach English.
Given the history of US military and Peace Corps-initiated construction projects
and English classes at Honduran schools (not to mention my own previous NGO work
which involved similar activities), this was an easily understandable explanation for my
presence. In certain instances my presence as a foreigner was grouped together in the
same category as volunteers from the Japanese development organization (Japan
International Cooperation Agency, JICA),
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who taught mathematics classes at both

schools. On various occasions, the directors from the rural school boasted to their
superiors that they were not only abiding by the reforms, but were in fact exceeding
expectations to promote their school in the local context, given that they had ‘two foreign
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This organization’s website, its mission and vision statement for their work in Honduras can be seen at:
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/mission/index.html
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volunteers’ working at their school. I always chose to respect the choices of my research
participants when describing to their superiors why I was at their schools, and then
answered any questions interested parties had about my presence (which were usually
quite minimal after having been introduced by the school directors themselves).
Similarly, when I would receive invitations to events for teachers outside of their
schools, I opted to let my research participants describe to other teachers the fact that I
support the Resistencia movement (which they were always eager to do). This was
especially important when attending magisterio assemblies in which teachers would
discuss their strategies for withholding their labour to pressure the Lobo government to
reverse these laws, and in those where they simply sought to learn about the implications
of the reforms.
Teachers’ assemblies essentially take two different forms: 1) informative
assemblies, in which representatives from teachers’ professional organizations give
Power Point presentations about the reforms, and answer questions about different
policies affecting the education system, while offering suggestions about what their
colleagues should do; and 2) assemblies before a paro, in which magisterio leaders rally
support and enthusiasm among teachers right before they take to the streets for a formal
protest. As my closest research participants told me, these second kinds of assemblies
would be dangerous for me to attend without their company, and without first being
introduced to their leaders as someone in solidarity with teachers and with the anti-coup
Resistencia movement. They explained to me that at these events teachers are especially
cautions of infiltrators – of Honduran or foreign origin – who spy on their organizing
activities and then report back to the government in power about teachers’ strategies for a
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given paro.

12

I heeded their suggestions.

While I attended several assemblies of this kind, my closest research participants
(and family members) advised me not to participate in the actual protests themselves. As
my friends took to the streets, I made the prudent (although sometimes difficult) decision
of returning home. I chose to not participate in the protests because the aims of my
research did not depend upon it – in fact the protests themselves were not an everyday
occurrence but more of an extra-ordinary event, happening about once every other month
– and because the Honduran national police and armed forces would almost always break
up teachers’ protests on the streets, usually by arresting protesters, and often through the
use of violence. I knew that being arrested or becoming a victim of violence would bring
my fieldwork to an abrupt end and I therefore chose not to participate in these protests.
This same type of prudent behaviour guided other decisions about accompanying
teachers to certain events, especially those that involved drinking alcohol in public spaces
at night.

1.7 A Word on Violence
By many estimates, Honduras is currently the most violent country on the planet.
According to a recent United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, Honduras has an
estimated homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants (UNODC 2013: 24). While
political violence has been endemic since at least the 1980s, it is clear that Honduras’

12

Honduran teachers take such spying on their organizations quite seriously, and have been known to retaliate. In one
instance they made an infiltrator walk through the streets of Tegucigalpa in just his underwear (see, for instance, this
video clip about teachers from The Real News:
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=6635). My
research participants told their leaders who I was, and that I supported their struggles and those of the Resistencia, in
order to avoid any instances of this sort.
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homicide rate has increased since the June 2009 coup. Different kinds of leaders of the
Resistencia movement – including teachers, but also students, lawyers, journalists, gender
equality activists, unemployed young men, labour activists, and peasants – have been
particularly targeted by the state’s security apparatuses and by the private security forces
of large landowners. Although none of the teachers with whom I worked became victims
of actual bloodshed themselves, on an average monthly basis at least one of my research
participants would talk of someone she or he knew who was recently murdered. The
subject was often on people’s minds in some way or another.
This situation resonates with the work of anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom on
how violence is experimental and fluid, how it shapes realities, reconfigures social worlds
and can be “made” and “unmade” (2007 [1997]: 251; see also Nordstrom 2004; Scarry
1985). Fellow scholars of Honduran political processes have illuminated how meaning is
ascribed to the everyday effects of violence in Honduras, as violence destroys the future
and devastates long-term plans, which are contingent upon not becoming victim to the
violence (see, for example, Boyer and Peñalva 2013; Phillips 2013, 2011; Pine 2011,
2009, 2008; Wolseth 2011, 2008). These valuable contributions underscore Hondurans’
preoccupations for what happens today and for what tomorrow might bring – issues that
have become quite urgent in the post-coup context.
Despite the importance of this topic, my objectives here are different. This thesis
is not about studying the on-going effects of violence in Honduras. Rather, I wish to
examine the processes through which people criticize and challenge oppressive policies
while imagining, and taking actions toward, creating a brighter future. The 2012 school
year was a key moment in which the post-coup Honduran government withdrew some of
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schoolteachers’ basic rights as educated professional workers. It was however also an
opportunity for teachers to reflect on what types of collective values they have as a group,
and what are the most effective strategies to realize the broader political projects of the
Resistencia and LIBRE Party. As members of the political movement that promises ‘state
re-foundation’ and radical changes to policies of governance and state practices in
general, schoolteachers were in a unique position to continue forging the revolutionary
spirit this movement has conjured. Here I hope to capture the ways in which this group of
front-line state agents creatively and opportunistically took political action during a
particular historical moment characterized not only by violence and political crisis, but
also by glimpses of enthusiasm and hope.

1.8 Chapter Layout
In the following chapter I locate the June 2009 coup in a broader historical
context, and highlight specific processes that have interested scholars of Honduran
political culture, drawing on some of the conclusions from my MA thesis. In this first
core chapter I also connect my doctoral research with distinct research topics that have
interested other scholars of Honduran history and politics since the 2009 coup. This
background information about the immediate effects of the coup and what sorts of social
and political processes characterized daily life in Honduras in 2012 is necessary to
understand the political environment in which the education reforms took place. Chapter
3 illustrates some of the ways in which teachers’ own experiences with the education
system and the state have forged their vested interests in the validity of state services in
general. Through life histories and official narratives of the history of this career and its
labour achievements, I show how experiences with these previous historical periods
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(when the state’s approach to national public education was quite different) have become
essential to teachers’ interpretations of the current reforms.
From these two historically-oriented chapters we move to my ethnographic
narrative of the 2012 school year (which I present in a loosely chronological fashion
throughout the remainder of the thesis). In Chapter 4 I show how teachers were preparing
for the beginning of the school year, and reading the political landscape in which the
reforms were going to take place. I describe the circumstances in which I came to do
research at both schools, and in the process I show the ways in which teachers selectively
began to implement the reforms, recognizing full well that the overall neoliberal spirit
was not in their best interest, but that certain aspects of the laws could be useful given the
circumstances they were already dealing with in trying to find ways to meet the basic
needs of public schooling. Here I begin to show how teachers were pushing the limits of
what was intended by these new laws, in order to further their own agendas at their
schools. Whereas Chapter 4 underscores how teachers secured funding for basic
infrastructure projects, Chapter 5 analyzes the co-dependent relationship among teachers
and politicians to reveal how funding reaches primary schools in practice, and what
innovative decisions teachers were making while both abiding by the reforms and trying
to meet local expectations for what the education system should be providing.
While Chapters 4 and 5 begin to show how teachers were developing visions for a
different kind of national public education system, Chapter 6 illuminates some of the key
obstacles to achieving that project by examining areas of conflict and discord within the
magisterio. It presents different aspects of teachers’ everyday work in rather mundane
contexts in order to understand how such conflicts intersected with the political
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environment of the reforms. In Chapter 7 I examine the ways that teachers’ resistance to
the reforms and ideas for what constitutes a better education system intersected with the
development of their opinions about what constitutes good governance and proper state
practices. Here I explore how schoolteachers’ experiences during the 2012 school year
informed their understandings of what state practices in general should be like in
Honduras with Resistencia/LIBRE-initiated re-foundation projects. This final core
chapter analyzes how teachers’ collective actions and daily acts of resistance were
merging into broader collective struggles to form distinct political paths to the future.
In the concluding chapter I present the reader with an update to Honduran
schoolteachers’ situation after the November 2013 presidential and congressional
elections, bringing together the central arguments of this thesis with the significance of
these data to show their relevance for the anthropological study of politics and the state. I
then suggest future avenues of research for an engaged anthropology of Honduran
political culture and Latin American state formation.
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2

Locating the 2009 Military Coup in Honduran History

2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the major themes in Honduran history that
are relevant for my subsequent analyses of schoolteachers’ everyday work in the postcoup political environment. I begin by describing the general history of Honduras in the
19th century, leading up to the 1870-1930 period of Liberal economic reforms, with a
specific focus on the relevance of Honduras’ concessionary development policies. From
there I analyze some of Honduras’ development strategies in the 20th century following
the Second World War, and analyze the importance of Honduras’ geopolitical position
during the Cold War. This history serves as a platform from which I move to describe the
significance of the government of Mel Zelaya and the national political environment
leading up to the June 2009 coup, drawing on some of the conclusions of my MA
research about diverse attempts to make sense of this sudden political change, precisely
through reflection on this recent history. I then describe the context in which the
Resistencia emerged and people in the south became active in the movement, as well as
the subsequent formation of the LIBRE Party. I finish by connecting this recent history
with ongoing themes since the 2009 coup, situating my doctoral thesis in relation to other
research in the social sciences on political processes in post-coup Honduras.
This chapter thus aims to describe general historical characteristics of Honduras
in order to lay the groundwork for illuminating the significance of the FNRP and LIBRE
Party. It does not claim to be a substantive overview of Honduran history. Rather, I am
interested in sketching certain political processes with broad strokes by drawing
selectively on secondary literature and my own previous research. This will serve as
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necessary background information for understanding the post-coup political environment
in which schoolteachers were navigating the reforms in the 2012 school year. One of the
arguments of this thesis is that schoolteachers are approaching the implementation of
these reforms and developing visions for what the state should become with refoundation through reflection on Honduras’ past, as they image what possibilities the
future could bring and take action toward what they think that future should entail.

2.2 Historical Characteristics of Honduras
In order to present nuanced arguments about the significance of the 2009 coup,
the Resistencia, and schoolteachers’ everyday work, we must first begin with basic
information about this Central American country. Contemporary Honduras is a republic
of approximately 112,090 square kilometres, divided into 18 different departments. Its
northern, sea-level Caribbean coast borders with Guatemala (to the west) and Nicaragua
(to the east); the much smaller southern Pacific coast borders El Salvador (to the west)
and Nicaragua (to the east). Coastal plains and a mountainous interior with deep valleys

13

characterize Honduras’ tropical, humid geography. The country has a population of
approximately 8.6 million with a negative net migration ratio of about -1.18 for every
1,000 persons per year. Roughly 60 percent of Hondurans live below the poverty line,
and about 52 percent of Hondurans live in urban centres. The literacy rate is roughly 85.1
percent, and the average Honduran is schooled for 11 years in the national education
system (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). Honduras has also been considered one of
the poorest places in Latin America since the colonial period.

13

Spanish colonizers named the country ‘Honduras’ for its deep valleys – ‘ondo’ means ‘deep’ in Spanish.
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Unlike other areas of Spanish America, the Central American isthmus was never a
significant source of precious metals for the Spanish colonizers. Rather, indigo and cacao
became the two primary products of the region’s colonial economy, the labour for which
came from the indigenous population through a system of encomienda.

14

In Honduras,

some silver was found, and the diseases brought by Spanish colonists to the mining towns
of Comayagua and Tegucigalpa devastated Honduras’ already relatively small indigenous
population (Lapper 1985: 17-18). The combination of disease, tropical lowland climates,
floods, landslides, and the lack of deep-water anchorage sites contributed to the
difficulties of establishing Caribbean ports in Honduras. All of these factors made
Honduras a ‘backwater’ or ‘no-man’s land’ of the Spanish Empire.
After gaining independence from the Spanish Crown in 1821, Honduras was one
of five countries comprising the United Provinces of Central America, a new nation
“born in debt,” owing five million pesos after absolute independence was declared
(Euraque 1996: 3). Elite Conservative wealth in Honduras derived principally from a
tobacco factory near Comayagua, silver ores exploited near Tegucigalpa,
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and a

domestic cattle market. Moreover, mining encouraged cattle raising in central and
southern Honduras to supply meat, leather products, candles, and mules. Salt was
exploited from the southern Pacific coasts for the process of smelting precious metals
(MacLeod 1973: 261).
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This is where the Spanish Crown granted a conquistador, and then subsequently a criollo (person of Spanish descent
born in the new world), the ability to collect tribute and labour from a particular indigenous population. As the
encomendero he would then have to take responsibility for the population’s health and wellbeing, and provide
instruction about Catholocism.
15
Hondurans have told me that ‘Tegucigalpa’ means ‘silver hill’ in Nahuatl. The exploitation of such silver ores
served as justification for Tegucigalpa becoming the nation’s capital.
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While the Conservatives wanted to continue a monopolistic trading system for
their own benefit, a middle sector emerged that wanted free trade and a confederation
based on the North American model (Woodward 1985: 91, 94). Since independence, the
subject of unity among the five states to form a more powerful economic and political
system for the isthmus became a Liberal project, for which Honduran General Francisco
Morazán was instrumental, fighting against several Conservative Guatemalan leaders
who opposed union. His defeat in 1840 under Conservative rule led to the rupture of the
United Provinces into five separate autonomous states; the idea of political union
continues to be debated in modern Central America (Woodward 1985: 111).
Following the breakup of the United Provinces, Honduras entered an economic
crisis even worse than when Central America as a whole separated from Spain, and the
government struggled with immense financial difficulties in the process of initial state
formation. There was still no clear sense of nation in Honduras at the time. The economic
crisis and high unemployment levels experienced under Conservative rule (from
independence up until the 1870s) created a weakening of these traditional economic elites
and thus an opening for subaltern groups. This increased support for Liberalism.
Between the 1870s and 1930s, Honduras experienced a series of Liberal military
dictatorships managing centralized, executive-run governments aimed at significantly
developing the country’s export economy by passing legislation which favoured export
production and the entrance of foreign capital (in congruence with a broader regional
phenomenon during roughly this same time period). In Honduras these reforms resulted
in a particular set of labour relations, land tenure, and governing policies toward
economic development in Honduras.
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Philosophically, the New Liberals of Honduras were positivist-oriented thinkers,
and their economic policies thus were aimed toward ‘scientific material progress.’ While
the social theories, political, and economic projects of ‘Liberalism’ were intellectual
ideas originating from Europe, in the Latin American context they took on new meaning
as the philosophy was applied “in countries which were highly stratified, socially and
racially, and economically underdeveloped, and in which the tradition of centralized
government authority ran deep. In short, these ideas were applied in an environment
which was resistant and hostile, and which in some cases engendered a strong opposing
ideology of conservatism” (Hale 1989: 226). This was especially the case in Central
America and the introduction of Liberalism was a contested process, largely impossible
under Conservative Guatemala (Woodward 1985: 111).
In Honduras Liberal intellectuals saw access to foreign capital as the means to
carry out significant economic reforms and “make up for lost time” (Meza 1991: ix). The
sparsely-populated national territory provoked images of vast untouched natural
resources, and inspired the Liberal leaders to believe that anything was possible
(Barahona 1989: 44). For Honduras’ first Liberal president, Marco Aurelio Soto, there
needed to be a “thorough regeneration of the country” (Euraque 1996: 3), in order to
incorporate Honduras into the world economy and “bring radical change to the way of
seeing, representing, and serving the rights and interests of the nation” (Euraque 1996: 4).
The 1870s-1930s was a period in which the role of the clergy was diminished in
Honduran society, in harmony with a broader trend of secularization in Latin America,
and the Catholic Church lost its monopoly over education and many basic services.
Instead, the Honduran armed forces became a significant state institution and began to

56

construct roads, hospitals, bridges, and in this regard started to provide valuable services
to society (Woodward 1985: 170). The institution has maintained a degree of autonomy
from different governments in power, thus comprising a political entity with its own
agenda that was sometimes aligned with the administration in power at the time and in
other cases was not. Whenever a president’s economic policies have not been in
congruence with the interests of the armed forces (who have been allied with sectors of
the country’s elite), that president ran the risk of a golpe de estado (coup d’état). As
historian Ralph Lee Woodward Jr. puts it, “Any president who completed his
constitutional term of office without being assassinated or forcibly removed had achieved
the extraordinary” (1985: 171).
Since the 1850s, Liberal intellectuals in Honduras spoke of a railway which
would connect not only towns along the north coast, but also run through Tegucigalpa
and end in the Gulf of Fonseca, in the southern region. “Between 1867 and 1870
Honduran governments negotiated loans in French and British financial markets, but the
project failed utterly” (Euraque 1996: 4) and Tegucigalpa remains without a railway.
About half of the labour for this first attempt to build a railway in 1869 was imported
from Jamaica and other Caribbean islands. Local industries also attracted labour from the
countryside, although it was still difficult to speak of ‘urban centres’ in 1869.
Soto and his elite allies in Tegucigalpa sought US investment capital to realize
their modernization project, and in December 1879, the New York and Honduras Rosario
Mining Company was founded, with Washington S. Valentine and Soto as primary
shareholders of the $1,500,000 company (Barahona 1989: 43; Euraque 2000: 98; Meza
1991: ix). This became the country’s most significant source of urban employment,
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contracting a total of 460 workers by 1887 (Barahona 1989: 43). Labour relations in the
mining industry during this period can, on the whole, be characterized as a relationship of
mutual benefit, although it was not without conflicts. In March 1909, for instance, a
group of miners protested against the company’s low wages. Threats to strike were met
with police violence in the name of defending the “security and order of the company.”
These strike planners were subsequently thrown in jail (Meza 1991: 5). While it was not a
significant source of state revenue, silver mining in central Honduras was still the
country’s main industry and “Tegucigalpa’s population increased from about 12,000 in
1881 to about 24,000 by 1901” (Euraque 1996: 5).
One point for reflection that we can make thus far is that elites saw the Honduran
population in a similar manner as they saw the country’s natural resources – as assets that
could be used to promote the nation’s welfare, which they identified with their own (cf.
Barahona 1989). Moreover, when foreign investors were encouraged by the liberal state
in the 1870s to develop Honduras’ export economy, both parties initially sought to
exploit not bananas on the north coast, but silver ores in the central and southern regions.
Yet later bananas became Honduras’ principal export crop, contrasting with neighbouring
countries’ emphasis on coffee. This is connected to the fact that whereas coffee oligarchs
were established during the 1880s in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, it was not
until after the Second World War that coffee became a major export crop of Honduras
(Woodward 1985: 150).
In explaining this phenomenon, some studies of Honduran history point toward
the absence of a ‘landed coffee oligarchy’ (see, for example, Alvarado 1987; Schulz &
Schulz 1994). However, instead of asking what Honduras lacked, we might find it more
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productive to ask what Honduras did in fact have, as historian Darío Euraque has done so
well (2000; 1996). This focuses attention on the fact that landed families in the highland
departments of Comayagua and Santa Bárbara (the most productive coffee-growing
regions) migrated to the north coast where they had more to gain from easy access to
banana lands than from producing coffee (Euraque 2000: 99; 1996: 13).
While the banana industry of the Caribbean coast was established by US banana
companies,

16

as Euraque demonstrates this was facilitated through collaboration with

Honduran elites and entrepreneurs from the Sula Valley, who had their own capitalist
interests and who pressured governing officials in San Pedro Sula to pass legislation in
their favour (1996). These particulars of the banana industry, along with the failure to
unite Tegucigalpa with the Caribbean coast by means of a railway meant that the ports
and towns of the north coast became more closely tied to the United States than to
Tegucigalpa. Because of the geographic barriers to land travel it was easier to travel from
Tela to New Orleans, than from Tela to Tegucigalpa (Lapper 1985: 24; Woodward 1985:
180). Thus, Tegucigalpa declined in importance, as northern cities like La Ceiba, San
Pedro Sula, and Puerto Cortés grew both economically and demographically (Woodward
1985: 180).

2.3 Preventing an Armed Guerrilla Movement
In comparison to its neighbours, these constellations particular to Honduras
permitted a different type of land tenure in which the peasantry had more access to land
in general. Whereas in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador, latifundistas (large

16

These included Standard Fruit, Boston Fruit, and Cuyamel Fruit, all of which were eventually incorporated into
United Fruit.
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landowners) controlled the coffee exports and thus owned significant portions of land, in
Honduras this simply was not the case. Instead, during the 1960s and 1970s, Honduran
governments engaged the peasantry in moderate land reforms, which minimally and
superficially met their demands. This in turn contributed toward staving off the formation
of armed peasant guerrilla forces from the Honduran Left (a unique situation when
compared to its neighbours).
Development policies under the government of Dr. Ramón Villeda Morales, a
paediatrician who “advocated civil rights, land reforms, rights of organized labour, and
revision of the government’s United Fruit Company contracts” (Woodward 1985: 255)
provide an example of how the formation of leftist guerrilla groups were prevented in
Honduras. Following his 1957 inauguration, Villeda began to engage Honduras in
moderate agrarian reforms. His polices were later seen as consistent with Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress, created after the Cuban revolution, aimed at supporting moderate
social reforms as a means to prevent socialist revolutions. Villeda therefore endured
criticisms from both the Honduran Right and Left (Lapper 1985: 50; Woodward 1985:
256). The reforms were aimed at mollifying landless campesinos (peasants), while at the
same time not fundamentally undermining economic elites and thus avoiding appearing
to be too far to the Left, a strategy continuously employed by the ruling elites in
Honduras.
The pressure for land reform resulted from violent confrontations over the legality
of land titles since the 1950s, especially concerning the encroachments of commercial
farms onto peasant lands, in conjunction with landowners’ common practice of leaving
large areas of land idle for extended periods of time, onto which landless peasants would

60

move (Lapper 1985: 52, 53). This contributed toward the creation of the first peasants’
union, the National Federation of Honduran Peasants (some members of which were exbanana workers, experienced in organizing), which focused their organizing efforts
among renters and sharecroppers on land where United Fruit was expanding its cattle
industry (Lapper 1985: 53). In response, Villeda’s government established the National
Agrarian Institute, which distributed 75,000 acres of national and ejido (communal) land
in areas of low population density, in an effort to combat what they considered to be a
“communist peasant union” (Lapper 1985: 53). In 1962, Villeda passed an agrarian
reform law that aimed to prevent landowners from leaving their land idle (a common
theme in agrarian reforms throughout Latin America):
The 1962 agrarian reform had three main aims: first to bring into production idle
or poorly utilised lands and make the old landowners more efficient; secondly to
create a legal basis for the recuperation of public and ejido land, which the fruit
companies and landowners had illegally occupied; and thirdly to absorb some of
the campesino pressure by giving land to peasants in individual plots (Lapper
1985: 53).
This legislation upset the landowning elites and the foreign fruit companies alike.
In addition to their disapproval of the agrarian reforms, the Conservative opposition
against Villeda in general was strong. In 1961 Villeda incorporated Honduras into the
Central American Common Market, yet another change in Honduran political economy
that challenged the traditional ruling class’ economic security (Lapper 1985: 4;
Woodward 1985: 256). After the rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba, elite Hondurans said that
Villeda was “soft toward the communists” (Woodward 1985: 256), even though he had
suspended diplomatic relations with the island in April 1961 (Euraque 1996: 114).
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Villeda’s political agenda of moderate reforms – aimed at preventing violent
guerrilla groups from the Left – was met with being labelled as a ‘pro-Cuba communist.’
Under these circumstances Villeda suffered a golpe de estado: the military forced him
into exile and postponed the 1963 presidential elections; they installed armed forces
commander Oswaldo López Arellano as Provisional President of Honduras. The golpe
against Villeda was justified through a discourse
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of a fear of communism penetrating

Honduran society – it was necessary to take out that “communist menace” from power
(Euraque 1996: 114).
Amidst the transition of power from Villeda to López Arellano, land tenure
conflicts between Honduran campesinos and landowners continued. As an adept strategy
to not confront either the peasantry or the elite land owners, the Honduran government
used Salvadoran migrants as a scapegoat, leading up to what is known as the Football
War of 1969.
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Since the early 1900s, Salvadoran migrants comprised a significant

minority in Honduras, mainly as workers in the banana enclave of the north coast, but
also as an estimated 20 percent of Honduras’ rural population, owning over 200,000 acres
of Honduran land (Lapper 1985: 60). By the end of the 1960s, there were roughly
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Rather than in the Foucauldian sense – to refer to the preconditions for talk, thought, and understanding – I follow
linguistic anthropologist Jane Hill’s use of the term ‘discourse’ to refer to the “actual material presence, in structure and
content, of language-in-use in history and at particular moments” (Hill 2008: 32). A focus on the implications of talk
and written texts does not always imply a direct cause-effect relationship; rather, how people are talking (or writing)
about a political subject can colour the topics raised with implicit messages and ideologies, which can then influence
how others perceive these topics. While I do not intend to conduct a discourse analysis in this thesis, this is what I mean
by the term.
18
Despite its misleading name, this war was actually about land rights, migration, deportation, and nationalism –
significant issues for both countries. The origin of the name ‘Football War’ nonetheless comes from when Honduras
beat El Salvador in a national soccer match in Tegucigalpa during seeding for the 1970 World Cup. Afterward, the
Salvadoran press spread rumours about their team’s food having been poisoned. Shortly thereafter, at another game in
San Salvador (where El Salvador won), Honduran visiting fans were attacked with fireworks (Lapper 1985: 61).
Richard Lapper writes that in response to this violence, the Honduran government finally began deporting Salvadorans
(the incident in San Salvador being the last straw).
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300,000 Salvadorans living in Honduras, about half of whom had come during the 1950s
and 60s, crossing an ill-defined geographic border (Lapper 1985: 60-61).
As Honduran campesinos continued to organize and stand up to Honduran land
owning elites, the elites (mainly cattle ranchers) in turn called for the expulsion of
Salvadoran migrants, blaming an essentially domestic land tenure problem on the
Salvadoran migrants (Euraque 1996: 140; Lapper 1985: 61). López Arellano was keen on
this strategy, as it was an easy way to avoid confronting land owning elites and a method
for redirecting discontent with his regime toward Salvadorans. In short, Salvadorans were
told to go back to where they came from. By May of 1969, 500 Salvadorans had been
deported and thousands more were fleeing, returning to their country as landless peasants,
which in turn caused land disputes between the returning migrants and the Salvadoran
landed oligarchy (Lapper 1985: 61). The Salvadoran elites (who had invested
significantly in their country’s industry and its trade within the Central American
Common Market) called for an invasion of Honduras, as one way to deal with the arrival
of landless peasants back in El Salvador (Euraque 1996: 141). The Salvadoran
government told the Inter-American Human Rights Commission that Honduras was
engaging in ‘genocide’ (Lapper 1985: 61).
The somewhat ill-defined border with this neighbouring country, coupled with
these land and trade issues, along with international accusations of human rights
violations, provided the perfect environment for violent conflict between these two
countries, in what resulted in a four-day battle. A Salvadoran air strike was not as
effective as their land invasion, which proved to Honduran governing elites that it was
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necessary to strengthen Honduras’ armed forces.
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Directly after this war, Honduras

closed its borders to trade and commerce with El Salvador. Honduras’ mere involvement
in the Football War contributed to a sense of national identity, and a resentment of
Salvadorans emerged especially among high-level officers of the Honduran armed forces.
This set the stage for continual issues of conflict with El Salvador, which Honduras
maintained throughout the 1980s – issues which in turn contributed to Honduran state
actors’ embracing of the US plans for militarization. For the Honduran armed forces, El
Salvador had become the traditional enemy of Honduras (Euraque 1996; Lapper 1985;
Morris 1984).
In addition to its significance in creating a national rival, the Football War also
helped ease López Arellano’s difficult position with the Honduran peasantry and working
class. Villeda had forged positive relations with organized labour and the emergent
peasant movement (two key sources of popular support) that the López Arellano regime
needed to acquire. President López Arellano attempted to do this through an
industrialization plan and a moderate agrarian reform aimed at pleasing reformists and
engaging Honduras in a more efficient agrarian economic model, yet at the same time not
20

deviating from a capitalist one, as to avoid a golpe de estado

19

by the land-owning elite in

According to Euraque, while the Salvadoran land invasion illuminated the Honduran army’s lack of preparedness,
the air strike was fraught with logistical problems. He states, “The Honduran air force, composed of twenty-three
aircraft, did not suffer any direct hits. Despite careful planning, the Salvadoran air raid confronted problems even prior
to arriving near Tegucigalpa. Before taking off from Ilopango air base near San Salvador, two Salvadoran aircraft
collided on the runway. Worse, the commander responsible for leading the attack on Toncontín failed to find the air
base. He became separated from his squadron and eventually flew to Guatemala City” (1996: 137).
20
Despite his efforts to avoid it, on 22 April 1975 López Arellano was ousted from power by means of a golpe. The
foreign fruit companies were concerned with his attempts to let the Honduran state gain more control over prices and
marketing, and United Fruit thus bribed López Arellano in an effort to reduce the banana tax (known as the Bananagate
Scandal). It worked – the tax was reduced to US$0.50 per crate, which saved the company an estimated US$7.5
million, but when López Arellano refused to have his Swiss bank account investigated, he was ousted. Leadership was
once again in the hands of the Honduran Armed Forces, which by then was closely allied with the National Party and
the interests of land owners (Lapper 1985: 68; Ruhl 2000: 51).
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alliance with the armed forces. In response to these land reforms, Nicaraguan president
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the staunchest US ally in the region at the time, referred to
López Arellano’s plans for Honduras as being ‘communist’ and a bad example for
Central America (Morris 1984: 47). All of this helps to place these political and
economic reforms in Honduras in the context of what issues Central American leaders
were debating (and how), prior to the 1980s US militarization.
Although moderate reforms in the third quarter of the 20th century helped prevent
the formation of a violent leftist resistance capable of toppling the Honduran government,
as the examples from the administrations of Villeda and López Arellano illustrate,
moderate policies in Honduras aimed at satisfying the needs of the working class and the
peasantry have been labelled as ‘communist’ by dominant ruling classes who oppose any
such economic reform – a phenomenon which continues into the present context. Elite
alliances with the armed forces mean they can oust any president whose agenda does not
support their own interests. Because of these particulars, however, in the 1980s Honduras
did not have a civil war of its own. Instead, it became the regional lynchpin for US
geopolitical interests and a military launch pad for civil wars fought in the three
neighbouring countries.

2.4 The Political Environment of the 1980s
As we will see, there are numerous connections between the political environment
during the 1980s and that of contemporary Honduras, in terms not only of governing
projects, but also Hondurans’ interpretations and actions as they make sense of these
histories and act upon their cultural understandings. For this reason, my approach to
studying the events leading up to and following the 2009 coup as well as their subsequent
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effects on Honduran political culture is necessarily historically-informed (just as
Hondurans’ political consciousness is also historically-informed). In order to understand
the particulars of the processes of the 1980s in Honduras, it is useful to explore the
interplay of how different local sectors and classes ally and clash with external processes
and ongoing foreign interests, which in turn are inserted into particular contexts of power.
This is what anthropologist William Roseberry means by the “internalization of the
external” (1989).
This notion draws our attention to movement and change within the structures of
dependence; it emphasizes the different possibilities and forms of dependence in
particular countries and regions (Roseberry 1989: 166). In other words, rather than seeing
the events of the 1980s in Honduras as the inevitable product of US imperialism in
Central America, I see them as having depended upon distinctive conditions in Honduras
at the time, which articulated with US preoccupations and geopolitical interests in
specific ways. This approach does not aim to conceal or deny US power and coercion in
the region. Rather, it is an attempt to emphasize the specifics of Honduran society – of
the local situation – which helped to forge the forms of economic dependence particular
to Honduras. My goal is to utilize this theoretical premise to provide nuanced
understandings of the events of the 1980s, and then to use these insights to illustrate the
continual effects of these ‘internalizations of the external’ in the remainder of this
chapter. In my MA I argued that these internalized preoccupations of communism
penetrating Honduras continue to manifest in contemporary society, cutting across social
and economic class divisions (Levy 2010).
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In examining the process of militarization of Honduran society in the 1980s, my
focus will be on how various Honduran politicians and military leaders took advantage of
US efforts to militarize the country for their own visions of domestic political-economic
(including nation-building) agendas. My intention is to go against the tendency of so
many North American scholars who focus solely on US forces over Latin America, while
ignoring specific Latin American responses to and accommodations of their interests,
which is what Brazilian sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso criticized in his
discussion of the North American adoption of dependency theory (Cardoso 1977: 13;
Roseberry 1989: 83).
In the beginning of the 1980s, Honduras entered a period of economic crisis, with
record high unemployment levels coupled with chronic foreign debt. Although there were
no leftist guerrilla movements, the government was dealing with pressure from peasant
groups for land reform, along with well-organized and widespread labour union strikes,
which threatened the already fragile economy. The government of General Policarpo Paz
García needed income. Regionally, the Popular Guerrilla Army of the Poor continued
against the US-supported Guatemalan government of General Romeo Lucas García, the
Nicaraguan Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, Sandinista National
Liberation Front or ‘Sandinistas’) successfully overthrew the US-supported Somoza
oligarchy in Nicaragua in 1979, and the growing strength of the Frente Farabundo Martí
para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation)
was coming closer to bringing down the US-backed Salvadoran government of José
Napoleón Duarte (Woodward 1985: 251). The US, worried about the spread of Soviet-
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and Cuban-influenced ideologies in its ‘own back yard,’ saw Honduras as the key to its
geopolitical interests (see, also, Lapper 1985; Peckenham 1985).
It was during this time of dire economic need that Honduras made the transition
from military rulers to a constitutional democracy. Amid re-establishing relations with El
Salvador in a peace treaty and sending troops to their border at the request of the
Salvadoran Defence Minister Adolfo Castillo (to protect against the FMLN), Honduras
also held national elections in late 1981. Dr. Roberto Suazo Córdoba was inaugurated in
1982 as president. He quickly agreed to IMF conditions that required the government to
reduce its spending and make its institutions more self-sufficient – which following the
argument of the IMF would stimulate savings, investments, and ‘stabilize the economy’
(Peckenham 1985: 242). The government agreed to these conditions to maintain
Honduras’ access to IMF development funds. During the Suazo government, there were
major cutbacks to social programs and reductions to government subsidies of food staples
(Peckenham 1985: 242). Suazo also increased sales tax, which cut the working class’
spending power (Peckenham 1985: 242). It was in the context of this economic crisis that
this Honduran government continually bargained with the US – not only for military
funding, but also for economic development aid during the 1980s.
The US military was determined to professionalize members of Honduran armed
forces, who they viewed as inferiors, incapable of operating without US presence. Such
military strength was supposed to intimidate the Sandinistas, the FMLN, and even Cuba.
The goal of the US was to make Honduras the guarantor of regional stability, by having
the largest air force in Central America. And because of the negotiations of specific
Honduran actors, their government was actually paid by the US to have it. The official
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purpose of the US military presence in Honduras – expressed by both governments – was
to prepare Honduras for a Sandinista invasion. In reality, however, both the Honduran
and US military personnel frequently spoke of how unlikely such an event was. They
knew that the Sandinistas had no intention of invading Honduras (Lapper 1985: 90). On
the contrary, because of their historical rivalry and land issues, most Hondurans had a
much greater fear of an attack by the right-wing US-backed Salvadoran government than
they ever did of the Sandinistas (Lapper 1985; Peckenham 1985).
In 1980 there were only 25 US troops in Honduras. By 1983 there were between
700 and 800 US troops (Lapper 1985: 88). By 1984, the number had gone up to an
estimated 1,200 US troops, most of whom maintained a regular presence living at the
main US airbase of Palmerola

21

about two hours outside of Tegucigalpa (Alvarado 1987:

164). During this time Honduran control over US military presence was minimal – troops
flew directly into US air bases without any immigration or custom procedures (Lapper
1985: 90). At any given moment the Honduran government had no idea of how many US
22

troops were in its country

(Lapper 1985: 90). All of this contributed to many observers

(including Honduran academics) referring to Honduras as the ‘Pentagon Republic’ or
‘USS Honduras’ (Pine 2008: 50; Salomón 1989). What I will argue here is that these
events would not have been possible if it were not for the particulars of Honduran politics
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Palmerola (Soto Cano) is still an air base owned and controlled by the US in Honduran territory. Indeed it is where
the plane carrying Mel Zelaya to Costa Rica stopped after departing from the country’s main airport in Tegucigalpa,
Toncontín. Hondurans comment that Palmerola has the best landing strip in all of Central America, much safer than
that of mountainous, urban Toncontín, one of the most dangerous in the world. A debate surrounding whether or not
Palmerola should become a Honduran air base, or even if it should be used as Honduras’ main airport, emerged in June
2008, after another fatal landing in Toncontín which prompted Mel to close the airport for about two months.
22
In an effort to win the support of the Honduran population, US troops engaged in school construction projects.
Indeed, one of the classrooms at one of the schools where I worked was constructed by US troops. Peace Corps
volunteers have engaged in similar activities. This history presented an awkward situation for me when I first began
research at these schools, as it was common for students’ parents and local political authorities to ask me if I had plans
to build a new classroom, ‘just like the other gringos.’
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and society and the agendas of specific Honduran leaders at the time of US militarization.
One such leader was Suazo’s head of the armed forces, Colonel Gustavo Alvarez
Martínez. The combination of Colonel Alvarez’s military background, political ideology,
and greed with the particulars of Honduran history and economic conditions contributed
toward the Suazo government’s collaboration with the US plans for militarization.
Alvarez was notorious for his hatred of the Sandinista government and the FMLN. He
openly supported right-wing Honduran operations and interests (Lapper 1985: 80). The
entire militarization process might not have worked if it were not for Alvarez’s staunch
anti-communist sentiment and willingness to use brutal force against anybody who he
suspected was sympathetic toward the Sandinistas, FMLN, Cuba or the Soviet bloc.
At the crux of Alvarez’s behaviour and ideology was his adoption of a doctrine of
national security in the context of his desire to invade Nicaragua, which he repeatedly
threatened to do (Lapper 1985: 80). Between 1958 and 1962 he took military officer
classes at the National Military Academy in Argentina, at the Superior War College in
Peru, at Fort Benning in the US, and at the School of the Americas in Panama. His
internalization of the national security doctrine – so popular in other Latin American
countries during this period – contributed toward making him the Honduran military
leader most capable of training the right-wing guerrilla group that the US wanted to
support: the Contras (Lapper 1985: 79).
The Contras (Contrarevolucionarios) were Nicaraguan refugees who resolutely
disagreed with the Sandinista government and who were willing to take up arms and
attempt to overthrow it. Most of the Contras were actual Somocistas or officers from the
former Somoza National Guard, but some of them were simply Nicaraguans who did not
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like the Sandinistas (Lapper 1985; Morris 1984). They formed a right-wing insurgency
unit and received significant funding from the US.

23

The Contras were trained in

Honduras, although both Washington and Tegucigalpa continually denied their presence
(Peckenham 1985: 316). This occurred while Honduras was receiving refugees from El
Salvador and Guatemala, most of whom were fleeing right-wing governments. By 1984
there were roughly 500 Guatemalan, 18,000 Salvadoran, and 20,000 Nicaraguan refugees
in Honduras (Peckenham 1985: 319). Because of this internalized fear of the spread of
communism in Central America, Salvadoran refugees were automatically associated with
the FMLN by the Honduran government, and there was a general concern about
Salvadoran leftist contamination sparking a revolution in Honduras (Lapper 1985;
Peckenham 1985). Hence the Honduran government granted Nicaraguan refugees more
rights than Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees who were fleeing from their ally
governments.
This preferential treatment of refugees speaks to the Honduran ‘internalization of
the external,’ of what have historically been US preoccupations (such as the spread of
Soviet- and Cuban-influenced ideologies in Central America). Without such differential
treatment of refugees in Honduras at the time, in part due to historical tensions with
Salvadorans, the US geopolitical goals involved in militarizing Honduras during the
1980s might not have been as successful. The ways in which Honduran state actors dealt
with this fear of communism included actively and violently preventing any sort of
grassroots organizing for socioeconomic change. Protests by urban neighbourhood
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The Contras were funded in part by laundered US funds from the illegal sale of arms to Iran; hence the ‘Iran-Contra
Affair.’

71

associations, peasant organizations, and trade unions were quickly and violently broken
up. Any activists who the government suspected of having leftist tendencies were
disappeared and held in clandestine prisons for their supposed ties with the Sandinistas
and the FMLN (Lapper 1985: 95,96). Many schoolteachers were among those affected,
and in the following chapter I show through life histories how these processes affected
some dirigentes magisteriales (leaders of teachers’ professional associations).
With his internalized doctrine of national security and suspicions of Hondurans
doing anything that resembled socialist activities, Alvarez created the Cobras and
Battalion 316 – two government death squads that would hunt down people suspected of
socialist ties through a network of spies working for the government (Lapper 1985: 92;
Pine 2008: 51). The clandestine network of intelligence agents who disappeared
suspected communists created an environment of fear among Hondurans, most of whom
never had any direct affiliation with the Sandinistas or the FMLN, both foreign entities.
There was a wide range of organized Honduran resistance to the environment of
fear and repression in Honduras during the 1980s, some violent and some peaceful. What
is important to understand for our purposes, however, is that because of distinct historical
experiences among differently-situated groups of people, there were great divisions
between peasant groups on the one hand and urban activists (including schoolteachers) on
the other. The campesinos would say that the urban activists were too concentrated on
supporting the Sandinistas and regional causes, and not focused on Honduran domestic
issues. The most important of the latter was access to land, a key point for fighting
poverty (Acker 1988: 102). In the 1980s the Honduran armed forces and US military
were thus never confronted by a united resistance front.
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Later in the decade the Suazo administration took further advantage of US
presence in order to solicit more economic development aid. Honduras’ geographic
location was used as a bargaining chip to further not only US geopolitical interests, but
also what Suazo and his supporters considered Honduran national interests. They did this
by denouncing that El Salvador was receiving more aid money than Honduras, yet
Honduras was doing the US a favour, furthering its interests in the region. The Suazo
administration wanted compensation. In effect, the Suazo government was prepared to
“sell the state” (Lapper 1985), but wanted a better price for it. If their traditional rival (El
Salvador) was receiving more money than them, they argued, why should Honduras
continue to serve the US? Additionally, at the request of the US, Salvadoran troops were
being trained on Honduran bases, a violation of the Honduran constitution.
Whereas under the Alvarez-led armed forces, the Honduran government had no
problem with this, and the Salvadorans were referred to as ‘students’ to avoid legal
problems, later, during López Arellano’s tenure as the armed forces chief, the
unconstitutionality of the situation was used as a bargaining tool (Lapper 1985: 98; Ruhl
2000: 54). When these leaders wanted a better price for their service, López Arellano
discontinued the Alvarez-negotiated training program of Salvadoran soldiers and began
to bargain with the US over how much aid Honduras would receive for training the
Contras (Ruhl 2000: 54). Considering the historical tensions between the two countries
and the notions of national identity furthered by the Football War of 1969, this was a
strong bargaining chip for the Honduran government. Aid money, in turn, was to be used
for economic development purposes. Suazo tried to create a bilateral defence treaty and
negotiate more economic and military aid from the US for their use of Honduran land. He
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came back from Washington to report that “Honduran dignity had been rescued” (Lapper
1985: 110), even though the US did not agree to all of his demands. Still, what is
significant here is that this history shows a specific type of dependent development, one
in which Honduran leaders internalized the US goals for militarization, and then took
advantage of these shared ideas of national security to negotiate their own geopolitical
and economic interests (a history which affected the magisterio during this period too, as
we will see in the following chapter).
In short, these external (US) forces were inserted into particular Honduran
contexts of power and cannot be clearly identified as the US having forced the Honduran
government to act in specific ways. Rather, specific state actors allied and clashed with
foreign geopolitical interests, which created particular (and sometimes unintended)
results for Honduras. I have thus attempted to illustrate this conjuncture – the particulars
of Honduran society as they intersected with the US preoccupation over the spread of
Soviet- and Cuban-influenced ideologies – which contributed to the process of
militarization of Honduras. Had it not been for factors such as the general economic crisis
in Honduras during the 1980s, the disconnect between rural and urban activists, the
country’s transition from a military-ruled to a constitutional government, differential
treatment of political refugees, and resentment of Salvadorans among members of the
armed forces, all within the context of attempting to build and strengthen a national
identity, the US militarization of Honduras would not have been as successful. Likewise,
had it not been for the ideologies of and particular actions taken by Alvarez and Suazo,
and the specific outcomes such as training Salvadoran soldiers on Honduran soil, the
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Suazo government would not have been able to take advantage of the US geopolitical
interests for its own political, economic, and national development agendas.
In the 1990s the regional context changed. With the Contra war coming to an end
(following the Sandinistas’ electoral loss), the US was no longer interested in supporting
the Honduran armed forces to the same degree as previously (Ruhl 2000: 55). The end of
the civil wars in the neighbouring countries made it difficult to rationalize supporting
such a huge military in Honduras. The result was a reduction in US funding, which
caused inflation, severe unemployment, and labour unrest, as the country’s main source
of foreign income was exhausted. The financially-burdened armed forces reached a new
level of corruption in which political disappearances and drug trafficking became
commonplace among military personnel (Ruhl 2000: 55). The circulation of these stories
further undermined armed forces funding and the US Embassy in Honduras became
critical of the armed forces, as did national entrepreneurs, student organizations, and
organized labour (Ruhl 2000: 56). This decline in support, political strength, and
financing for the armed forces continued through the 1990s.
It was in this context of the removal of US military aid money and the end of the
civil wars in its neighbouring countries that Honduras experienced the consolidation of
neoliberal policies (although one could argue that these also existed in the 1980s during
the militarization project). The year of 1990 was a significant change toward full
acceptance of neoliberal policies with the beginning of Rafael Callejas’ presidency. As
sociologist William Robinson describes:
The full turn to neo-liberalism and the new model of accumulation only came
once the Sandinistas had been removed from power in 1990. In March 1990,
within weeks of his inauguration, Callejas launched his paquetazo, or economic
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reform package, negotiated earlier with the IMF, the AID, the World Bank, and
the Inter-American Development Bank. These institutions disbursed several billon
dollars to support the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) over the next few
years. The paquetazo included a 50 percent devaluation of the national currency,
the Lempira, tax hikes on consumption, austerity measures, and the elimination of
price controls, a sharp tariff reduction (and abolition in some cases), new export
incentives, and a privatization program. Along with the neo-liberal program came
the arrival of transnational capital, in what was locally referred to as the “Asian
invasion,” the near overnight entry of maquiladoras, along with a commercial
opening-up and new service activities (2003: 129).

With neoliberal policies and the curtailing of basic social services already in full
swing, natural disaster struck. In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch whipped through
Honduras,

24

and roughly 80 percent of the country’s infrastructure and agricultural

production were lost to floods (Ruhl 2000: 61). “Early damage estimates put the nation’s
losses at $3 billion, a sum equal to about three-quarters of the entire Honduran GNP”
(Ruhl 2000: 61), most negatively affecting those who were already struggling to meet
their basic subsistence needs (see, also, Barrios 2009 for an analysis of how the poor
continued to be the most negatively affected during the post-Mitch reconstruction
efforts).
With the inauguration of Panamanian citizen

25

Ricardo Maduro in 2002 as

president, Honduras continued to engage in free trade. What was perhaps most significant
about Maduro’s administration was the increase in military and national police personnel
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Several teachers have shown me how they were instrumental in leading community-based emergency response teams
to deliver water and food to people in need, as well as rescue individuals from dangerous levels of flood waters during
this natural disaster – one example of the leadership roles that teachers often hold in the communities where they work.
25
Despite its controversy, there is no law in Honduras that prohibits a foreign national from becoming president.
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to fight organized crime. By this time common theft and violent crimes especially by
maras (youth gangs) had increased dramatically, particularly in urban centres. While the
violence is usually between gang members themselves, Maduro’s policies of zero
tolerance against crime

26

consisting of la mano dura (an ‘iron fist’ policy) gave the often

poorly-trained, poorly-paid, and corrupt officials a new level of power as they were
allowed to arrest anyone who they suspected of being a gang member.
This had adverse effects for young men who were actually not gang members, but
who were arrested nonetheless while wandering the streets and loitering – the police
having identified them by their tattoos, short haircuts, and clothes, which are sometimes
also gang symbols. As anthropologist Jon Wolseth (2011, 2008) has successfully
illustrated, poor urban youth are often left with few alternatives other than to join the
national police, armed forces, emigrate, or join gangs. In contemporary Honduras they
are often targeted as ‘delinquents’ for their mere presence in public spaces. “Indeed, the
bodies of young men act as a palimpsest of the state’s failure to provide for its young. At
a time when public funding for youth – specifically educational funding and job training
– is disappearing from budgets, youth are disappearing from social life through their
murders” (2011: 11).
A slight change to the mano dura policies came about when the Liberals came
back into power in 2006 with the inauguration of José Manuel Zelaya Rosales. Before
becoming president, Mel was a cattle rancher and prosperous agriculturalist from
Olancho. Yet his successful presidential campaign reached the interests of diverse social
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These policies were adopted from New York Mayor Giuliani’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ policies against crime in that US
city (Pine 2009).
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and economic classes, beyond just conservative entrepreneurs and landowners. For
instance, in contrast with the 2005 campaign of Porfirio Lobo Sosa (who was the
Nationalist candidate who lost to Mel during those elections), Mel clearly stated during
his campaign that he was against establishing the death penalty in Honduras.
In terms of battling organized crime, Mel promised to change the mano dura
policies toward gang violence (unlike Lobo), and focus instead on rehabilitation
educational programs for those arrested for gang-related crimes. At first, Mel’s principal
support base was among his fellow land-owning elite Liberals, many of whom comprise
the economically conservative sector of the Liberal Party (and had supported him
throughout his political career in the Olancho department). Once in power however Mel’s
support base broadened as his policies began to benefit the majority of the Honduran
population. Meanwhile, elites began to see Mel’s policies as a threat to their economic
interests.

2.5 The National Political Environment under the
Government of Mel Zelaya
What did Hondurans themselves identify as the major areas of political discord in
the months preceding the events of 28 June 2009? What were the most controversial
aspects of Mel’s government – issues that people later internalized as reasons why the
coup occurred? In the outbreak and immediate aftermath of the coup, Hondurans of
diverse political opinions about the event were quick to describe why Mel lost the support
of rich entrepreneurs and became imagined as a potential danger to elite interests. Their
reasons included Mel’s domestic policies to raise the minimum wage, his attempts to
enhance the benefits of some public-sector employees, and his engagement with the
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peasantry in their struggles for land. Yet the people with whom I worked in 2009 also
generally agreed that the coup occurred because Mel ‘got too close to Hugo Chávez,’ and
that he ‘wanted to bring socialism to Honduras.’ The implicit understanding was that the
Honduran elite who initially supported Mel, and who were ultimately the instigators of
the coup, would not tolerate any state project resembling socialism. This notion is
connected to a widespread explanation for his ousting: ‘Mel wanted to remain in power
indefinitely, just like Chávez.’
The idea that Chávez and socialism presented a danger for Honduras has
historical antecedents in some of the processes we have seen here. Mel’s decision to sign
the Venezuela-initiated energy cooperation agreement Petrocaribe in December 2007
was controversial, but the move that brought Mel’s government into the discursive realm
of ‘leftist’ and ‘supporter of communism’ came in July 2008 when he committed
Honduras to the Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA,
Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of our America; later called the Bolivarian
Alliance, instead of Alternative). Despite the economic benefits for a poor country under
this agreement – including access to cheap gasoline and manufactured goods such as
tractors and energy-efficient light bulbs in exchange for Honduran beef and dairy exports
– committing Honduras to ALBA had important symbolic effects in the months prior to
Mel’s ousting.
After the signing of ALBA, the mainstream news media insisted that this new
alliance with the Latin American Left would ‘weaken’ Honduras’ alliance with the
United States. The messages communicated were that Honduras would suffer
economically and politically because of its new trade agreement with Venezuela; and
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how dare Honduras, a close US ally and proven friend in the fight against communism,
now support a leftist enemy such as Chávez? Absent from these debates was any
acknowledgement that Mel’s government had also signed the Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States; that neighbouring Nicaragua had
been a long-standing member of ALBA and still maintained diplomatic and trade
relations with the United States; or that Venezuela and the United States themselves have
a co-dependent economic relationship where the United States was still purchasing
Venezuelan oil and Chávez still chose to sell it to the United States. These variables were
ignored as select politicians, entrepreneurs, and journalists denounced Mel’s decision to
sign on to ALBA as a manoeuvre that would ‘bring socialism to the country.’
These national news media outlets later referenced Mel’s perceived close alliance
with Chávez when Mel proposed holding a referendum to see if citizens would favour the
formation of a national constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution (which Mel
considered obsolete). One reform that Mel advocated was to allow presidential reelection for a second four-year term, similar to the US system. Normally the Honduran
Supreme Electoral Tribune includes three different ballot boxes in the presidential and
congressional elections, for citizens to select: 1) a presidential candidate; 2) candidates
for diputado (regional delegate to congress); and 3) candidates for municipal officials.
Because Mel wanted citizens to also vote in November on whether or not a national
constituent assembly should be formed, by installing a ‘fourth ballot box’ in the 2009
electoral ballot, the entire proposal (including the non-binding public opinion poll
scheduled for 28 June 2009) was referred to locally as la cuarta urna (the fourth ballot
box).
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In theory, if on 28 June 2009 the majority of citizens had responded to the opinion
poll stating that they wanted a fourth ballot box to subsequently vote on a national
constituent assembly, then the November 2009 presidential and congressional elections
ballot would have included an opportunity to vote for or against the establishment of a
national constituent assembly to discuss constitutional reforms. In other words, the June
opinion poll would have been the first step in a three-step process for rewriting the
constitution: 1) the opinion poll on 28 June 2009; 2) the referendum vote in November;
and 3) the formation of a national constituent assembly and its deliberations on possible
constitutional changes. Only then could Mel have been a candidate for re-election. For
the country’s political and economic elite however, any attempt to rewrite the
constitution – and especially the possibility of Mel’s re-election – was seen as a threat to
their economic and political power, given how Mel’s policies were turning toward the
Left.
By early April 2009, newspaper articles
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and debates on talk radio shows began

to refer to Mel remaining in power indefinitely by changing the constitution in his favour,
‘just like Hugo Chávez.’ This fierce anti-Mel campaign in the months preceding the coup
sought to equate the referendum itself with continuísmo (‘continuism’). Grouped together
within this same framework were accusations that in order to promote the non-binding
June opinion poll Mel had reordered areas of the central government’s budget to promote
his re-election, and that he was violating Honduran law by attempting to remain in power.
Since the coup occurred in the hours before the opinion poll was to begin, and citizens
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Here I am referring to a broad campaign against the cuarta urna and the overall political climate around the
referendum. Among many examples, representative articles can be found in El Heraldo, 4 April 2009, 16 June 2009,
and 19 June 2009, and in La Prensa, 18 May 2009 and 25 May 2009.

81

were never given the opportunity to vote on or experience the results of that poll, we will
never know what the cuarta urna would have meant in practice.
It was in this confusing and uncertain political environment – of not knowing
what the non-binding opinion poll would mean; or whether there would be a national
constituent assembly; or who would be its members; or exactly what the changes to the
constitution might be – that Mel suffered a golpe de estado. By now we are well aware of
what happened to the president that morning: the military kidnapped him in pyjamas
from his home in Tegucigalpa and flew him to Costa Rica (after a stop at the US military
base Palmerola). In my MA thesis (Levy 2010) I attempted to show how ordinary
Hondurans experienced these events, and how they unfolded in a non-central region of
the country, processes about which we know considerably less.
In that research project I found that there was considerable heterogeneity in local
understandings about the implications of the coup, which problematizes the strict
divisions that were being drawn between supporters of Mel and/or of the Resistencia on
the one hand, and on the other, supporters of the golpe, of the coup-installed regime of
Roberto Micheletti Bain,
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or since November 2009 election, of Pepe Lobo. In some

cases, even immediately after the coup, these differences were very real, and today most
Hondurans clearly align themselves with one group or the other. However, when I
examined the experiences of those who were neither active members of the FNRP nor
direct collaborators with the coup complete support for one project or another was less

28
Liberal Party politician, Roberto Micheletti Bain, was President of the National Congress during the government of
Mel Zelaya. Once members of the armed forces ousted Mel from power in a military coup, a false letter of resignation
was forged on Mel’s behalf, and the National Congress elected Micheletti as the ‘interim president’ (see Levy 2010). In
this doctoral thesis I refer to the government of Micheletti as ‘coup-installed’ or ‘de facto’ and the government of Pepe
Lobo as ‘post-coup’ or elected during a coup government.
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stable or easy to define in the immediate aftermath of the coup. I attributed this in part to
the fact that Hondurans had limited access to information about these events as they were
occurring, but also because the human experience of developing political opinions is a
complex and contradictory process.
Since so many areas of Hondurans’ lived experiences simply did not align neatly
with the initial discursive frameworks promoted by coup supporters or resisters, their
alliances were especially prone to shifting. In my MA thesis this allowed me to reflect
upon some of the lessons from an anthropology of political culture during moments of
sudden political change (Levy 2010). Here I maintain that everyday life in San Lorenzo
and the surrounding countryside during and immediately after the coup went against easy
categorization of being ‘with us or against us’, resulting in people’s alignments being
shifting and unstable. During the confusing and uncertain summer of 2009, common folk
were struggling to understand what was happening with the government. In the
immediate aftermath of the coup, there were aspects of the golpista justification for the
ousting that resonated with Hondurans of diverse backgrounds.
The emergence of the Resistencia first attempted to counter some of the explicit
and implicit arguments of the golpistas. They actively rejected, for instance, the idea that
there had been no coup, or that Mel and his supporters were not ‘true Hondurans.’
Members of the emerging movement argued that there was in fact a military coup, and
that they were engaged in a patriotic struggle to reinstate their democratically-elected
president. As people exchanged information about the coup – via word-of-mouth and
through what limited news outlets were available – these counterarguments began to have
an impact among individuals who previously believed aspects of the golpista justification
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for the coup. In my MA thesis I sought to explore these processes ethnographically, to
highlight two major factors through which Hondurans made sense of the coup during its
occurrence: 1) reflection on the country’s recent history of being a US regional lynchpin
in the fight against communism; and 2) internalization of some of the official messages
from both the golpistas and the Mel camp/Resistencia. I argued that this human
experience of living through sudden political change couldn’t be reduced to binaries,
precisely because most of the Hondurans I worked with had experiences that
simultaneously aligned with and contradicted the golpista discourse and that of the
Resistencia in the summer of 2009 (see Levy 2010).
In Honduras during the summer of 2009 individuals navigated through a complex
web of understandings about what could potentially happen in the context of heightened
levels of uncertainty. Not knowing when or if Mel Zelaya would return, or if a civil war
would break out, affected how people imagined the political future. Today we are quick
to reject such an outcome as absurd, even despite the on-going political violence, because
we now know that a civil war did not break out. Now we can reflect upon the results of
the coup, consider what the on-going struggles of the FNRP to win control of the state
through the LIBRE Party might mean, and study their strategies to alter the golpista
status quo upheld by post-coup governments. During the period reviewed in my MA
thesis however, such clear political options were not envisioned by most ordinary
Hondurans. On the contrary, I found that people’s everyday experiences with the coup
were more focused on navigating the contours of daily life. People developed
understandings about the ways the coup might affect their lives based largely on the
issues they were already facing during the months preceding 28 June 2009. An
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ethnographic sensibility would lead us to expect just this. Less foreseeable however were
the ways Hondurans of different political opinions were actively assessing what the
Honduran state was capable of doing, and then re-thinking their initial opinions on the
coup and sometimes altering their own actions. This assessing of the state’s capabilities
was achieved through two discernable avenues: 1) individuals’ own reading of the
political landscape – their interpretations of the political processes as they were
occurring, through the filter of their own previous experiences as well as their
interpretations of Hondurans’ collective experiences (such as with militarization in the
1980s); and 2) individuals’ experiences in the moment of this particular political change
where specific things either did, or did not, happen to them.
Hondurans’ lived experiences continue to influence their shifting understandings
of these issues, even today. I believe these experiences of ambivalence with the onset of
the coup influenced people’s interpretations of the meanings of the event itself and the
significance of being a member of the FNRP, or a supporter (to whatever degree) of the
coup and post-coup governments. However, the goals of the FNRP, and the size of their
support base, have also changed significantly since the summer of 2009 – something that
individuals living through the coup could not have predicted.

2.6 The Formation of LIBRE
Today the Resistencia has moved beyond merely countering some of the basic
golpista justifications for the coup. While their initial goal of reinstating Mel Zelaya was
not achieved, the movement has since organized around a host of progressive issues such
as the rights of vulnerable groups, decreasing political violence, creating mechanisms to
hold politicians and elite entrepreneurs accountable for their actions, and redesigning a
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series of previously-achieved policies that were overturned with the ousting of Mel and
rule under post-coup governments (such as those in the education sector). For reasons we
have seen here, those opposed to the FNRP project of state re-foundation sometimes
(incorrectly) associate it with communism.
These broad goals of the Resistencia movement began to gain popularity in late
2009 when on the one hand it became clear that Mel Zelaya was not going to be
reinstated, and on the other, there appeared to be more popular support for a national
constituent assembly than initially expected. Shortly after the election of Pepe Lobo –
despite the Resistencia-led boycott of the November 2009 presidential and congressional
elections on the basis that they occurred during a coup-installed de facto government –
many Resistencia members began to argue that the only method of successfully
achieving a national constituent assembly would be through the formation of a formal
political party. This was a controversial process, and not everyone in the Resistencia
believed electoral politics would be a viable solution; some even argued that it would in
fact weaken the movement and distract people from the grassroots work involved with
the state re-foundation project.
Taking these preoccupations into consideration, the Frente Amplio de Resistencia
Popular (FARP, Broad Front of Popular Resistance) was initially proposed by Mel
Zelaya in May of 2011 as a political party that would represent the Resistencia, but
remain separate from the FNRP. Meanwhile another faction within the Resistencia –
opposed to the leadership of Mel Zelaya and his wife Xiomara Castro de Zelaya –
formed a different political party called the Frente Amplio Electoral en Resistencia
(FAPER, Broad Electoral Front in Resistance) with Andrés Pavón as its candidate. Given
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that both parties were associated with the anti-coup Resistencia movement, and they both
had very similar names, the FARP changed its name to Partido Resistencia Popular
(PRP, Popular Resistance Party). Then in October 2011 leaders of the FNRP who
supported Mel Zelaya voted to call their party the Partido de Libertad y Refundación
(LIBRE, Freedom and Re-foundation Party). While there was substantial support for
Xiomara as the LIBRE presidential candidate,
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there were however a total of five

different currents within LIBRE which produced primary election candidates for
diputados (departmental delegates to the national congress) and municipal government
officials. These different factions consisted of the: 1) 28th of June Movement; 2) the
Popular Revolutionary Force; 3) the Progressive Resistance Movement; 4) the People
Organized in Resistance; and 5) the 5th of July Movement.
What is relevant here is that LIBRE became the dominant political party to
emerge out of the Resistencia, with the goal of forming a national constituent assembly to
rewrite the constitution, claiming that “revolution was inevitable.” The party advocates
for socialism, but also aims to change broader state practices in Honduras. In the party’s
official declaration of principles, they list: 1) popular sovereignty; 2) social and economic
equality; 3) unity of forces and respect for diversity; 4) relationships with the popular
sectors; 5) critical thought and permanent doctrinal updating; 6) respect and promotion of
human rights; 7) human security; 8) honesty and transparency; 9) nature and
environment; 10) secularism and liberty of worship; 11) Central Americanism and Latin

29

While Xiomara won her candidacy by consensus and was thus the only primary election presidential candidate, there
was pressure from the National Electoral Tribune to insist that LIBRE had to vote among different candidates in the
primary elections to determine their presidential candidate. LIBRE leaders later found the legal mechanisms to argue
that Xiomara was the party’s candidate by consensus and that no primary election of presidential candidacy was
required.
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Americanism; and 12) anti-imperialism, anti-neocolonialism, and international solidarity
(Partido Libertad y Refundación 2011). The contention among LIBRE supporters in 2012
was that the party and electoral politics were viable methods for achieving these goals,
and that if LIBRE were elected to power and the constitution were rewritten to facilitate
these processes, then Hondurans would indeed be living the revolution that so many have
been hoping for since long before 28 June 2009.
As FNRP members and LIBRE supporters began to reflect on the recent history
of the 2009 coup, they often suggested that these initial experiences with this sudden
political change were the push that they all needed in order to advance a broader political
project. As one schoolteacher who became active with the Resistencia and LIBRE Party
explained to me in July 2012:
Look here, the Resistencia has never been only about Mel; it is about all the
injustices against the people. What happened with the golpe de estado was that
the people finally woke up. Now we have united. They say that sometimes
something bad has to happen in order for something good to happen. If Mel had
never been kidnapped, who knows where we would be. But now the people are
awake.
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I would add to this member’s statement the idea that the FNRP would probably not be in
the position it occupied during 2012 (and perhaps would not even have existed) had Mel
actually come back to finish his term. This ‘awakening’ was therefore neither inevitable
nor predictable.
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Interview, 16 July 2012.
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Looking at such a situation ethnographically as it was occurring is a different kind
of endeavour than interviewing people about the coup after it happened, when both they
and the ethnographer have the privilege of reflection. The multiple, overlapping, and
sometimes contradictory meanings that individuals forge in the midst of sudden political
change are not always coherent, which in the case of Honduras meant that in the summer
of 2009 people were actively seeking out new information despite the confusion and
censorship.
While retrospective insights are very valuable, my data from the summer of 2009
differ from the stories that Hondurans now tell about what they did in reaction to the
coup. (This became especially apparent to me during my doctoral fieldwork when
schoolteachers were in a position to reflect upon this recent history of sudden political
change.) In 2009, rather than envision the formation of a progressive new political party
(LIBRE), most people were struggling to figure out just what had happened and how
these political changes would affect their everyday activities and livelihood strategies. In
the process of imagining different paths to the future, the weight of Honduras’ past
influenced people’s understandings about why the coup occurred and what was
politically possible during the summer of 2009 and thereafter.

2.7 Current Research among Schoolteachers
By the time of my doctoral fieldwork in 2012, the Resistencia political movement
and LIBRE Party had already gained considerably more support. Schoolteachers had a
clear understanding of who was affiliated with the FNRP and who had chosen to side
with the golpistas. The shifting of opinions I had observed during the summer of 2009
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had slowed down, and the post-coup government of Pepe Lobo had significantly
withdrawn support for basic public services.
Scholars of Honduran political processes and political culture have approached
the post-coup political environment in different ways. Since June 2009 this has resulted
in valuable contributions about why the coup occurred (Fasquelle 2011); the reactions of
the international community (Pine 2011); the on-going effects of violence perpetrated by
post-coup governments (Phillips 2013); the disruption of various pre-coup social policy
31

achievements (Euraque 2010) ; the intensification of neoliberal development policies
(Brondo 2013); and the cultivation of an unprecedented revolutionary spirit among those
who continue to resist these practices and envision a fundamentally different path for the
country (see, for instance, Anderson 2012; Boyer & Peñalva 2013; Euraque 2010;
Phillips 2011).
This doctoral thesis engages aspects of these on-going themes by examining how
a group of front-line state agents is denouncing these set-backs to progressive policies
and critiquing the current situation, but also finding new and quite innovative ways to fill
otherwise limited spaces with progressive political action aimed at forging what they
consider to be better policies of governance and a more equitable education system.
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Historian Darío Euraque (2010) writes about the cultural policy achievements made at the Honduran Institute of
Anthropology and History during the government of Mel Zelaya and how with 2009 coup, the newly-appointed
Minister of Culture quickly dismantled these achievements. The reforms to the education sector can be seen in the
context of this same problematic of coup-appointed state officials who produce the derailment of previously-achieved
social policies.
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3

Historical Antecedents through Life Histories and
Colegio Accounts

3.1 Introduction
As the largest gremio of public sector workers in Honduras, schoolteachers are
people whose daily activities and labour struggles support the expansion of state services
in general. Most of those with whom I work studied in the normal schools during the
1970s and 80s – a period when the state sought to expand the education sector. As
promising normalistas (normal school students) they studied under governmentsponsored scholarships. These same teachers then experienced the career of
schoolteacher as a ‘carrera de los pobres’ (career of the poor) – the opportunity for
individuals from humble (usually urban) backgrounds to become professionals and
experience all of the responsibilities and benefits their positions entail.
Today Honduran schoolteachers are reflecting on their own life histories in
conjunction with the recent history of the expansion of state services under the ousted
government of Mel Zelaya. They want at least that same level of support from the state,
but have not been receiving it since the June 2009 coup. At international conferences for
teachers in neighbouring countries they see public education systems which they believe
work well – returning to Honduras with arguments about the progress and good
governance that is occurring now in ‘sister republics’ El Salvador and Nicaragua. As both
products and producers of a national public education system, Honduran schoolteachers
have developed a vested interest in state services. All this contributes to reasons why
Honduran teachers recognize the usefulness of the state, and are defending public
education and state services in general.
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This chapter has two central aims. The first is to provide background information
about the profession of schoolteacher in Honduras and the ‘magisterio’ – the teachers’
professional organizations – as a whole. While Honduran schoolteachers often use the
term ‘magisterio’ to refer to all teachers as a gremio, the profession, or their
organizations, it is important to clarify that when it refers to their professional
associations, this consists of six different nation-wide ‘colegios magisteriales’ (teacher
colleges), which have developed in different historical contexts, specializing in their own
strategies of how to represent a particular group of teachers. For instance, there are
colegios for teachers who work in primary education, secondary education, or
pedagogical planning and administrative activities. Indeed, there are conflicts within and
between colegios magisteriales, which has led to factions and the creation of new
colegios.
This background information will become essential for my subsequent
ethnographic analysis of the significance of the 2012 reforms, of teachers’ actions as
front-line state agents who challenge certain aspects of governance, and as agents of
social and political change in the current political environment. Here I present basic
historical antecedents about the functioning of the magisterio and profession of
schoolteacher in Honduras, drawing on: 1) what my research participants have told me;
2) what different colegios magisteriales tell their members about this history; and 3)
some secondary sources about education policies in Honduras written by Honduran
academics.
As an anthropologist, I am not only interested in describing what happened. In
addition, I seek to understand how differently-situated individuals have experienced these
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changes over time. I am less concerned with exactly what laws were passed during which
governments, for instance, and much more interested in how schoolteachers themselves
experienced the effects of these laws, and developed opinions about their profession – a
process which has contributed toward schoolteachers’ collective struggles to pass new
legislation at the national level.
The second aim of this chapter is to address the question of who governs in the
context of implementing policies for national public education in Honduras. A central
premise of this thesis is that the agency of schoolteachers influences how – and the extent
to which – the reforms are implemented in practice. The way that they do so results in
part from their particular perspectives that emerge out of their backgrounds and the types
of experiences they have had both individually and collectively. Honduran
schoolteachers’ lived experiences underlie their vested interests in the state and in the
validity of state services in general, which in turn influences their actions vis-à-vis the
education reforms. Ethnographic examination of these processes requires that we first
ask: What type of person would want to pursue a career as a schoolteacher? And what
social, economic, and political circumstances attract individuals to the profession and
support them while they pursue this career?
To address these anthropological questions, I will explore aspects of the lives of
three Honduran schoolteachers, describing the circumstances in which they entered the
profession and how they arrived where they were in 2012. An account of key aspects of
their lives highlights some of the common experiences that Honduran schoolteachers as a
group have had since the 1960s. While all three of the teachers presented here are
considered to be professionally ‘successful’ (which might not make their experiences
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entirely typical), their life histories illuminate the ways in which the magisterio and
profession of schoolteacher have changed over time.
The information presented here reflects both what these individuals were willing
to share with me, and their own assessments of which details of their lives were relevant
to answering my questions about their professional experiences. This chapter therefore
alludes to many shared aspirations of Honduran schoolteachers, as well as the social and
political circumstances many have undergone. These lived experiences and the opinions
formed about the profession are then remembered and reflected upon during an ongoing
process through which schoolteachers: 1) develop political opinions about the current
reforms and political environment; 2) act upon these perceptions of their realities; and 3)
imagine the range of possibilities that the future might bring with different kinds of
governing policies and state projects. I conclude each life history with a brief mention of
how the individual’s professional life became interconnected with and affected by the
June 2009 coup and emergence of the Resistencia movement, as these events continued
to influence how teachers interpret and experience the magisterio and their engagements
with national politics in 2012.

3.2 Basic History of the Honduran Magisterio
Most organized labour in Honduras locates its beginnings in the 1954 Gran
Huelga Bananera (Great Banana Strike), in which United Fruit Company workers
withheld their services for 69 days, and in the process gained the support of workers from
other industries and popular organizations, as well as regional capitalists and politicians
(see, for example, Euraque 1996: 95-97). The major achievement of the general strike
was the legal right for workers to organize and to form unions. It also provoked public
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debate about agrarian reform, the political rights of women, and workers’ rights in
general. This later led to the passing of relevant legislation in those areas, and the
emergence of various sindicatos (unions) for workers in different industries. It is in this
national historical context that we also see the profession of schoolteacher becoming
more institutionalized, with the centralization of the procedures whereby schoolteachers
are formally registered with the Ministry of Education in 1957 – meaning that central
Ministry offices in Tegucigalpa began to play a more important role in regulating
teachers as workers – and a decree in 1958 that established teachers’ minimum monthly
salary of 100 Lempiras (COLPROSUMAH 2011).
These structural changes were quite significant as they were the early stages of a
process that would formalize the profession and encourage teachers to continue
organizing and to demand better working conditions, rights, and benefits. With the 1962
passing of the Ley de Colegiación Profesional Obligatoria (Law of Obligatory
Professional [Teachers’] College Affiliation), approximately 8,000 Honduran teachers
were formally registered with the central Ministry (COLPROSUMAH 2011). This
facilitated additional attempts to continue validating the profession by forming a ‘colegio
magisterial.’ Up until that point, Honduran schoolteachers did have two different
associations – ‘La Asociación de Maestros Hondureños’ (The Association of Honduran
Teachers) and ‘Acción Magisterial Hondureña’ (Honduran Teacher Action) – but these
initial organizations were of little significance in terms of the power they had to demand
that the central government regulate the profession and thus pay schoolteachers as
legitimate workers legally entitled to certain rights and benefits.
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In addition to these initial structural changes that worked to formalize and validate
the profession, in 1963, as the Acción Magisterial Hondureña sought to form an official
colegio magisterial through legislation, they also formed teachers’ interest committees
which later that year called for the first nation-wide schoolteacher strike
(COLPROSUMAH 2011). The strike committee sought an increase in teachers’ salaries,
and during the process of declining the initial offers from the national congress the
Colegio Profesional Superación Magisterial Hondureño (COLPROSUMAH,
Professional College of Honduran Teacher Improvement) was formed on 4 June 1963
(COLPROSUMAH 2011). Two days later the magisterio achieved their initial strike goal
with the increase in teachers’ basic monthly salary from 100 to 150 Lempiras
(COLPROSUMAH 2011).
Some Honduran schoolteachers who reflect on this history claim that these
pioneering organizers sought not only to formalize the profession and further teachers’
rights, but also to distance themselves from the various sindicatos (for non-professional
workers) that were emerging in the banana and other industries. By claiming that their
organization was a ‘colegio magisterial’ (a teachers’ professional association),
exclusively for educated professionals, they developed a certain amount of leverage in
claiming that because of their education and because of the necessity of their services,
they were worthy of additional rights and benefits.
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Inquiry into the history of the six

Honduran colegios magisteriales seems like rich terrain for future historical research
projects, if archival research into the internal dynamics of each colegio were permitted.
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For an analysis of similar processes in Peru see Parker (1998).
I initially enquired with Valle departmental COLPROSUMAH dirigentes about possible access to their colegio’s
archives and was told by several senior teachers that the higher leaders of the colegios magisteriales would never allow
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The focus of the present research project is the 2012 reforms and schoolteachers’
actions in the post June 2009 coup political environment. My historical inquiries here are
therefore more modest – serving as tools for understanding the present, in accord with an
anthropology that studies how people imagine what is, or is not, politically possible by
considering how the weight of the past orients the present and opens different paths to the
future. What, then, were the experiences of some schoolteachers who entered the
profession during these earlier periods when the state sought to expand the education
sector? How did these experiences interact with their involvement with the Resistencia?

3.3 Profesor Luis
Born in 1950 into a poor and fragmented family from a fishing village in rural
Amapala (Isla del Tigre), Luis
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never knew his biological father, who left the family of

four children soon after he was born. Luis’ mother supported herself and her children
with the meagre wages that she earned by washing the clothes of her neighbours in the
river. Basic subsistence resources (such as food, shelter, and clothing) were quite scarce
throughout Luis’ early childhood, even after his mother re-married. Despite suffering
from hunger and other challenges of poverty, Luis did manage to graduate from primary

such research to be done. These comments also connect with opinions they shared about colegio leadership corruption
and divisions within colegios – topics that I explore in Chapter 5.
34
Consistent with standard practices in sociocultural anthropology, I have assigned pseudonyms to all of my research
participants, and disguised certain identifying features. Likewise, the names of both schools where I conducted
research, ‘Carías Andino’ and ‘José Cecilio del Valle’ – although quite common names for schools in Honduras, as
these Liberal intellectual figures sought to bring education in the realm of the state – are not the real names of these two
schools where I conducted research. Moreover, the name of the rural community (in the municipality of Nacaome)
where Carías Andino is located, ‘El Garrobo’, is also a pseudonym.
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school, after which his mother made arrangements with her cousin in Tegucigalpa for
Luis to go live with her, where he had the opportunity to pursue a secondary education.
In Tegucigalpa Luis’ mother’s cousin – who he refers to as his ‘aunt’ – provided
him with food, clothing, and a place to live. There Luis’ economic conditions were
somewhat better than in Amapala: he had more food security and his aunt even bought
him his first pair of shoes when he turned 14. But Luis’ aunt could not afford to support
him and send him to secondary school all by herself. For these reasons, Luis took on a
janitorial job mopping the floors of a public health centre in order to contribute to his
living and educational expenses.
While the earnings did help to offset some living expenses, Luis’ desire to
continue his secondary education came into direct conflict with the economic reality of
his family’s situation: his aunt could not continue to pay for his educational expenses
beyond ciclo común (the first three years of secondary school). However, around the time
that Luis finished ciclo común the opportunity to study at the Escuela Normal de Varones
‘Pedro Nufio’ (‘Pedro Nufio’ Boys’ Normal School) presented itself. There Luis was
granted a scholarship which covered his matrícula (enrolment and tuition fees), and
which also provided a small stipend for the purchase of academic materials and school
uniforms. Whatever minimal amount remained Luis could use to purchase basic food
items at the school. Since this normal school was in Tegucigalpa, Luis was also able to
continue living with his aunt and keep his part-time cleaning job to contribute toward his
living expenses. Between the scholarship and the earnings from his janitorial job, Luis
was almost entirely self-sustaining; his aunt only had to provide him with a place to
sleep.
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During the late 1960s, when Luis was in the normal school, he experienced what
can be considered a period of victory for the Honduran schoolteachers’ labour movement.
By then the magisterio already enjoyed various labour achievements made during the late
1950s and early 1960s. Opportunities were becoming more commonplace for individuals
of limited financial resources. While the military government of General Oswaldo López
Arellano sought to dismantle teachers’ organizations in general, these actions can also
been seen as a reflection of teachers’ successful organizing and the fact that López
Arellano considered them activists for the Liberal Party – around which, according to
COLPROSUMAH and some of its members with whom I work, the Primer Colegio
Profesional Hondureño de Maestros (PRICMAH, First Professional College of Teachers)
was formed by this military government as a strategy for gaining schoolteachers’ support
for the National Party.
What is significant about this period are the overall achievements made by the
magisterio. That is, by the late 1960s Honduran schoolteachers – as an organized gremio
– had already: 1) formalized their profession with the state by establishing a registration
process and a basic monthly salary that all registered and working teachers were to
receive; 2) achieved their demands for higher salaries during one (1963) occasion, a
process which both increased their income and proved to schoolteachers that their
organizing was worth the effort; and 3) developed a reputation with governing authorities
as a group of professionals capable of influencing national politics. All three of these
achievements are significant in and of themselves; all three will become important
themes in subsequent sections of this thesis when analyzing the current attempts to
dismantle teachers’ professional associations.
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It is not coincidental that this period of labour achievements for the magisterio
was also a time when the Honduran state needed more schoolteachers, and on the whole –
especially by the late 1960s – was expanding the education sector. Employment was
however not guaranteed for Honduran normal school graduates, as was the case in some
other Latin American countries during this time (see, for instance, Luykx 1999 on
Bolivia). Nonetheless, full-time employment was common for beginning teachers,
although this often meant competing with other normal school graduates and moving to a
less desirable and unfamiliar rural location.
It was customary for the all-male normal school to have regular social gatherings
with the all-female Escuela Normal de Señoritas ‘Pedro Nufio’ (with which they later
merged to form a co-educational normal school). At one such event Luis met his
girlfriend who he would date through the remainder of his normal school studies. Having
already made good friends and formed a romantic relationship, Luis did not want to leave
Tegucigalpa when he completed normal school studies in 1973. His grades placed him at
the top of his class, and his teachers told him that he would have a bright future as a
teacher. He decided to take the ‘concurso’ (contest) qualifying exam to see if he could
secure employment in Tegucigalpa at a primary school.
Luis did well on the concurso exam, receiving a perfect score of 100 percent. He
was confident that such a high score would lead to a permanent primary school position
in Tegucigalpa. However, this was not the case. As Luis put it: “At first I thought it was a
really significant score, and then I realized there were about one hundred hundreds!”
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All of the concurso applicants with perfect scores that year were instructed to re-apply for
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Interview, 31 December 2012.
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their licencias (temporary positions) or plazas (permanent positions) by meeting directly
with the Francisco Morazán director departamental (departmental Ministry director). It
was then that Luis realized that his score, while better than his classmates’, did not stand
out sufficiently at the national level where he was competing with normal school
graduates from other regions who also wanted jobs in the capital city.
The director departamental had to make placement decisions based on other
qualifications and qualities of these recent graduates. After his interview with the
director, Luis was told that he would begin with a licencia that was created in order to
cover the absence of a natural science teacher at a secondary school in Comayagüela (still
within the greater Tegucigalpa region). Luis was shocked that the director departamental
would send him to teach secondary school classes; he told the director that he didn’t have
any real experience with natural science classes at all, as a recent normal school graduate.
The director explained that the position was just for a few months until they could find a
permanent, qualified, secondary school natural science teacher. Under these conditions,
Luis began his first job within a few months of having graduated from the normal school.
One day the school in Comayagüela received a surprise visit from the Minister of
Education, Lidia Williams de Arias, who did not have a reputation as a minister friendly
to the magisterio. In fact she was often accused of not respecting the laws that the
magisterio had achieved through its labour struggles (a common theme that we will
continue to observe in the present context). The conflicts between Williams and the
magisterio even led COLPROSUMAH to denounce some aspects of Williams’
professional life and ultimately demand her resignation (COLPROSUMAH 1977). In any
case, the Minister told Luis that the Bay Islands high school on Roatán had been without

101

a natural science teacher during the first two months of class, and asked him to move to
Roatán to fill this position. She explained that the Roatán high school had recently
received status as a ‘colegio oficial’ (a high school completely funded by the state, as
opposed to semi-private). Coincidentally Luis’ girlfriend, who had not yet completed
normal school, had returned to her native Santa Bárbara to attend to the needs of her sick
father. Williams brought Luis into her office, took out 100 Lempiras from her pocket and
gave them to him. She explained that a one-way flight from Tegucigalpa to Coxen Hole
would cost 33 Lempiras, and that he could use the rest to travel to the town where the
high school was located and to get settled. Luis left the next day for Roatán.
Soon after his arrival both the sub-director and director of this high school retired,
and the minister asked Luis to become the high school director. Thus at the young age of
26, Luis held the position of high school director and natural science teacher – even
before having begun an undergraduate degree (technically, a requirement at the time in
order to teach secondary school at all). Luis was awarded these positions at the Roatán
high school not through the concurso process, but rather at the direct request of the
Minister of Education. Luis later began to take courses toward his undergraduate degree
at the Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Francisco Morazán UPNFM (Francisco
Morazán National Pedagogical University) in Tegucigalpa during the school vacation
months of December and January. This routine continued through his time in Roatán: he
taught at the high school from February through November, and took undergraduate
courses in Tegucigalpa during the summer break. He also became more involved with
community life and was elected to be the community ‘padrino’ (godparent, or sponsor).
In this capacity he engaged in various community-based development projects, including
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helping to secure funds from the national public works department for construction of a
paved road through Roatán.
In the late 1970s, around the time that Luis finished his degree in natural sciences
at the UPNFM in Tegucigalpa, Minister Williams de Arias asked him if he would be
interested in changing locations. As a southerner herself, she sympathized with Luis for
having to live so far away from home. She offered him a job as the director of a high
school in a rural, south-eastern border town. The school had also just been granted status
as colegio official, and the central Ministry of Education sought an experienced director
with an undergraduate degree to manage the colegio.
Luis accepted the position and moved to the south-eastern border town in the late
1970s. He bought property before he had enough money to construct a house, and
therefore rented a room near the colegio during the first year of his position, in easy
walking distance of work. Luis found that although he was in an isolated rural town, his
basic subsistence needs were met without needing to travel outside the town on a regular
basis. He did still make visits to the central Ministry offices to report on the status of his
colegio. During one such visit to Tegucigalpa he ran into his former girlfriend who had
been living with her sister-in-law while attempting to finish her normal school degree
(after her father had passed away). They got back together and were married before she
graduated. Luis’ wife left school to go live with him in the south-eastern border town,
where the newlyweds built a house on Luis’ empty lot.
In subsequent years as Luis began to develop regional contacts within the Valle
departmental Ministry offices he put in a good word on behalf of his wife for a position at
a primary school in San Lorenzo that was in need of teachers. The departmental Ministry
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directors permitted this type of employment at the time – as ‘profesores empíricos’
(empirical teachers, or teachers without professional credentials) – because of the need
for teachers in this area. Luis’ wife was thus appointed her position even before she had
graduated from the normal school. (She later went on to complete her normal school
degree while working full-time as a primary education schoolteacher.) While living in the
south-eastern border town in their new home, Luis and his wife had their first child in
1980. Once the couple’s second child was born they decided to relocate from the southeastern border town, given that Luis’ wife continued to work full-time at the primary
school in San Lorenzo. This arrangement meant that Luis would commute from San
Lorenzo to the town (about an hour and a half driving time).
By the mid-1980s the effects of the Cold War were also being felt in Honduras in
ways that profoundly affected teachers (just as they did other groups of organized
workers and the peasantry). Schoolteachers’ organizing efforts began to be incorrectly
categorized as ‘communist’ and as ‘subversive’ activities (as suggested in the previous
chapter). More specifically, it was also common for magisterio dirigentes (colegio
leaders) to be accused of supporting the Salvadoran FMLN or the Nicaraguan FSLN,
even when they were organizing a nationally-oriented labour movement for educated
professionals paid by the Honduran state.
While some Honduran schoolteachers did sympathize with the causes of the
FMLN and FSLN – and expressed their solidarity for these movements verbally, during
magisterio marches – none of my research participants were aware of anyone who
actually joined those foreign revolutionary fronts. Instead, Honduran teachers were
principally interested in furthering the rights of Honduran workers, and specifically, their
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own rights as professional educators. In so doing they continued to distinguish
themselves as educated ‘professionals’ from the uneducated general labourers, a process
which perhaps reinforced distinctions of social class, but in any case was realized within
the Honduran national context and had nothing to do with communism elsewhere.
Overall however, the armed forces special operations unit Batallón 316, known locally as
a ‘paramilitary’ death squad, did not see teachers’ organizing efforts in this light. Instead,
the tactic of the 316 was to scare, threaten, and disappear those magisterio dirigentes who
had organizing power, using the threat posed by the FMLN and FSLN as a scapegoat.
During his time at the south-eastern border town – in close proximity to the militarized
border with El Salvador – Luis held a leadership position as a dirigente for the Colegio de
Profesores de Educación Media de Honduras (COPEMH, College of Secondary
Education Teachers of Honduras).
There were several occasions when the 316 came through town looking for Luis.
They often wore their uniforms, but sometimes arrived in civilian clothing. Local
residents could easily recognize outsiders, however, and news of their presence circulated
quickly. Whenever 316 members were detected, community members friendly with Luis
would allow him to hide in their homes until the danger had passed. Since these
operatives detained, tortured, and disappeared civilians without any formal legal arrest,
their tactic was to take teachers away at night, when few people would be able to witness
their actions. For Luis, this made his usual work routine of driving home in the dark, after
closing the school, a dangerous task. Especially when word spread of 316 presence in the
town, Luis would often spend the night hiding in a friend’s home, rather than return to
San Lorenzo.
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On one occasion Luis was at the school late with his young son who became tired
and wanted to go home. Despite the threat of 316 members, Luis decided to make the
trip. He asked the colegio security guard to accompany them to the end of the dirt road
connecting the community with the Pan-American Highway. Before they reached the
highway, however, the 316 members were waiting for Luis – standing in a line across the
road with guns in hand. They took him to a Nacaome jail for questioning. Luis was
terrified, but as he was being hauled away he managed to ask the security guard to take
his car (and his son) to San Lorenzo that night to tell his wife what had happened. At the
jailhouse the 316 members stopped short of torturing Luis, but did abuse him verbally.
They called him a ‘lazy teacher,’ a ‘subversive anarchist,’ a ‘communist piece-of-shit,’
and a ‘traidor a la patria hondureña’ (traitor to the Honduran fatherland). Luis, scared
that he would be murdered, pleaded with the 316 members, telling them that he had done
nothing illegal, and that he was a simple schoolteacher, not a member of any communist
movement.
When they insisted that he was a ‘subversive’ and a ‘communist,’ Luis explained
that while he was a departmental magisterio dirigente, all he had been doing was
organizing schoolteachers in order to negotiate teachers’ working rights with the Ministry
of Education – nothing illegal. As the 316 members continued to insult him, Luis
screamed out that they had no right to treat him this way, as a Honduran citizen without
any criminal record. Luis remained in the Nacaome jail under these conditions for several
more hours until the 316 members received a phone call from one of their high-ranking
counterparts in Tegucigalpa. To Luis’ surprise, the 316 members suddenly removed his
handcuffs and apologized for having arrested him without justification, telling him that
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he was free to go. Luis hitch-hiked home to San Lorenzo, bewildered and still frightened.
He later learned that his release was made possible through his personal network. Once
the school’s security guard told Luis’ wife about his arrest, she called a distant uncle of
hers who was a high-ranking military officer. She pleaded with her uncle to use his
influence to secure her husband’s release. And it worked.
As the repression against schoolteachers continued throughout the 1980s, Luis
and his wife concluded that distant familial connections with one military officer did not
provide enough security. They both had colleagues and friends who had been
disappeared. And as 316 members were regularly spotted in the border town, Luis’ wife
gave him an ultimatum: either they both move to her hometown of Santa Bárbara, or he
ask to be transferred to a different school, somewhere outside of the south. Either way,
she insisted that Luis give up his position as a Valle dirigente and that he move away
from the south, where most people knew who he was. Luis agreed that he would have to
move someplace where few people knew him. Although upset to leave the leadership
positions he had earned through experience (his appointed position as director of the high
school), and through election by his colleagues (as a Valle dirigente for COPEMH), Luis
asked the Ministry for a transfer and explained that it was for ‘security’ reasons. He was
not the first schoolteacher in the 1980s to do this. According to Luis, the Ministry of
Education knew that the 316 had been disappearing Honduran teachers, and they
therefore granted various transfers during this time when an applicant said it was for
security reasons (which points to the contradictions and variability among state
institutions).
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Luis was assigned a natural science teaching position at the ‘Escuela Normal de
Varones ‘Centroamérica’ – an all-male live-in normal school in Comayagua. Although
this position was a demotion to a lower level teaching job, Luis considered his
involvement at this normal school more prestigious, given how large it was. The normal
school’s campus had roughly 40 hectares of land where the students cultivated crops and
raised livestock, producing enough food for its own population and also generating a
surplus to sell in the Comayagua market. The ‘Ciudad Normalista’ (‘Normalist City’) –
as it was referred to locally because of its immense campus – became known for the
quality of its food products. The school often filled orders from local vendors, generating
revenues which were dedicated to expenditures beyond those supported by the Ministry.
Luis received the same salary at the normal school in Comayagua as he did while
working as the director of the high school in the border town, but he also received
subsidized room and board to live on campus at a negligible cost. He was therefore able
to travel home to San Lorenzo every weekend, where he still tried to keep a low profile.
One weekend in San Lorenzo while running an errand, Luis noticed a van with
dark tinted windows driven by military personnel. It stopped and a 316 member grabbed
him and arrested him in broad daylight. The 316 member was wearing dark sunglasses
and told Luis not to look at his face and not to ask why he was being arrested. They threw
Luis in the back of their van, where three other 316 members were sitting. They told him
to pray and ask God for one last wish, because this was ‘the last time that he would see
the light of day.’ Then the driver said that teachers such as Luis aren’t always all that bad,
and that he should be permitted to sit in the front seat next to him, instead of the back of
the van. Luis was terrified and moved to the front seat as instructed. But he couldn’t help
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asking himself why a young 316 member had invited him, the detainee, to sit next to
him…. As they began to drive outside of San Lorenzo, the other 316 members called
Luis a ‘lazy teacher’ and a ‘subversive.’ They told him once again that they were going to
shoot him in the head, just as soon as they were further outside of town.
When they stopped to have lunch, all of a sudden the driver said to Luis: “Profe!
How soon you have forgotten about some of your best students, eh?” Shaken up, Luis
replied, “I am so sorry, but I don’t know what you mean….”
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The 316 member took off

his glasses and said, “It’s me! From the Escuela Normal Centroamérica! Don’t you
remember me? You taught me chemistry classes a couple of years back! Look, I’m now
in the special operations of the armed forces.” It was then that all of the 316 members
admitted to Luis that when they saw him in San Lorenzo, the driver insisted on playing a
practical joke on him. The 316 members finished their meal, and said good-bye to Luis.
He was not at all amused.
Not every Honduran schoolteacher had such a fortunate escape from the infamous
316 and other special operations units during the 1980s. Luis had teacher friends who
were disappeared during this time. He himself tried to avoid attracting any significant
attention as a teacher or a former COPEMH dirigente. This was not always an easy task,
for at the normal school in Comayagua he was again elected to be a regional dirigente for
COPEMH – this time, even to hold the prestigious position of departmental president for
the colegio – but he chose to decline the offer for his own safety. Since teachers involved
in organizing were accused of being ‘communists,’ Luis chose to avoid common
identifiers of communist ideas or symbols. For instance, he had a red automobile that he
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used to travel from Comayagua to San Lorenzo. After explaining to his wife what had
happened that day in San Lorenzo with the 316 members, they decided to paint the car
brown, as to not appear in support of communism.
In the late 1980s Luis gave up what could have been the most prestigious position
of his career. The director of the Escuela Normal de Varones ‘Centroamérica’ passed
away due to illness and the sub-director refused to run such a large enterprise. The job
was subsequently offered to Luis by the Comayagua director departamental. Although it
was a highly prestigious position, it also included additional levels of stress (as normal
school directors endure various kinds of criticisms emanating from different fronts). For
Luis, taking on such a position would have certainly raised his public profile, which
would have been counterproductive for his goal not to attract the attention of 316.
Although this position also would have implied an increase in salary, this was not enough
to convince Luis that the risk was worth taking.
In the 1990s, once the effects of the Cold War and violence against teachers
began to decline, Luis asked for a transfer somewhere closer to San Lorenzo. At first, it
appeared as though there were not any positions available. But within the first six months
of his search, the director of a colegio in the department of Choluteca told him about a
natural science teacher who wanted to move someplace else. He and Luis agreed to
switch positions through a permutua (an ‘exchange’ approved by the Ministry), and the
teacher from Choluteca was delighted to be able to move to Comayagua and teach at the
Escuela Normal de Varones ‘Centroamérica’. While not nearly as prestigious as his
position at the normal school, Luis was happy to take on the position at the colegio in
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Choluteca simply because it was much closer to his family, and he could once again live
in San Lorenzo and commute to the town in Choluteca.
In the latter part of the 1990s when the natural science laboratory director retired,
Luis applied through the concurso process for this position and successfully obtained it.
In the early 2000s, the colegio director retired, and the Choluteca director departamental
placed Luis in charge of the colegio as director, insisting that he was the only qualified
applicant in the area, given his previous experiences as director. Luis had once again
found employment stability, and began to pursue other professional interests. He started
to work part-time as a journalist – something which had interested him during his
undergraduate studies, even though he choose to major in natural sciences since it was
more likely to lead to employment as a teacher. By 2002 Luis was working as a local
radio correspondent. For this position, he attended different kinds of newsworthy events
and reported his findings to the national radio headquarters and during news programs.
This has resulted in a unique situation in which Luis is invited to magisterio events (like
protests) where he both participates as a teacher and observes as a journalist reporting on
the event.
Luis’ dual position as colegio director and radio correspondent has afforded him
other opportunities to follow newsworthy events. In the immediate aftermath of the June
2009 kidnapping of Mel, Luis attended local marches, reporting on the formation of the
Resistencia movement in the south. Since he became known as a high school director in
solidarity with the movement, different Resistencia dirigentes have seen Luis as a
resource for their activities. During one occasion in late 2009, the Resistencia planned a
nation-wide event in which participants from different regions of the country walked to
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Tegucigalpa to protest the coup-installed government, and to demand that Mel be
reinstated as president. Luis was asked to allow the participants to sleep in the classrooms
of his high school while walking from Choluteca to Tegucigalpa – a common request
made of teachers during this time. Meanwhile, Luis had also followed the orders of the
Federación de Organizaciones Magisteriales de Honduras (FOMH, Federation of
Teachers’ Organizations of Honduras) – a committee composed of the presidents of all
six colegios magisteriales – to hold a nation-wide paro to protest against the coup. As a
result, Luis had closed down the high school campus, and many of his colleagues at the
school had travelled to Tegucigalpa to protest the coup. Luis stayed behind at the school,
not to conduct classes but to help house hundreds of Resistencia members in his colegio.
Soon enough the armed forces arrived and insisted that Luis remove the protesters
from his school, the property of the Honduran state. The soldiers argued that if the school
was closed due to a magisterio paro, then Luis would therefore be prohibited from
entering the school premises, just as all the Resistencia members would also be
prohibited from entering. Luis disagreed, and insisted that by Honduran law, the director
of a centro educativo (education centre) has the authority to grant or deny permission to
enter the school property. Luis insisted that the Resistencia members were welcome, and
that armed forces personnel were not. Luis then entered the school himself, and while
closing the gate with a deadbolt lock, he said: “This is my high school, where I am the
director. As the law states, from this line inward, I am in charge. You and your fellow
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soldiers can stay out there and be in charge of whomever you find out there, ¡pero aquí el
que manda soy yo! (but here I am the one in charge!)”
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3.4 Profesora Mercedes
Similar to Luis’ background, Mercedes is another teacher who grew up in a
household with limited financial resources. Born into a Tegucigalpa working class family
in 1962, she was the youngest of four children. Mercedes has little memory of her
Salvadoran (immigrant) father, since by 1969 he was forcibly removed from Honduras
during the events leading up to the Football War. According to Mercedes, her father had
intended to return to Honduras, but even several years after the war had ended, neither
she nor any of her immediate family members had heard anything from their father. Her
mother eventually remarried and Mercedes was able to complete primary school in
Tegucigalpa, in spite of significant financial difficulties. Her mother’s expectation was
that Mercedes was either to find work, or get married, shortly after graduating from
primary school. However, Mercedes wanted to pursue a secondary education and she
began taking ciclo común courses in Tegucigalpa – amidst familial pressure to find either
employment or a male partner to support her.
While in ciclo común a distant cousin of Mercedes, who had political connections
with the armed forces and the government of Coronel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro, told
her about scholarships available for aspiring young women
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at the Escuela Normal de

Interview, 23 August 2012.
Women, as a group, have been seen by state planners in different Latin American countries as the ideal candidates
for the teaching profession, following perceptions which hold that women: 1) are good at transmitting moral standards;
and 2) could be paid less than men, and would thus comprise a continual source of cheap labour (Palmer & Chaves
1998: 49). Indeed, the majority of Honduran schoolteachers with whom I work are women (and the majority of teachers

38

113

Señoritas ‘España’ in Danlí, in the Department of El Paraíso. All of Mercedes’ extended
family members were from the Department of Francisco Morazán; she did not have any
relatives in Danlí. But her cousin was able to put in a good word for her to the
appropriate military government authorities overseeing the education budget, which led
to extensive funding for Mercedes during her normal school studies.
During the late 1970s, Honduras saw a general increase in government funding allotted to
the national public education system in an overall effort to increase the number of
teachers, and the quality of their education at the normal schools. Mercedes thus entered
the Danlí normal school during a period when the Honduran Ministry of Education was
investing more resources in schoolteacher training.
UPNFM professor and scholar of Honduran magisterio history, Mario Membreño,
cites that during this period the Honduran state was spending a total of 56.4 percent of its
education budget on normal schools, and that 46 percent of registered secondary school
students were normalistas (1989: 10), while the rest were students enrolled in other kinds
of high school specialization programs. The Plan of Consolidation of Normal School
Education, implemented during the military government of General Oswaldo López
Arellano, stipulated that four important normal schools in strategic locations (La
Esperanza, Comayagua, Tegucigalpa, and Danlí) would serve as model normal schools

who held leadership positions as school administrators and magisterio dirigentes are men). However, far from being
passive recipients of what has largely been a patriarchal order, women Honduran schoolteachers (such as Mercedes)
have become influential agents of social transformation. As historians Steven Palmer and Gladys Rojas Chaves have
argued in the case of Costa Rica, the women teachers trained at the ‘Colegio de Señoritas’ normal school in the early
1920s perceived themselves as privileged agents of modernity. Palmer and Chaves go on to argue that these
normalistas were integral to the emerging conviction that women had an important place in the public sphere, and were
thus essential agents of the birth of Costa Rican feminism (1998: 82). While I am interested in anthropological
questions related to gender, and I am conscious of the gender inequalities within the Honduran magisterio, specific
inquiries about gender are not a focus of mine in this particular research project.
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for producing Honduras’ new teachers, who were to be better educated and more capable
of solving the nation’s social problems (see Membreño 1989 for a description of this in
Honduras, which also resonates with what Luykx 1999 reports on normal schools in
Bolivia).
The year that Mercedes entered the normal school, 1977, was one year after the
first cohort graduated under this new plan for normal school students. Mercedes’
scholarship from the military government (which fully covered tuition as well as room
and board at the all-female normal school) can be seen as a reflection of this emphasis on
training more schoolteachers and expanding the public education sector.
While living and studying in Danlí, Mercedes met the man she would later marry.
He was not a normal school student, but rather was an albañil (brick layer/construction
worker), and he was supportive of Mercedes’ desire to continue her own education.
Mercedes’ good academic record demonstrated her potential for further study, and her
teachers at the normal school encouraged her to pursue an undergraduate degree. After
graduating in 1980 she was successful in gaining admission to the mathematics program
at the UPNFM. At the same time, she applied through the concurso process for a position
as a primary school teacher in Tegucigalpa, to support herself while studying full time.
She received a high enough score on the concurso exam to secure a year-long licencia as
a primary school teacher in Tegucigalpa during her first year of undergraduate studies.
The young couple thus relocated to Tegucigalpa where Mercedes began to work as a
primary school teacher and study to become a secondary school math teacher; her
boyfriend was also able to continue working in construction in Tegucigalpa.
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Toward the end of her licencia and first year in undergraduate studies, Mercedes
began to apply for other licencias and plazas – whatever was available in Tegucigalpa.
But she was unable to secure employment, and risked losing the income that supported
her living expenses while at the UPNFM. In the midst of re-applying for a licencia she
experienced what other female schoolteachers have also all-too-frequently experienced:
Mercedes’ boss, the director of the primary school, who was also a colegio dirigente for
PRICMAH, offered her a plaza at his school (through his political connections) in
exchange for sexual favours. Mercedes refused and attempted to denounce her superior’s
inappropriate actions. While she found solidarity among some of her colleagues,
including some male teachers at the school, neither authorities at the departmental
Ministry office nor leaders of PRICMAH would listen to her complaint.
Even without a job, Mercedes continued her enrolment at the UPNFM. However,
early in her second year at university she became pregnant. Mercedes was subsequently
subject to social pressure from her family to get married, to set aside her professional
goals, and instead to dedicate her time to raising her child. She complied. After getting
married, right before her first child was born, Mercedes and her husband decided that it
would be most convenient for them to relocate to Nacaome, where her husband was from,
and where they would be close to his extended family who could assist with child care.
Mercedes agreed, as long as she could look for work as a primary school teacher near
Nacaome. Her husband and in-laws were all supportive of this, and Mercedes applied
through the concurso process at the Valle departmental level for a position in primary
education.
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In 1982 Mercedes had her first child and received her first plaza as a
schoolteacher. However, the position was in a rural community far from her home in
Nacaome. Transportation into the community was via a dirt road that could only be
traversed by foot, on horseback, or with a four-wheel drive truck. The latter two options
were not readily available to Mercedes, and from the Pan-American Highway outside of
Nacaome, it would take her close to seven hours to walk to the rural community. Thus it
was not practical for Mercedes to commute daily from her home in Nacaome and she
decided to instead rent a room in the community and to live there during the workweek.
This was a difficult decision, since it meant leaving her newborn baby in the care of her
mother-in-law in Nacaome and only seeing her husband and child on the weekends.
To make matters more difficult, the rural community where Mercedes worked
was very poor, even in the context of the familiar conditions of poverty in the Honduran
south. So poor were the children of the families that Mercedes taught, she says, that they
would almost always arrive to classes without having eaten breakfast, and often without
having eaten dinner the night before. Mercedes, herself a cash-strapped beginning teacher
and wife of an albañil, did not have the financial means to feed her students. Yet she
herself had to eat something during the day while at the school. In order to avoid eating in
front of the already-hungry children, she would hide her food under her shirt and go to
the latrine to eat in solitude.
Article 51 in the 1982 Estatuto del Docente law establishes that in addition to the
base wage, five other factors increase a teacher’s monthly salary: 1) the position held; 2)
years of service; 3) academic degrees earned; 4) professional merits earned; and 5)
working zone (República de Honduras 1997 [1982]). Number five means that teachers
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working in a rural area should receive a ‘rural bonus,’ to help compensate for their
additional transportation or living expenses given the remote locations of their schools.

39

This extra amount was however not enough for Mercedes to feel that it was a favourable
situation: after two years of living and working under these circumstances, she solicited a
traslado from the departmental Ministry. She asked to take her plaza to some other
school closer to Nacaome, in order to live in the city with her family. Once this became
available, Mercedes was offered a position at a rural primary school within a half hour
bus ride from Nacaome. This was again a small school, where Mercedes had only three
teacher colleagues, one of whom was the school director. However, accepting this
position meant that Mercedes could once again live with her family.
After a few years, in the latter half of the 1980s, Mercedes was asked by the
departmental Ministry to accept a transfer to the (then) primary school Carías Andino in
the rural community of El Garrobo (the school where I conducted most of my fieldwork).
She accepted this traslado, which consisted of an afternoon shift further away from her
house in Nacaome, but still less than an hour-long bus ride. After a couple of years of
working just this afternoon shift, Mercedes applied for another job in the morning shift,
again within an hour of Nacaome so that she could commute. She was offered a position
teaching kindergarten classes, something that she had not done since her initial training at
the Escuela Normal de Señoritas ‘España.’ Yet making the sacrifice of working with
kindergarten students was well worth it for Mercedes, because the kindergarten was
within the city limits of Nacaome. Mercedes could thus work the morning shift, and then
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While some teachers told me that this rural bonus does exist, others have told me that they have never actually
experienced it. What teachers do commonly receive when working in a rural area, as an incentive, is an increase in
salary every three years rather than every five years.
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take the bus to El Garrobo in the afternoon. At both schools Mercedes was well received
among her colleagues, and she began to take an interest in the local leadership of her
colegio magisterial, COLPROSUMAH. In the late 1980s she was elected to become a
regional magisterio dirigente.
In addition to, and partially resulting from, the violence against schoolteachers in
the 1980s, the decade was also a period when Honduran schoolteachers experienced
different kinds of attempts to divide their colegios. This had also been the case, although
arguably to lesser degrees, in the 1970s and 1960s. So great was the potential for factions
within the colegios to break off and form a new colegio, or to simply disrupt the
organizing efforts of the colegio leaders, that Mercedes and other such dirigentes at the
time considered it a tremendous achievement when at the end of a given dispute, their
colegio still existed as one COLPROSUMAH. As Mercedes explained, “The magisterio
was weakened during the 1980s. Unfortunately some of our dirigentes were bought-out
by the oligarchy, and the ones who were verdaderos maestros del corazón [real teachers
at heart], we had to focus on not becoming divided. Remaining united was our main
40

achievement. This is what we ended up fighting against, el dividismo.”

The other major aspect of Mercedes’ leadership position with COLPROSUMAH
during this time was that it came with the danger of being associated with ‘communism,’
and indeed Mercedes had numerous colleagues who were disappeared during this time. In
its official summaries of this history, her colegio claims that 189 of their members were
disappeared by paramilitary organizations during the 1980s (COLPROSUMAH 2011).
Mercedes was nonetheless committed to participating in the nation-wide labour struggle
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to further the rights of Honduran schoolteachers, and she herself was fortunate not to
experience any violence directed at her specifically.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the director of Carías Andino retired, and the subdirector took on the position of director. Mercedes applied through the concurso process
for the position of sub-director and was successful. Since then she has been the subdirectora of Carías Andino. This has implied an increase in her responsibilities to help
the director administer curricular activities and supervise the staff. While this position
does imply a slight increase in salary, Mercedes maintains her morning job at the
kindergarten in order to make ends meet. In the early 2000s, she was also offered an
additional part-time job teaching adult literacy classes in the evenings to adults in the El
Garrobo community. This position is somewhat unregulated by the magisterio: her salary
comes directly from an international development fund, and there is no formal concurso
process. Rather, a Valle diputado recommended Mercedes for the position, and the
current director of Carías Andino allows her to use her classroom at the school, even
though he and all the other teachers leave and officially close the school at 5 pm. The
earnings from this evening position are meagre, and Mercedes complains that although it
is not regulated by the magisterio, the government still deducts the standard amount from
this pay to go toward teachers’ retirement and life insurance funds.
There is no standard curriculum design or didactic material for Mercedes to
follow in this position. She has thus had to tackle the difficulties of teaching adult literacy
on her own. Mercedes says that despite the influence of the radio school movement
during the 1960s, in which teachers would attempt to teach adult literacy classes over the
radio (see White 1972), her adult students are not well prepared to learn how to read and
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write, and some of them are embarrassed about this fact. She spends a good deal of time
going to their houses and encouraging them to come to class. All too often however
Mercedes is left with less than half of her class present. She has also offered to teach
private lessons to those adult students who would rather not be associated with illiteracy
locally by coming to the group. Mercedes herself was influenced by the writings of Paulo
Freire (1994 [1970]), and despite these complications with the job, she finds working
with adults rewarding, and considers it to be a good service to ‘poor peasants’ of the El
Garrobo community, who she says, “have their own experiences as adults that I need to
recognize as important”
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(which according to Freire, (1994 [1970]) is a necessary

pedagogical approach for such work).
After years of putting up with her husband’s infidelity, in early 2009 Mercedes
initiated divorce proceedings when her husband announced that he would be moving in
with his mistress. Mercedes had never lived on her own, but she was the primary income
earner of her household and didn’t fear financial repercussions from not living with her
husband. In fact, she told me, “I am the professional here, and I can say what I am going
to do. My ex-husband is only an albañil; he doesn’t even have the education [degree] that
I have.”
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Once the Resistencia consolidated following the June 2009 coup, Mercedes
became active in the movement. She frequently participated in the marches and protests
in Tegucigalpa and other distant cities, where she said her husband would not have
allowed her to travel by herself. In fact, Mercedes had never travelled outside of
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Francisco Morazán, El Paraíso, Choluteca, and Valle (which is quite uncommon for most
teachers, especially dirigentes) until she became involved with the Resistencia. Her first
time visiting Amapala was not until she accompanied a group of Resistencia leaders in
their visit to a peasant community in Zacate Grande, to demonstrate solidarity with the
campesinos’ struggles for land tenure there. Mercedes became an active participant in
such acts of solidarity and began to incorporate her political views of the June 2009 coup
during conversations that she had with community members in El Garrobo – within and
beyond her adult literacy classes.
For Mercedes, becoming active with the Resistencia coincided with what she
considered to be another liberating change in her own life: her divorce. She became
especially interested in women’s rights, and has since attempted to incorporate into the
Resistencia movement dialogue about abuses against women and about family
disintegration in general. In early 2010, in the midst of her active involvement with the
Resistencia, Mercedes decided to return to the UPNFM to take weekend classes at the
Nacaome campus and pursue an undergraduate degree in ‘administración educativa’
(educational administration). There she has been able to fulfill her professional
educational goals that she had previously given up because of her pregnancy and
marriage.

3.5 Profesor Marlon
A third teacher who was raised partially by extended family members is Marlon.
Born into a middle-class family in Choluteca in 1972, Marlon’s parents divorced when he
was very young, and his mother (a schoolteacher) decided to raise him at her mother’s
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home in Tegucigalpa, where they would have more financial stability. There Marlon
finished primary school, and began his ciclo común education in the mid-1980s. As a
rebellious teenager during his ciclo común studies, Marlon often disobeyed his mother
and grandmother. He frequently skipped class to engage in other activities with his peers
throughout the city. At that point in his education, Marlon did not have any interest in
continuing on to pursue a secondary school carrera. But he had made friends with older
adolescents, some of whom were normalistas. A group of these normalistas, who Marlon
says self-identified as Marxists, encouraged him to join a student group of the Honduran
Left that promoted socialist policies for Honduras and Latin America in general.
Although this group expressed solidarity with the FMLN and FSLN, its activism was
aimed toward furthering the rights of different urban working class, campesino, and
indigenous movements within Honduras – showing broad solidarity despite the divisions
between these groups themselves. The normalista student group travelled extensively
throughout Honduras to engage in protests, and at the young age of 14, Marlon began to
receive invitations to come along to these excursions, which as he said: “forged political
consciousness among young people.”
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One day during his last year of ciclo común studies, Marlon left his home –
without telling anyone – to travel with the student political group for a week-long
meeting in Siguatepeque. The group’s goal was to ‘tomar’ (take over) a high school
there, out of protest against the national security doctrine and the Honduran government’s
collaboration with the US military invasion of Nicaragua and El Salvador. This sort of
political action was a frequent occurrence among some of the senior members of the
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group, but it was the first time that Marlon was invited to participate. Marlon didn’t tell
his mother, his grandmother, or any of his teachers where he was going or what he was
doing. In the end the Honduran national police repressed the group during their protests
in Siguatepeque, and several of Marlon’s friends were imprisoned. Marlon himself was
injured during the police raid. He remembers that although some of his friends responded
violently in reaction to the police violence, he refrained, as he had promised himself to
never use violence in such situations.
When Marlon came back to his home in Tegucigalpa he was reprimanded by his
mother, who noticed his injuries. She scolded him both for what he did, and for not
letting her know where he was. Marlon’s last year in ciclo común was also a difficult
time at home in general. The only common ground that he seemed to share with his
mother was the fact that she was a schoolteacher – a profession that he considered to be
in alignment with his own political orientations. Marlon’s decision to study a carrera del
magisterio was not due however to pressure from his mother (as other daughters and sons
of teachers do experience), but rather, based on advice from his older normalista friends
from the student political group who convinced him that becoming a teacher was an
acceptable professional goal.
Upon graduating from ciclo común Marlon enrolled in the Escuela Normal de
Varones ‘Pedro Nufio’ where he continued to be involved with Left student groups in
Tegucigalpa. He received a scholarship which covered all academic-related expenses, and
he was able to continue living at home with his mother, although by then his grandmother
had passed away. At the normal school, Marlon began to develop connections between
what he was being taught to become a teacher, and the political struggles his student
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group was fighting for: the end of US imperialism in Central America and more dignified
labour conditions for Honduran workers. Marlon became a leader of the group and
invited specific normalista colleagues to join exclusive planning committees. For Marlon,
learning about schoolteachers’ labour struggles and the history of their organizing during
his normal school studies was one way that he felt he himself could fit into the shifting
political environment at the end of the 1980s in Central America.
By the end of his normal school career Marlon felt that he could best contribute
toward his personal political goals by becoming a secondary mathematics teacher and
teaching Honduran youth about how macro-level political-economic processes affect
their everyday living standards. He believed that the student group he belonged to was
integral to developing his own political awareness and was linked to what he had learned
about political-economic processes during his normal school years.
Having graduated with good marks, Marlon was accepted into the UPNFM
mathematics program in Tegucigalpa. He was therefore able to continue living with his
mother (affording him the luxury of not having to work to pay for his own living
expenses), and pursue his undergraduate degree full-time. At the UPNFM Marlon again
became involved with Left student groups, now at the university level. With them he
frequently engaged in political protests, and travelled to other regions of the country for
different kinds of meetings with other Left political groups, and what he describes as
“solidarity educational tours,”
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during the early 1990s.

While at the UPNFM Marlon met the woman he would later marry, who
happened to also be from Choluteca. Upon graduating both teachers were successful in
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their applications through the concurso process for licencias in Choluteca. For Marlon,
this meant beginning to teach math classes at a high school. After two years of working
in this temporary position, Marlon was offered a plaza at the same high school. Since this
was only a morning shift however, he subsequently applied for another job elsewhere in
the south. This was difficult to obtain, at first, because the only positions available to him
were distant and he would not have been able to make the commute. Then in 2007
Marlon was able to secure a second job, working an afternoon shift, at the Carías Andino
school. This does require him to commute, but it is within an hour and a half drive from
Choluteca. Marlon was pleased to have the opportunity to hold two positions, and owning
his own vehicle facilitates this commute. At Carías Andino, Marlon became one of the
first secondary school teachers to work there during the time that it was transformed from
an escuela into a Centro de Educación Básica (Basic Education Centre), a process I
describe in detail in Chapter 5. The Valle director departamental subsequently asked
Marlon to teach natural science classes, despite his lack of experience in this area.
By the late 2000s Marlon had an established career and two plazas (permanent
jobs). He then began to volunteer his time with a local credit cooperative, where, he
explained, they have been delighted to have someone with an undergraduate degree in
mathematics. He also became active within his colegio magisterial, COPEMH, after
having followed his interest in their internal politics since his undergraduate studies.
Marlon has however refused to run for an elected leadership position for the colegio,
because he disagrees with the politics of the ‘Frente ‘Fre’ de COPEMH’ – the faction
within the colegio that has consistently won colegio leadership elections on a national
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level. Instead, Marlon has sided with what he considers to be the ‘most revolutionary’ of
teacher groups, the ‘Frente Unitario de COPEMH.’
Marlon is aware that the magisterio has been plagued with dividismo, and
understands that most of his colleagues have struggled to keep their colegios united.
From his perspective, this has implied a weak colegio magisterial leadership, which has
translated into mediocre labour organizing achievements for Honduran schoolteachers (a
subject I return to in Chapter 6). As part of a Left minority within the most powerful of
Honduras’ six colegios magisteriales, Marlon has been disappointed with what his
colegio leaders have called ‘achievements’; he feels that they could do much better. In
the latter part of the 2000s Marlon engaged in various protests against the policies of both
the Ricardo Maduro and the Mel Zelaya governments. He is adamantly against the June
2009 coup and its outcomes; he identifies as ‘de Resistencia.’ But, as Marlon continues to
remind those who ask him: “I, just like so many other Hondurans, have been ‘de
Resistencia’ since long before anything to do with Mel Zelaya or el 28 de junio.” As he
told me when discussing teachers’ positions with the Resistencia and LIBRE Party:
You know I’ve been de Resistencia since long before June 2009. I’ve always been
a revolutionary, ever since I was in the normal school. But at these marches you
see all sorts of people, not just people from the Left; all sorts of teachers from
other regions of the country. What we share in common is that we are all so fedup. People outside the magisterio might tell you that we teachers just want higher
wages, but that’s not it. We march on the streets because the governments that we
have had don’t respect our rights – they disregard the laws that we fought to pass.
No government has given us the respect that we deserve, not even that of Mel….
It was a little better with Mel, but not much – we still had our struggles. But now
it’s much worse. Ever since the golpe de estado things have become much worse.
There will be a moment when things will just explode. The state is putting itself in
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jeopardy with these reforms. They know they can’t continue like this. The truth is
every one of these golpistas should be in prison for what they have done. They
violate the constitution and all of the laws. But they have impunity. The armed
forces protects them. The police in this country beat up the common folk and
protect the criminals. And that’s what they are: criminals. Everyone knows it! So
we are out there marching against all of these injustices and hoping that we might
reverse the reforms. With a LIBRE government we might be able to. Honduras
has never had a popular revolution, but this is the real deal! I have faith. I also
have some critiques, which I will tell you some other time… but I do think it
would be good for this country, a step away from neoliberalism…. Xiomara is a
good candidate. We’ll talk more later. Right now I’ve got to go to class, and then
we have a meeting with the director to talk about the events for this civic activity
next week – the students’ parents are coming and we always have to receive them
well.
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3.6 Conclusion
These individuals of slightly different ages and of distinct family backgrounds
have had unique experiences with the carrera del magisterio. They do however share
specific experiences and characteristics in common. Mercedes, and especially Luis, come
from humble families of limited economic resources. For them, pursuing a secondary
education was difficult, as their families needed to prioritize covering the expenses of
more immediate needs, such the costs of food and housing. This did not seem to be the
case for Marlon, although his mother did relocate to Tegucigalpa for financial reasons. In
any case, these experiences of growing up with limited economic resources, and then
experiencing the benefits of a formal public education (especially that of having a full-
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time professional position and monthly salary) contribute to why Honduran
schoolteachers as a group have developed a discourse about how ‘education is the only
way to escape poverty.’
Throughout this thesis we will see ethnographic examples where teachers use this
line of thought as a tool for promoting the public education system in different contexts.
Whether or not all Honduran schoolteachers believe the public schooling system can
alleviate Hondurans from the shackles of poverty is not the point. Rather, we should
recognize that schoolteachers exemplify how success in the Honduran public education
system can lead to a better life. Moreover, while some of the labour achievements that
teachers have won are directly related to their own rights and benefits as workers – as
they so often claim, ‘todo lo que tiene el magisterio lo ha ganado a través de la lucha’
(everything that the magisterio has, it has won through its struggles) – other aspects such
as the idea that education remain public, are also seen as broader social policy
achievements that benefit the general Honduran population.
Schoolteachers recognize that not everyone has the same opportunities to access
the national public education system. Indeed, all of these individuals had extended family
members in different regions of the country, and were all fortunate enough to have had at
least one family member in Tegucigalpa, which facilitated their pursuit of secondary
education. Living in the capital city provided opportunities to pursue their education,
even if it came with other sacrifices (such as working at a cleaning job while in the
normal school). One of the central arguments of this thesis is that teachers are reflecting
on their own experiences with the national public education system as they envision what
it should be like. As they talked amongst themselves about the reforms, they recognized
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that equal access to education is necessary if Hondurans from humble backgrounds are to
take full advantage of what the public schooling system can offer.
Another commonality among the teachers examined here is that they all come
from families whose livelihood strategies depended upon an urban setting. Luis’ mother
was quite poor, and she lived on the outskirts of a small town in a marginalized region of
the country, but subsistence agriculture or farming was never one of her livelihood
strategies. Luis was therefore never expected to assist with planting or harvesting (as is
generally the case with adolescent males in the countryside). Likewise, it was acceptable,
if not expected, that Luis would someday seek employment opportunities in a distant city.
Indeed, beyond these few examples, more generally too the typical Honduran
schoolteacher does not come from a wealthy family, or even an upper-middle class
household, but at the same time she/he is generally not the daughter/son of campesinos
either. This is an important insight as we proceed to analyze how teachers view their own
positions, and work in the name of the Honduran state, in the post-coup political context.
Several of my research participants claim that: ‘el magisterio es la carrera de los
pobres’ (the magisterio is the career of the poor). This does seem to be the case, for the
type of individual who pursues a career as schoolteacher generally does not have the
financial means to study one of the ‘more expensive majors’ (such as medicine, law, or
engineering). I would add to this phrase nonetheless, that the magisterio is also a career
of those who are able to pursue a career in the first place. During the periods observed,
studying at the normal school did imply that some form of paid employment would
become available after graduating. The allure of a permanent job with a steady monthly
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income cannot be underestimated in assessing what is meant by the phrase ‘la carrera de
los pobres.’
Many of the later generations of Honduran schoolteachers (born in the late 1970s
or early 1980s) are children of other schoolteachers. There is a point to be made therefore
about how frequently these newer generations of schoolteachers have followed the same
professional pathways as their parents. We should keep in mind however that this is not
the only variable in their desires to become schoolteachers. For these younger teachers,
other types of individual interests can be more important than parental pressure to pursue
the career (as we saw was the case with Marlon, who considered his political orientations
to be a major factor in his decision to enter the profession). In summary, the carrera del
magisterio does seem to have been a viable option for the poor to become educated
professionals historically. Now however we see that this is no longer the case.
Aside from Honduran schoolteachers’ social profiles as individuals who chose to
pursue this career, the other question this chapter has addressed is how the profession was
experienced during these time periods. It is significant to note that all three individuals
entered the normal school when it was still common to receive scholarships that covered
at least their tuition and educational expenses. This is no longer the case. The experience
of Mercedes is especially noteworthy, as she received three years of paid living expenses
while in Danlí (something not to be taken lightly in the context of poverty). All of this
would lead us to conclude that the 1970s was a time of expansion of the public education
sector, when the Honduran state sought to increase its number of schoolteachers by
investing in the training of normal school students.
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These levels of state investment had decreased by the mid-1980s, during the
period of US-supported militarization. Likewise, when Luis graduated from the normal
school in 1973, he was offered two different positions as a secondary school teacher even
before earning his undergraduate degree. This reflects the fact that schoolteachers with
UPNFM degrees used to be relatively scarce, whereas today, there is a surplus of teachers
who have their undergraduate degrees and who are still unable to find work (even in the
undesirable rural areas). As Marlon put it: “antes el estado carecía de profesores… ahora
está totalmente saturado”
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(before the state lacked teachers… now it’s totally

saturated).
The fact that Luis was offered the position in Roatán directly by Minister
Williams de Arias also demonstrates that the concurso process, while functioning in
certain areas, was not the only means by which a teacher could secure a job. Here we saw
that the minister chose to override the concurso process to assign a teacher with
experience in natural science to an emerging high school in the Bay Islands. We might
infer that this was due to the overall scarcity of schoolteachers with undergraduate
degrees during this time period, but in any case this type of situation is far from the
standard in contemporary Honduras. Today there are far more applicants than vacant
positions – even for those in the most undesirable rural locations.
The experiences of all three individuals during the 1980s are also significant. On
the one hand they show how some teachers were affected by the environment of the
national security doctrine and the fear that ‘communism’ would penetrate Honduras,
during which time they as individuals formed certain opinions about what their everyday
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work lives should, or should not, be like. On the other hand these collective experiences
of being associated with ‘subversion’ are also important because they are remembered
and referenced by schoolteachers in the current historical conjuncture. Today when
schoolteachers organize around magisterio-related goals, or demonstrate their support for
broader nationally-focused political causes such as the goals of the Resistencia/LIBRE
Party, they are often referred to by national media outlets, politicians, entrepreneurs or
otherwise as ‘antipatriotic,’ ‘criminal,’ or even ‘communist.’
Schoolteachers as a group have certain shared experiences from the 1980s which
they can reference and compare with the strategies of post-coup governments for
repressing schoolteachers in Honduras (which in fact are shockingly similar). As one
knowledgeable COLPROSUMAH member told me: “In the 1980s the state would
disappear teachers for organizing, and they would blame the violence on the FMLN or
the FSLN. Now they continue to kill us and they place all the blame on the mareros
(gang members).”
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Finally, it is important to understand that Honduran schoolteachers are a group of
people who have engaged different state institutions through various techniques – often
seeing certain traditions and laws as useful resources, while recognizing that others are
working against their interests as education workers. This occurs in ways beyond simply
funding national public education and teachers’ own education credentials. For instance,
while the 316 members were disappearing Honduran schoolteachers during the 1980s, the
Ministry of Education was sympathetic to their petitions to be transferred because of this
practice. Another example of how the state can be seen as a resource for teachers is with
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the different kinds of laws that it passes. We saw that in the aftermath of the June 2009
coup when members of the armed forces demanded that Luis remove Resistencia
members from the premise of his school, he announced that ‘by Honduran law’ he had
the right to grant or deny permission to the school (which was his own interpretation of
the Estatuto del Docente).
In this next chapter we will see various ways in which teachers are interpreting
the significance of different kinds of laws – determining which ones are favourable or
not, and why. In Chapter 7 I will return to this idea that the state can be seen as a resource
for schoolteachers, as they seek to promote the expansion of state services in general,
while criticizing post-coup governance in the current context.
The stories of how these three individuals became involved with a carrera del
magisterio and began to pursue distinct professional paths has shown us details about
how some differently-situated individuals have experienced the profession of
schoolteacher in Honduras historically. Such ethnographic details underscore the
different types of aspirations that these individuals have had, and what sorts of
understandings they have had about how their profession worked in the past. We have
seen important commonalities and shared experiences among them, and we have
observed how the profession functioned historically. These are important insights as we
begin to explore how teachers understand the significance of the reforms and the current
post-coup political environment; as we study their strategies for implementing their own
visions for what governing policies and the state in Honduras should be like; and examine
their actions as ‘trabajadores de educación’ (education workers), and as agents both of
state formation and of social and political change.
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4

Reading the Political Landscape and Navigating the
Reforms

4.1 Introduction
This chapter initiates my ethnographic analysis of how Honduran schoolteachers
were reading the post-coup political landscape; learning what each new law entailed; and
navigating through these changes to the education sector during the 2012 school year.
Rather than merely announce what the new laws are, here I aim to show how Honduran
schoolteachers themselves were learning about what each new law entailed – a process
that took place during the entire school year as they read the political landscape and made
decisions based on the information they knew at the time. I was thus learning about the
dynamics of the magisterio and these new laws in contemporary Honduras during a time
when my research participants themselves were also learning about all the changes that
the reforms implied. Here I hope to capture the process of reflection and re-evaluation
that this involved for the teachers with whom I work.
I begin by describing how I met Esdras – the director of Carías Andino – and my
first trip to his school, in which he shares with me his interpretation of the significance of
the reforms. I then use Esdras’ words as a guide for exploring the extent to which policies
written in legislation do or do not become a lived reality on the ground. To this end, I
examine the ways in which teachers attempted to openly demonstrate that they were
abiding by the reforms through: 1) increasing the student population of their schools; 2)
monitoring the behaviour of their own colleagues; and 3) soliciting local funding for
school infrastructure projects. For the third point, in addition to reflecting on the
experience of rural Carías Andino school, I discuss comparable processes at the second
school where I did research, José Cecilio del Valle in the city of San Lorenzo.
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4.2 Meeting Director Esdras
Since my MA fieldwork in 2009 during the outbreak of the coup I had heard
stories of Esdras – a humble schoolteacher whose bravery and resilience made him a
well-known and active participant of the Resistencia. Because of his tireless involvement,
however, Esdras was rarely in San Lorenzo during this time. Most of the stories I heard
about him were through his mother, who would come to my house after each major
violent act against Resistencia members. She would discuss how she believed his
involvement with the movement had gone too far, explaining that she was worried about
his safety (see Levy 2010).
In the immediate eruption of the coup Esdras joined many teachers across the
country in a national paro to protest the illegal and violent overthrow of President Mel
Zelaya. For this purpose, he frequently travelled to Tegucigalpa to participate in protests
on the streets of the capital city. Later, when Mel was in Nicaragua gaining support for
his return to Honduras, Esdras crossed the land border clandestinely and travelled to
Ocotal and later to Managua as part of a group of Resistencia supporters who joined their
overthrown president in his attempts to return to Honduras by land (a story I tell in
Chapter 7). Once United Nations and Organization of American States resolution talks
began to occur outside of Central America and Mel attempted to fly from Washington to
Tegucigalpa, Esdras was also one of several Resistencia members who travelled to
Tegucigalpa’s airport on July 5 to await the plane, which did not land because the
Honduran armed forces placed a military Jeep on the runway, and shot at the many
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civilians who awaited their president, murdering a twelve year-old boy.

48

In September

2009, once Mel Zelaya returned to Honduras through a punto ciego (blind spot) in the
border between Honduras and Nicaragua and sought refuge at the Brazilian Embassy in
Tegucigalpa, Esdras was also one of several supporters who remained at the embassy
alongside Mel, during moments when the order from the movement was to protect the
president in case of any assassination attempts. In summary, this humble schoolteacher
from San Lorenzo did not miss a formal, although dangerous, Resistencia event.
It was in this context of Esdras’ family members expressing their concerns for his
safety that I would hear stories about his involvement with the Resistencia – his
perseverance toward obtaining his goals, how this influenced his strong dedication to the
movement, and the fact that he was one of several teachers from the south who had
joined the FNRP in order to defy the coup peacefully, in a popular struggle to demand the
return of democracy to Honduras. Despite my previously-established network of
schoolteachers in the region, I had yet to actually meet and talk with Esdras until January
2012 when he came by my house to speak with my father-in-law about the reforms.
Esdras wanted to share his knowledge about the implications that one of the new laws
would have for teachers’ economic benefits and their pension plans in particular:
Did you hear that with the new INPREMA law, they will be taking out twice as
much from our wages, and we’ll only get back eighty percent [instead of ninety
percent] when we retire! I can’t believe these guys. Who do they think they are?
My mother is close to retirement anyways. She says that COLPROSUMAH has a
lawyer who can help with the process of submitting retirement paperwork, but
that we have to act fast. I don’t know about you, but we’re going to Tegus next
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The name of the aforementioned ‘5th of July movement’ within LIBRE comes from this horrific experience.
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week to hurry up and submit her retirement paperwork. They say if you do this in
the next two weeks, you can bypass the new law.
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“INPREMA” or the Instituto Nacional de Previsión del Magisterio (Teachers’
National Pension Institute) is a state-run financial institute that manages the benefits that
all schoolteachers have access to, such as loans, insurance plans, and retirement
benefits/pension plans. The new Ley General del INPREMA (General Law of
INPREMA) takes away several financial benefits from teachers and changes the terms of
their retirement plans. Articles 27 and 28 of the new law stipulate that teachers will now
pay eight percent of their salaries to the institute, while the government continues to
contribute twelve percent. Previously, teachers would only pay four percent of their
monthly earnings (see República de Honduras 2011b).
In addition to having to pay more into INPREMA from their already meagre
salaries, teachers will receive less “basic monthly salary” from their pension funds once
retired. Whereas previously, a teacher’s monthly salary once retired was calculated based
on the average of the last 36 months of service, Article 126 of the new law stipulates that
this amount will be calculated based on the average of between the last 120 and 180
months of service. Since most teachers receive a higher salary toward the end of their
careers – due to raises based on years of service, additional education credentials, and
taking on higher paying positions, such as school director – Article 126 represents a
major reduction in the actual amount of “basic monthly salary” a teacher receives after
retirement. Furthermore, as Esdras explained to my father-in-law, Articles 78 and 79 of
the new law establish that the “basic monthly salary” can only reach a maximum of
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eighty percent of what teachers were making at the time of retirement, if the teacher
retires between the ages of 58 and 65 (see República de Honduras 2011b). Only after age
65, can this average calculation reach ninety percent of the teacher’s salary at the time of
retirement (as was previously allowed at 58 years of age with the old INPREMA law).
The new law thus negatively affects Honduran schoolteachers’ livelihoods both
immediately (by decreasing their net salaries) and in the long term (by decreasing the
overall funding available for retirement and life insurance).
My father-in-law’s 40 years of service had prepared him for a frugal yet stable
retirement. With the new INPREMA law however, he would lose a significant amount of
the post-retirement income and benefits he had been counting on. The idea that he could
avoid this from happening, even if it meant retiring sooner than he had planned,
motivated him to contact his colegio magisterial COPEMH, and enquire about their
lawyers and how they could help members with the process of submitting retirement
paperwork before the law took effect.
As he and Esdras continued to talk about the many teachers who were rushing to
retire, I waited patiently for a chance to join in the conversation and finally introduce
myself to Esdras. As I was still just beginning to learn about the many acronyms for the
different teacher organizations and services, this was no easy task. I did remember
hearing, however, that whenever Esdras was not working he spent his free time fishing at
San Lorenzo’s industrial cargo ship port, el Puerto de Henecán. Despite my prolonged
and frequent visits to the region since 2001, I had never actually participated in this
common pastime of many men from the region. In fact, I had only fished a few times as a
kid and knew next to nothing about it. Still, I used this topic to break the ice with Esdras,
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as it was certainly a less intrusive subject than his well-known and controversial
involvement with the Resistencia or his opinions on the reforms for that matter.
As a foreigner, even a well-adapted semi-insider, I still considered it wise to tread
lightly when discussing politically-sensitive subjects with people I didn’t know. The fact
that Esdras planned to travel with his mother to Tegucigalpa and seek out the services of
COLPROSUMAH lawyers and defy the terms of the new INPREMA law could very well
have been considered information too private to share with a North American whom he
had never met. As I would later learn, there are many sensitive subjects about teachers’
work and personal involvement with resisting policies of governance that they would not
discuss openly without the prior establishment of strong levels of trust.
Esdras and I thus began our new friendship discussing the types of fish I could
expect to catch in the Gulf of Fonseca, and how fishing helps to subsidize his family’s
food budget. He explained to me that teachers in Honduras, despite their status as
educated professionals, are still underpaid workers. He described how because of this
most teachers try to engage in some other activity to subsidize their family’s income,
such as running small businesses, subsistence farming, or even fishing. This led to further
conversations about teachers’ positioning in Honduran society, and the work that
schoolteachers do.
Esdras recognizes that teachers are generally more financially solvent than the
majority of Honduran working-class families, which is why he considers teachers to be
members of the middle class. Schoolteachers are able to save for specific material goals,
such as the purchase of a car or house. But, on a monthly basis, many teachers struggle to
get by and – especially when they are not paid on time – this results in taking out loans to
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be able to meet their basic subsistence needs. Once Esdras understood my research
project on teachers’ work and positioning in Honduran society, he offered to take me to
the rural school where he held the position of director. He explained that if I really
wanted to understand teachers’ work, I would have to visit them at their place of work, in
order to see and feel the environment at their school and understand the projects in which
they were engaged on a daily basis.
The Carías Andino school located in El Garrobo lies between three different rural
communities, about twenty minutes outside of San Lorenzo by car. The school itself is
only a few kilometres from the Pan-American Highway, but most of its students reside
significantly further away, deep within the countryside. Aside from a few eateries and
auto mechanic workshops along the highway near the bus stop, the residents of these
communities make their living through subsistence agriculture, selling watermelons near
the highway during harvest season, and low-paying temporary manual labour jobs (such
as construction workers, security guards, janitors, or shrimp packers) in the cities of San
Lorenzo and Nacaome. The area also has a reputation for high levels of violence, drugs,
and prostitution, attributed locally to the effects of poverty (despite the fact that these
problems are usually associated with urban rather than rural areas).

4.3 Teacher Poverty under the Pepe Lobo Regime
Shortly after Esdras offered to take me to his school, he confessed that he actually
did not have enough gas money to take me in his car, given that he still had not been paid
for the month of January. He was embarrassed to have to tell me that if I wanted to go
that day, it would have to be in my car. When we arrived to El Garrobo, Esdras rolled
down his window and asked me to drive slowly over the dirt road that leads up to the
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school. As we drove along, Esdras shouted greetings to everyone we passed, announcing
that he was on his way to the centro and that he would need his security guard to unlock
the front gate. We arrived with a group of roughly thirty children, five or six adult
women, and even some elderly men behind us, all gathered because of Esdras’ presence.
While we waited for the security guard to come, Esdras took advantage of his presence in
the community to announce that classes would start on February 6 (the first day of the
school year), something that seemed otherwise unconfirmed for the community members.
Esdras told the security guard that he was just there to pick up some documents,
and that I was a friend of his from San Lorenzo. The security guard drove in with us,
locking the gate (and the community members) behind us. Esdras asked the guard to open
the doors to the director’s office and the computer lab. Inside his office, Esdras had on
display a map of Honduras, the Honduran flag, a framed copy of the Honduran national
anthem, and framed copies of the school’s history, vision statement, and mission
statement. He spent about an hour showing me digital photos of what the school looked
like previously – proudly showing me how the school’s physical structure has changed
over the years. Outside Esdras then gave me a tour of the courtyard, and showed me the
walkway that was constructed in 2009, the gardens and trees planted in 2010, and the
new roofs installed over various classrooms in 2011, all under his mandate. Esdras
explained that as the director, part of his responsibility was to make sure that each year he
completed at least one construction project to improve the infrastructure of the school. He
was most proud of the computer lab that was inaugurated in late 2010, after he secured
funding from different Honduran NGOs and the Japanese Embassy. Esdras was excited
to show me the roughly thirty computers that the school has and the two air conditioners
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that came with the room. He said that his dream is to someday get an LED projector so
students can give Power Point presentations with the school’s computers.
With both air conditioners on, Esdras continued to show me digital photos he had
of the Carías Andino staff on a computer in the lab, explaining how long each teacher had
been working at the school and which subjects they taught. He said that if I was
interested, I could come meet Mercedes, the sub-director, during a formal planning
meeting they would have together the next day, explaining that as long as it was OK with
her, I could have a regular presence at the centro in order to conduct my research and
interview whichever teachers were interested in talking with me.
While my mind wandered about all the ethnographic opportunities this
arrangement would afford me, I took advantage of interviewing Esdras further about the
reforms. I asked him what he thought about the Ley Fundamental de Educación
(Fundamental Law of Education) – the new law that most directly affects how teachers
go about doing their jobs. Through ambiguous criteria it says that Honduras will increase
its academic standards and now offer new subjects in schools. It also demands that
teachers solicit funding from municipal and departmental governments and from the
private sector, to fund both their school infrastructure projects and new academic
programs such as computer literacy, which they are now required to teach (see República
de Honduras 2012). While the move toward a privatized and decentralized system is
gradual, regional governments already had funding they could allocate toward education
expenses, and teachers were already expected to seek out this funding and abide by this
law as of 2012.
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Esdras explained to me that in his opinion, the Ley Fundamental is part of the
post-coup government’s effort to remain on good terms with international finance
institutions, by creating a meaner, leaner, neoliberal state. He went on to say that:
These guys [in the government] want to make things seem much more efficient by
bringing us toward a decentralized, privatized system. They’re not going to be
happy until they’ve privatized everything! But you know, there are some good
things about these reforms; we should be more efficient with our work. The thing
is, we’re underdeveloped here. And education is the only way out of poverty. But
this law asks us to do things that we could never really do. Look around you. Do
you think that every school here in Honduras has a computer lab like this one?
Ha! We are lucky to have this here, because the Japanese Embassy approved my
funding request. But most schools here in the south do not have such a luxury.
There are plenty of schools further inward, deep within the communities, that
don’t even have electricity! And then there’s this law, which states that we are
now going to teach computer literacy to every Honduran child. It says that if a
given school doesn’t teach computer literacy to the students, then its teachers can
be fired. Imagine if you were a teacher in one of those rural communities… what
are you going to do? So you see, there is no agreement between the law and our
reality. We see this time and again here in Honduras. Those who are really high
up, you know, people like the president and those in the congress, they always
make up these new laws to please the World Bank. But these laws aren’t
consistent with the Honduran reality. I doubt if those who wrote the reforms even
know where my school is! You know, these guys have probably never even taught
a class themselves! That’s just the thing. The Ley Fundamental de Educación can
never get fully realized. It’s impossible – even if we all really wanted to. Not here
in Honduras. We have good ideas sometimes, but they don’t ever materialize into
anything. Here, there’s always a huge difference between theory and practice.
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Interview, 31 January 2012.

50

144

Esdras’ comments about the difference between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ of governing
policies serve as a guide for understanding two key themes of this thesis which I will
begin to examine in this chapter.
First is the fact that state institutions in Honduras continue to make unrealistic
promises to the population about how they will improve public services. These promises
often go unfulfilled, especially under post-coup regimes of neoliberal governance.
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Indeed, one of the major components of the Resistencia movement and its members’
vision to re-found the state is to rethink the proper use of government revenues, and to
realign promises for state services with achievable policy goals that benefit the majority
of the Honduran population (as opposed to an elite few). The teachers with whom I work
want to forge a society in which education and opportunities for youth are prioritized,
where the state has a central role in funding and overseeing this social investment, and
where access to national public education is fair and equal.
The second major theme that Esdras’ comments allude to is the extent to which
policies of governance on paper and in ‘theory’ actually do get implemented in ‘practice,’
on the ground. Despite its significance for the study of state formation, we continue to
know more about policies themselves as they are written in legislation than we do about
the processes through which they are actually implemented by real people through
mundane everyday practices (but see Heyman 1995 and Smart 2002 for notable
exceptions). With the ethnographic examples that follow, I show that although Honduran
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As the work of James Scott shows, these unfulfilled promises are not necessarily intentional (1998). In fact, even
some of the best intentions for good governance by state planners have had unintended negative consequences. The
polarizing political environment of post-coup Honduras has however generated considerable everyday discussion about
which specific governments, and which policies in particular, are to be blamed for specific failures and unfulfilled
promises.
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schoolteachers reject the overall neoliberal spirit of the education reforms, there are still
certain elements of these new laws they find useful for meeting basic schooling needs in
the context of widespread poverty and political uncertainty – realities that affect both
teachers as workers and the populations with whom they work. Here I suggest that as
these front-line state agents necessarily implement aspects of the reforms, they are also
enacting their own visions for what the state in Honduras could be like – one that fulfills
realistic promises and meets certain basic needs of the majority. These themes will
become important throughout this thesis as we continue the story about how teachers
navigated the reforms.
As Esdras and I drove back to San Lorenzo that day he asked to use my cell
phone. He said that he didn’t have any credit on his, but that he was tired of just waiting –
he needed to call the bank and see if he had been paid for January. He explained that his
wife and parents were all teachers too, and that nobody in his household had been paid.
After the bank’s negative response to his query, he shouted in frustration, “Dammit! This
Pepe Lobo. He doesn’t know who he’s dealing with. People like that have it coming to
them. With Mel, we were always paid on time. It was always on the 20th of every month.
With Lobo, who knows when or if they’ll pay us.” It was already January 31.
Esdras’ experience of not being paid on time – of lacking money to drive to his
school or even to make a phone call – highlights the fact that teachers’ work is
chronically underpaid. In proceeding to analyze teachers’ actions and their challenges to
the post-coup government, it is important to remember that despite their status as
educated professionals, many Honduran teachers live in poverty. Even where their
employment status is stable, their situations are often experienced as precarious. If
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Honduran schoolteachers are not paid fully and punctually, their families cannot meet
their basic subsistence needs.
The rest of our trip back was spent discussing the Honduran political environment
under Pepe Lobo. Esdras and I talked about how even two and half years after the coup
the violent repression against Resistencia leaders continues, and how teachers as a group
are key figures of the movement. We also discussed the success of the Resistencia – how
the movement had produced a strong presidential candidate, and that while we still did
not know what the results of the presidential elections would be, LIBRE had already been
successful in forming political consciousness among the Honduran population. Esdras
characterized this as an ‘awakening’ – explaining that a good portion of the Honduran
population has now been enlightened about the injustices implicit in certain governing
policies and state practices, while others have still not ‘woken up,’ ‘opened their eyes,’
and ‘seen the light.’ Such political consciousness has enabled those in solidarity with the
movement to criticize ‘the oligarchy’ in general, and even identify specific landed elite
families who have benefited from structural mechanisms that keep the majority in
poverty.
This awareness of the alignment between the government and ‘the oligarchy’ has
led teachers and other Resistencia supporters to speak of what they call an ‘inevitable
revolution’ in post-coup Honduras – based on socialist ideals, but also based on creating
state institutions that work well, and that are capable of grasping the ‘Honduran reality.’
LIBRE supporters understand these goals as achievable through ‘re-founding the state
and society.’ In 2012 the party was making concrete plans about how to achieve this
through a national constituent assembly to re-write the constitution.
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Yet state formation occurs not only through such formal projects but also through
everyday activities. It is within this context of people’s envisioning what the state could
be, what social and economic policies Honduras should have, and their actions toward
that end in their everyday lives, that we can discern a certain revolutionary spirit in this
particular moment of Honduran history. One of the arguments of this thesis is that
Honduran schoolteachers are the everyday leaders of the Resistencia political movement,
and that through their social roles as thinkers and community organizers, they use their
mobility and connectedness with national and international communities to cultivate this
revolutionary spirit among those who continue to resist post-coup policies and envision a
fundamentally different path for the country. An examination of schoolteachers’
everyday practices helps us grasp these broader processes.

4.4 Directors’ Meeting in Preparation for Teachers’ Council
Meeting
Esdras followed through with his promise to introduce me to Mercedes, inviting
me to accompany him to a private meeting between them on February 1, in preparation
for their first teachers’ council meeting the following day. The purpose of the school
administrators’ meeting was to plan together what to say to their staff about the reforms,
and to prepare themselves for supervising the upcoming school year in light of these
changes.
At age 38, Esdras was still considered a relatively young school director. His 50year-old sub-director, Mercedes, had significantly more teaching experience than him.
According to Esdras, Mercedes sometimes has the final word in school-related events,
even though he was the director. This is why Esdras deferred to sub-director Mercedes
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before giving me permission to conduct research at the school. The meeting took place in
the school’s air-conditioned computer lab, with the security guard standing outside the
room, monitoring the door and telling community members who had gathered outside
that the directors were in a meeting. It was clear to me that Esdras and Mercedes were
collegial, but not friendly enough to have socialized together outside the workplace over
the December 2011 – January 2012 break. After they briefly asked each other how their
vacations were and commented that they still had not been paid, Esdras introduced me to
Mercedes:
This is Jordan, from the US. He has a master’s degree in anthropology, and now
he’s going for his doctorate. He lives in Canada, but he’s married to a
Sanlorenzana. He’s been coming here for like thirteen years. He knows his way
around. And he’s writing this thesis about the magisterio here in Honduras. His
father-in-law is a schoolteacher too. In any case, he is interested in writing a thesis
about teachers and politics in Honduras. He was talking to me yesterday about the
Ley Fundamental and its implications for education in Honduras. He likes talking
about that stuff. He’s actually quite knowledgeable about these reforms. You
know, most gringos don’t even speak much Spanish. So I told him that he could
come to our centro….
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Sub-director Mercedes interrupted Esdras: “But he should know that our education
system here in Honduras is very different from that of Canada. We don’t have a very
good system here for him to look at.” Esdras continued by saying: “Well that’s just the
thing, he’s interested in the Honduran magisterio.”
I was eager to clarify my research intentions to the sub-director, but Esdras
continued talking about me (rather accurately) on my behalf. Mercedes continued to
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question Esdras why I, as a foreign doctoral student, would want to come to their centro
in rural Honduras: “If he wants to know about Honduran education, why doesn’t he just
talk with his wife, or read a book, or something like this? Didn’t she go to school here [in
Honduras]?” Esdras continued to talk about me to Mercedes, mentioning things that he
had heard about me, without me having told him. They maintained a dialogue about me
as if I was not present in the room:
Well the thing is that Jordan has interest in talking with our teachers. He actually
does know some teachers, you know. He has experiences with the NGO, you
know that one in San Lorenzo, Save the Children. He’s done volunteer work for
them in the past. So Jordan actually does have a lot of experience here. He’s not
just any backpacking gringo, that is. He can look after himself.
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At this point Mercedes still did not seem very convinced. She had yet to look me in the
eyes, speak directly to me, or even offer to shake my hand….
Oh yeah, and one more thing about Jordan… he is whole-heartedly ¡de pura
Resistencia! You know, he was here on June 28 when they kidnapped Mel.
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Upon finding out that I supported the Resistencia and was in solidarity with their
movement, Mercedes’ attitude toward my presence radically changed. She suddenly
hugged me, looked me in the eye, and said that it would be a pleasure to have me do
research at their centro. I was surprised how drastically her attitude toward me and my
research had changed. Mercedes suddenly welcomed my questions with enthusiasm. We
began to share stories about where we each were when we learned about Mel’s
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kidnapping, and how confusing daily life was during the outbreak of the coup, and
generally the difficulties of coming to grips with such sudden political change.
This anecdote illuminates how meaningful solidarities with the Resistencia can be
for certain teachers, as well as how trust in an ethnographer is established in
contemporary Honduras. Indeed, Mercedes did not seem to care that I had been coming
to southern Honduras since 2001, that I had previous NGO experience working among
teachers, or even that I had married a Honduran woman from the region whose parents
were both well-known schoolteachers. All Mercedes seemed to care about was the fact
that I was ‘de Resistencia.’ Throughout the 2012 school year, when introducing me to
specific Resistencia-supporting individuals, Esdras continued to present me as ‘de pura
Resistencia’ (about which I learned to trust his judgment).
Mercedes sat next to me during the meeting and talked enthusiastically with me
about her political opinions and how the experience of the 2009 coup changed her life.
While Esdras wrote ideas on the blackboard about what their CEB should aim to achieve
during the 2012 school year in light of the reforms, Mercedes whispered to me her
opinions on the strong golpista campaign to defame and discredit schoolteachers. She
explained that the country’s mainstream news media outlets are blaming schoolteachers
for all aspects of Honduras’ dysfunctional education system. Mercedes spoke about how
El Heraldo, the most popular national (golpista) newspaper, has been publishing
misleading articles about how teachers plan to walk out on the first day of classes. She
underscored that despite the fact that there has been no official FOMH order for teachers
to withhold their labour, there are many who quite simply won’t be able to afford the
transportation expense of travelling to work for the first day of classes, if they are not
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paid beforehand. Mercedes said that here they were, twelve days late for the first payment
of the year, and yet the Ministry of Education expects everyone to come to work on
February 6. She said that the only way she was able to pay for her bus fare from
Nacaome, to attend the meeting, was because her daughter had been working as a street
vendor of cell phone SIM cards, and managed to give her enough money for the bus. “So
you see, there is the state, brainwashing the Honduran. Where is the news article about
how we are still not paid!? There’s a strong campaign against us and our work,” she said.
Esdras explained to Mercedes that this year he will be working hard to gestionar
(seek out and negotiate) more funds to refurbish a classroom, and hopefully to make a
multi-sport court where students can play basketball and other sports on a cement pad. He
asked Mercedes to be in charge of all the pedagogical aspects of running the school, and
told her that this year they will have to make sure that all Carías Andino teachers keep up
with their academic statistic log books. Esdras said that there are some aspects of the new
law – the Ley Fundamental – that he likes:
As you know Mercedes, we do have a few problematic teachers here. You know,
as do I, that we have some lazy people working here. That one teacher, Marilu,
hardly ever shows up! She’s always asking me for permission to take yet another
personal day…. We can no longer put up with that kind of attitude. Do you have
any idea how easy it will be for them [the district and departmental directors] to
fire us now? We have a very delicate situation on our hands. But I think we can be
smart about how we move forward from here.
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Mercedes seemed to agree with the director’s statement. She turned toward me, speaking
loud enough for Esdras to hear her, and said: “Here, we’re not afraid of this new law.”
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4.5 First Teachers’ Council Meeting
The next day, before reading over the agenda, Esdras introduced me to the group
of Carías Andino teachers – explaining that I am in solidarity with the Resistencia, and
would be writing about the Honduran magisterio for my PhD. He announced that any
teacher interested in talking with me could do so on an individual basis, and that he and
Mercedes as directors had given me permission to come and go at Carías Andino
throughout the school year. I briefly introduced myself to the group, clarifying my
intentions as a researcher, and saying that I hoped to get to know each and every one of
them, and that I was happy to be able to participate in their meeting. Esdras then began
his first teachers’ council meeting on February 2 with stern messages and instructions for
his staff:
Compañeros maestros [teacher colleagues], I can assure you that we have now
officially lost our job security. This is a very delicate situation, and we must
proceed cautiously. 2011 has already come and gone; we must now think about
2012. I want everyone to do their own analysis of what the COMDEs mean for us,
and then reflect upon how you can each improve your own: a) personal behaviour,
and b) pedagogical activities [writing these two items on the black board]. I am
telling you that these reforms are a reality; in fact, they are already here! We all
have to do a better job, because I warn you that the criticisms, evaluations, and the
supervisions are coming! And I can assure you that I am not going to lose my job
due to someone else’s mistake. I am here asking you today from the bottom of my
heart that we all change. And please don’t see me as the ogre here either – this is
not my doing, it’s the law.

56

56
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Esdras’ opening statement was met with anger and frustration from the other
teachers at Carías Andino. At this point most of the teachers present had already been
informed by their colegio leaders – or had heard via word-of-mouth – about the
implications of the March 2011 Ley de Incentivo a la Participación Comunitaria para el
Mejoramiento de la Calidad de Educación (Law of Incentive for Community
Participation for the Improvement of Education Quality). As the first new law of the postcoup education reforms that aimed specifically to discipline teachers as workers, the ‘Ley
de Participación Comunitaria’ (as teachers call it) creates the “COMDE” or the Consejo
Municipal de Desarrollo Educativo (Municipal Council of Education Development) and
its more fluid counterpart the “CED” Consejo Escolar de Desarrollo (School
Development Council). Teachers were learning about the implications of this new law by
talking with each other during these initial meetings.
The COMDE consists of different local interested parties including one
representative from the municipal government; one local school district official; one
member of the school directors’ council; one member of a student government
association; one dirigente magisterial; one parent from the Sociedad de Padres de
Familia; one member of the municipal sponsorship council; and finally, one
representative from a municipal government-supported NGO (see República de Honduras
2011a). The CED is simply a group of COMDE supporters, and has rather open
membership. Whereas anyone can become part of the CED, the COMDE has appointed
leadership positions.
The Ley de Participación Comunitaria stipulates that, with the purpose of
promoting parental and local participation to create quality education, the COMDEs will

154

be involved in soliciting and allocating funding for school projects, approving local
school policies, and creating relations with regional development councils. Further, as
Article 2 of the law states, the COMDEs will also serve as a ‘veeduría social’ or ‘social
inspector’ which verifies that: 1) teachers show up to teach their classes, 2) their schools
fulfill the required 200 days of instruction during the academic year; 3) they are operating
in conformity with municipal and national education guidelines; and 4) no schools are
over staffed (relative to their enrolment numbers) at any point (see República de
Honduras 2011a).
Teachers also point out that when and if the COMDEs communicate that teachers
are complying with the guidelines, their schools will receive ‘incentives’ for such good
behaviour. According to Article 12, such incentives include financial resources allocated
from the central government (for school infrastructure projects), teaching resources (such
as computers, text books, and library materials), and public recognition of their success
(see República de Honduras 2011a). This means that only schools successful under the
stipulations of the reforms will have full access to basic educational resources they need
to function. Together these organizations serve as a powerful mechanism to supervise and
discipline teachers, with the legal right to audit those teachers whose behaviour they
suspect is illegal, immoral, or simply not supporting the goals of the current
government’s broader plan de nación (nation plan). Most schoolteachers, in turn,
consider these organizations to be a network of coup-supporting orejas (ears for
espionage) that should be feared. Teachers were thus talking adamantly about the effects
of these laws by learning about each other’s experiences and hearing stories of how the
COMDE had affected fellow schoolteachers.
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During the first teachers’ council meeting, several Carías Andino teachers spoke
out to Director Esdras about how it is unfair to allow someone who is not even a teacher,
and likely has not even visited their school, evaluate their performance and professional
conduct. Marlon stood up and argued: “How can it be that some empresario
(entrepreneur or business owner) from Nacaome can now tell me how to teach? I’ve been
working with the people of this community for the last five years. He probably doesn’t
even know where El Garrobo is, let alone anything about the dynamics of our centro!”
Other teachers whispered among themselves about how the new INPREMA law was
already reducing their wages and benefits – how it had become clear that the state no
longer needs teachers and that Honduras’ education system would soon be reduced in
size through budget cuts and eventually be completely privatized. As the anger of the
group continued to grow, Sub-director Mercedes stood up to share her own analysis of
Honduras’ political landscape vis-à-vis public education policies. Mercedes’ loud, clear
speech was met with prompt silence from her angry subordinates:
Look here compañeros, Director Esdras and I are well aware, as I imagine all of
you are too, that these reforms are in fact one step further toward the privatization
of our education system. By passing the Ley Fundamental, the state has put itself
in jeopardy! We are all a part of this country, but it seems that now the rich
empresarios of the oligarchy want to take over our education system too, and see
that the state has less of a role to play in what happens here. And we need to be
prepared. Nobody has done an analysis of what this all means – the fact that they
are now treating us like a private company. But even though this will be a slow
process, we all need to be prepared. Our purpose here today is to help you. Let’s
be honest. We have been at fault here too. We are all guilty of being more familiar
with what our rights and benefits are, than with what our obligations are. The
Estatuto del Docente grants us certain rights, it’s true, but this same law also
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implies that we have certain obligations and responsibilities. We need to be
prepared. Just as the campesino doesn’t go out to the field without his machete,
neither should we come into our centro without knowledge of these laws.
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While Mercedes spoke, Esdras stepped outside to talk with students’ parents who
had come uninvited onto the school’s campus to insist that teachers clarify whether or not
there would be class that upcoming Monday, February 6. When Esdras stepped back
inside, he took over the meeting once again, and echoed his previous statements about the
need for teachers to change their own conduct:
I am asking you please; let’s change our attitudes. We need to be more careful
with everything we do. One little mistake, even the tiniest, could cost us our jobs.
I for one am not going to lose my job due to someone else’s error. You need to
keep up with your daily class attendance logs, and your pedagogical control
notebooks. We did a good job overall with this stuff last year, but we need to be
prepared for any inspection. The Sociedad de Padres de Familia is observing us
with more vigilance now, but we’re going to make sure that they sign their Acta
de Compromiso (Act of Commitment) whereby they will swear to make their
children abide by the code of conduct in our centro. Just as the parents are strict
with us, let’s be strict with them. But we do need to change, compañeros
maestros. Where is the conduct of the teacher? Who is in charge of the classroom
– the students, or you? If you have problematic students, kick them out of class! If
their parents come here to complain, remind them of the Acta that they signed.
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At this point teachers began to talk among themselves about which students had
behaviour problems in the past, which parents could be considered allies, and which ones
were more likely to denounce teachers’ actions as part of the COMDEs or otherwise.
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Both directors joined in the conversation about particular parents who had been helpful in
the past, while mentioning others who were always ready to criticise their work and who
did not support school projects in general, but how the Acta de Compromiso might help
to give them some leverage when disputes arose with the parents.
A discussion emerged about what infrastructural projects they could propose for
the 2012 school year. Director Esdras already had some possibilities in mind:
We have to sell the image of our centro. And it’s all about soliciting funds for
new projects. This is how it is compañeros. We need to grow our centro and
attract new students. We have had some students from Nacaome here before,
which was a success, but we have also had some students from these same
communities at El Garrobo drop out of our centro…. I don’t see how, but I have
heard that some even would rather to go school in San Lorenzo. We cannot permit
students to leave our centro any longer, regardless of the reason. They need to
stay here until they graduate. So I have been thinking that what we need is a
music band, and a multi-sport court. I know it seems like a big goal for us, but
only he who never tries will not achieve anything. This could go over well with
the parents. People like that stuff. These people here in the communities, they live
for soccer – that’s a sure thing. But some people like basketball too. So let’s do it.
And it’s all about making an accurate, real budget. You need to have researched
exactly what the costs will be, not just an estimate. You need to already have an
albañil, and know the input costs. When I went to the Japanese Embassy for the
funds for our computer lab, this is what I had to do: make a real budget and follow
through. Those of you who are on the committee for gestión (fundraising) will
need to work closely with me this year so that we can get the municipal
government to give us this money. Let’s plan to have a rough outline of these
budgets by February 29. We can’t just walk up to the mayor’s office and say ‘give
us money,’ we have to make it look professional.
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Most of the teachers at Carías Andino live in Nacaome proper, and everyone
knows the mayor and other municipal government officials. This prompted discussions
about how cheap the Nacaome mayor had been with other kinds of municipal projects,
how he was not someone very likely to support a rural school like Carías Andino. Some
teachers then argued that since several of them are self-identifying members of the
Resistencia/LIBRE Party, and that since the current government in Nacaome is of the
Liberal Party, it might be more difficult for them to secure funding. After all, as
Resistencia members, many of these teachers participated in a boycott of the 2010
elections – during the coup-installed government – that put these politicians in power.
Some teachers commented that with these reforms, they would have to maintain strong
personal relationships with the mayor in power or else they could forget about securing
funding for their centro. Other teachers discussed how impractical the Ley Fundamental
is for the Honduran reality, highlighting that while politicians never keep their promises
to fund infrastructural projects, if they as teachers failed to complete a project for their
school they would be criticized. Still others commented that although there are
sometimes great ideas for how to make things better, such as designing computer literacy
courses, these ideas are rarely put into practice in Honduras.
In the context of discussing which politicians do not comply with their duties,
some teachers mentioned that the Lobo government had not even distributed current
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textbooks,
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and that they were still using textbooks published during previous

Textbooks in Honduras are normally updated with each new government, and each incoming president has the power
to appoint the Minister of education who oversees this process, even though Honduran teachers themselves can
contribute to writing the textbooks. While this certainly does raise interesting questions about what is taught in the

159

governments. They argued that if the government was not even competent enough to
provide updated teaching materials, then how could they as individual workers be
expected to solicit funding not only for school infrastructure projects, but even for their
own teaching materials. Sub-director Mercedes shared her views on the subject:
Director Esdras and I have decided that I will be in charge of supervising your
pedagogical activities, and that he will be in charge of gestión. Just as they [the
Ministry] are de-centralizing authority, so are we.... I am well aware that no
textbooks have arrived. This is one of many areas in which this government has
failed us compañeros, I know. Then they look to us and insist that we are to blame
for the poor quality of education in this country. We’re going to have to make do
with what little resources we have. As we are all still learning, we can no longer
depend upon the state. This is all part of what they call globalization and the
neoliberal system. You all have the right to be upset about these reforms, but your
criticisms need to fall within the law. We still have a job to do compañeros
maestros. And let me say, it’s a beautiful thing. Our role is not just to informar
(inform), but also to formar (form) citizens, in order to enrich Honduras. Yes,
there is a national curriculum standard, which says that we need to use current
teaching materials, but we each also have our own libertad de catédra (academic
freedom) too. The lazy teacher who doesn’t go out of her way to find her own
teaching materials will not continue forward. Each one of you should consult each
other about classroom strategies. You do have resources. If you feel that you don’t
have the materials that you need, then I would encourage you to gestionar your
own funding to purchase them. The purpose of the director and I today is to help
you. The law says that we should all become autodidácticos (self-taught). We

classroom, my focus here is on policies that affect education funding, not curriculum design. Mercedes and the other
teachers with whom I work had little interest in talking with me about what ideologies their textbooks produced, and a
lot more interest in using the subject of textbooks to illustrate how post-coup governments had abandoned their
responsibilities for national public education, while blaming teachers for all the shortcomings.
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therefore need to go out of our way to get the resources that we need. That is our
goal today: to help you all become autodidácticos in your daily work.
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4.6 Creating Neoliberal Subjectivities?
Different events from this initial teachers’ council meeting allude to the process of
forming neoliberal subjectivities among teachers themselves – including making
individuals responsible for creating the conditions that allow them to do their jobs. For
instance, Mercedes’ comments affirming the notion that schoolteachers are now expected
to go out of their way to seek their own funding for basic school materials (which
includes seeking money from the NGO and private sector), work to create self-regulating
agents. Likewise, Esdras’ comments about not losing his own job because of someone
else’s fault point toward the general environment of competition in the context of reduced
job security and the practice of assigning blame to individuals while ignoring structural
variables – processes which are not limited only to neoliberal contexts, but consistently
observable in them nonetheless.
On the one hand such comments from two school directors do encourage selfgovernance among their staff. On the other hand however, Honduran schoolteachers are
not easily manipulated into believing that it is a good thing that the central government is
no longer willing to pay the full cost of such expenses and that schools should therefore
compete with each other for basic schooling materials. In fact, Mercedes and Esdras as
directors have themselves criticized these new policies as a neoliberal golpista
manoeuvre and a step in the wrong direction for their country. At the same time however
everyone was conscious of the implications if they as teachers appeared non-compliant
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Teachers’ council meeting, 2 February 2012.
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with the reforms – or worse, if they were portrayed as incompetent educators or
unaccountable workers. As we will see throughout this thesis, teachers’ navigation
through the reforms are shot-through with political actions aimed at criticizing neoliberal
development policies.
Through these initial teacher council meetings, schoolteachers at Carías Andino
were beginning to assess what the reforms would imply for their daily work lives. In this
sense, teachers were working the new policies into the particular contexts of their school
during this time, creating specific (not always intentional) outcomes. As Cris Shore and
Susan Wright have argued, “… policies are not simply external, generalised or
constraining forces, nor are they confined to texts. Rather, they are productive,
performative and continually contested. A policy finds expression through sequences of
events; it creates new social and semantic spaces, new sets of relations, new political
subjects and new webs of meaning” (2011: 1). Here I present the ways in which these
neoliberal education policies are interpreted, contested, and then reproduced by those
responsible for their implementation.
The idea that Ministry authorities at different levels, private funders, and students’
parents are looking over the shoulders of schoolteachers in Honduras is nothing new.
Rather, what has changed is the political environment encouraging these interested
parties to supervise teachers’ behaviour as workers in an attempt to discipline them;
giving these local interested parties a new set of legal tools – such as the COMDES and
CED – to denounce
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any actions they understand as incongruent with the objectives of

Such denunciations can also be made online through the website of the coup-supporting NGO Transformemos
Honduras: http://transformemoshonduras.com/CP/monitoreo.php. While supporters of the reforms argue that this
website operates to increase transparency and to prevent ghost teachers (who receive a salary for a position they do not
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national public education as defined by the post-coup government; and an explicit and
continual communication that at any moment nearly anybody can audit Honduran
schoolteachers. The notion of an “audit society” (Power 1996; 1994) for performing
“rituals of verification” (Power 1997) in an “audit culture” (Strathern, ed. 2000) is
therefore a useful theoretical concept for analyzing how teachers were reading the
political landscape and navigating through the instruments used to measure their
accountability and effectiveness during the 2012 school year.
As both audited and auditors (of their colleagues’ work), schoolteachers were still
trying to figure out questions such as: “What kinds of activities should be checked? How
much explicit checking is enough? How does checking affect those who are checked…?
Can the benefits be clearly demonstrated?” (Power 1997: 2). In the remainder of this
chapter I present examples of how school administrators engaged these aspects of the
reforms that aim to monitor their behaviour and discipline teachers as workers.
The directors would bear most of the burden of not securing adequate funding
from local sources for basic school infrastructure projects, and in order to do this they
also needed to verify that their staff was acting in accordance with the reforms. This was
the way in which the directors could promote an image of their school as dependable and
thus fundable, hence the significance of an audit culture to maintain good behaviour.
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, questions of funding are the primary
concern of Honduran schoolteachers at this current historical conjuncture. Studying these

actually work at), many teachers commented about the ease with which anyone can denounce a schoolteacher, without
even proper documentation of the inappropriate action.
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practices therefore helps us to understand the particulars of the Honduran case, but it also
illuminates how policies of governance are implemented in practice more broadly (cf.
Painter 2006). My aim here is to show how teachers were interpreting the theory of state
projects and policies of governance and then – following Esdras’ comments – attempting
to merge the “huge difference between theory and practice” by selectively implementing
certain aspects of the laws into practice within and through the social and economic
realities on-the-ground. Despite their explicit critiques of the overall neoliberal spirit of
the education reforms, there are still certain elements of these new laws that
schoolteachers find useful for meeting basic schooling needs in the context of widespread
poverty and political uncertainty.
Teachers approached implementing these new laws not through blind acceptance
of the (neoliberal) justification for the reforms, but through conscious rejection of the
broader neoliberal state project, which they believe will negatively affect the majority of
the Honduran population. Yet school directors in particular were able to recognize certain
aspects of the new laws as useful, as they also sought to project an image of their
compliance in the 2012 political environment. These processes inform another broader
argument of this thesis: as teachers necessarily implement aspects of the reforms, they are
also enacting their own visions for what the state in Honduras could be like – one that
fulfills realistic promises and meets certain basic needs of the majority.

4.7 Monitoring Schoolteachers’ Behaviour
As we have seen with the description of the Ley de Participación Comunitaria,
the reforms closely scrutinize the work of teachers and their behaviour – making sure
they solicit local funds and expand their school’s enrolment, but also verifying that they
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come to work on time and complete their academic duties. This includes taking
responsibility for those students who don’t come to school for whatever reason; teachers
are often blamed when adolescents drop out of school. Understanding this, from their
reading of the political landscape, the directors of Carías Andino took action to show
local interested parties that they were indeed increasing student numbers and closely
monitoring their staff, just as agents in any audit culture would do (see Strathern, ed.
2000).
Ensuring that the school’s enrolment did not drop below previous levels was no
easy task. As the teachers at this rural school were well aware, student drop-out rates are
generally higher in poorer regions and in areas where subsistence farmers opt to keep
their adolescent children at home to help with agricultural activities instead of paying
fees to send them to school. The directors were proactive by visiting the rural
communities where they suspected potential students were living. They reminded
residents that by law all Hondurans must be in school until the age of 16, after which they
could choose to discontinue their schooling (an example of how teachers speak with the
authority of the state). They further argued that since education is the only way to escape
poverty, and they were now offering training in practical skills, adolescents from the
community would someday financially benefit from attending. This strategy worked. By
the second month of classes – just in time to submit these figures to their superiors – the
school’s enrolment numbers had increased above what they were during the previous two
years. The teachers posted a graph in the director’s office (a semi-public space)
demonstrating the growth of their student population just as the reforms demand (see
Appendix E).
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As the school year progressed Esdras began to dedicate more of his time toward
soliciting local funding for school projects and could no longer monitor the work of each
teacher at the school. At the same time, he was already dealing with previously-existing
disciplinary problems with specific teachers who habitually arrived late or sometimes not
at all. He therefore maintained his decision to assign all supervisory tasks to the subdirector, so that he could focus on fundraising. In order to show other teachers and local
interested parties how they were restructuring the ways in which the school’s teachers
were supervised, Esdras posted an open letter indicating that he had turned over all
pedagogical and curricular supervision to the sub-director, and detailing how Mercedes
would verify that teachers maintained their academic log books, which include student
attendance sheets, marks, and classroom lecture plans. At the end of the letter Esdras
reminded his staff that all Honduran schoolteachers must fulfill these duties by law (see
Appendix F).
In a similar fashion, the directors attempted to communicate transparently the
behaviour of their teachers by posting a list of the personal days each teacher in the
school had taken (see Appendix G). The list detailed the exact date when permission was
given to a teacher for missing class, and also underscored the fact that Honduran law only
permits personal days with legitimate excuses, which must first be pre-approved by the
school director. As Esdras and Mercedes later explained to me, posting these signs in the
director’s office was a good way for parents and other interested parties to see that their
teachers were being supervised. They also explained that they hoped this would
encourage teachers to always come to work on time, teach effectively, and not distract the
director from fundraising for school projects.
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By citing the new laws as the reason for this public disclosure of teachers’ work
activities, these directors were able to resolve some pre-existing disciplinary problems
while communicating to their colleagues that such micro-management of their work was
required by the reforms. At the same time they were able to communicate to local
interested parties and potential auditors that they as school administrators were fulfilling
their responsibilities under the law. This pro-active attempt to show that the school was
being run efficiently and in accordance with the reforms was an effective strategy for the
teachers with whom I worked in this rural context. If the directors there were ever
accused of not abiding by the reforms – if it were proven that their school’s teachers were
not competent workers, or that their school was not increasing in size – the school could
be forced to close and the teachers could be fired (something that teachers confirmed did
happen elsewhere in the region during the 2012 school year).

4.8 School Infrastructure Projects – Carías Andino
In order to please students’ parents and other local interested parties, and in order
to show their superiors at the regional Ministry offices that they were abiding by the
reforms, these directors also needed to maintain and expand the physical structure of their
schools. Both schools in the urban setting of San Lorenzo and the rural communities in
the municipality of Nacaome competed for funding among other schools in Valle for
basic projects such as fixing roofs to prevent flooding, fixing doors and windows to
prevent theft, and constructing new classrooms to accommodate their growing student
population.
Despite the requirement of the education reforms to solicit funding from
municipal governments, teachers were conscious that any commitments obtained from
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municipal authorities could well go unfulfilled, and were therefore cautious about making
promises to parents and community members. At Carías Andino, municipal authorities
indeed backed down from initial commitments made in conversation
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with the directors

to help fund the reconstruction of two classrooms. The school directors and teachers’
council were afraid that such actions would upset not only their superiors at the regional
Ministry of Education offices, but also the Sociedad de Padres de Familia at their school.
As a result they sought funding from the daughter of a multi-millionaire cantaloupe
melon exporter who ran a foundation to support local development initiatives. Despite the
initial positive interactions with this potential donor, she declined an invitation to visit the
school and the directors thus lost the chance to ask her formally to help fund their project.
These interactions with the melon company’s foundation took place over several
months and were therefore time-consuming for the directors and the rest of the Carías
Andino teachers. During this time they held numerous meetings with the Sociedad de
Padres de Familia, explaining their initiatives and progress with soliciting the funds. At
one point the entire student body and teachers were preparing an elaborate welcome party
with food, dancing, and games for this potential funder, all of which was cancelled when
she declined to come.
Once both the municipal government and the daughter of this melon exporter
failed to provide funding, the third option for these teachers was a sugar cane export
company that ran a similar foundation for community development projects in the regions
where they operate. The sugar-cane company foundation agreed to support half of the
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We should not misinterpret such oral agreements to fund school projects as always untrue or invalid. They are often
the real ways through which such funding actually reaches the schools – based on conversations with politicians over
beer (a very gendered activity), at soccer matches, or even over the phone (as we will see in Chapter 5).
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budget for the project, but this was not achieved without conflict. The company has its
own reasons for donating this money to the school: any such donations function as tax
write-offs, reducing the taxable revenue of the company. Conflicts arose when the
company needed the directors to sign corresponding paperwork confirming that they
were receiving the amount claimed. After review of the documents detailing the budget
for the construction project, Mercedes initially refused to sign them. According to her
analysis, the company would be claiming a higher amount donated than they were
actually paying toward the school project.
In the context of this dispute Carías Andino teachers also voiced their broader
disagreement with the very idea that a sugar cane company was needed to fund their
school projects. Honduran schoolteachers’ struggles against these reforms have included
the demand that the state pay for such necessities. They want the post-coup government
to see education as a social investment, not an expense to be minimized in nation-wide
budgetary planning (a topic I examine in Chapter 7, by returning to this example to
analyze a different set of processes after the construction project was complete). Teachers
did recognize however that the leaner, meaner, post-coup neoliberal state is not going to
pay to fix the holes in their roof anytime soon. They needed to act with what resources
were available to them, to meet urgent needs at the school. Even despite the misleading
tax claims, Profe Mercedes and other teachers at this rural school set aside aspects of
their own political opinions on how education ought to be funded, in order to work
through the challenges they were facing in their everyday work, as they navigated
through the beginnings of these reforms.
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As a strategy to pay for the other half of the project, these school administrators
asked the Sociedad de Padres de Familia not to donate money themselves, but rather to
organize a Bingo fundraising event.64 Teachers instructed the parents and students about
how to approach selling the Bingo tickets, and how to properly ask businesses and
numerous individuals in the region to donate prize items, drafting a formal letter on their
behalf (see Appendix H). The teachers, parents and students spent their time asking
everyone possible for a donation, even me. And the event managed to gather the
remaining funds.

4.9 School Infrastructure Projects – José Cecilio del Valle
At José Cecilio del Valle, the other school where I conducted research in the
urban setting of San Lorenzo (which I gained access to through family connections),
teachers were already struggling to rebuild the main classroom since before the 2012
school year. When I began participant observation there, teachers would show me the
holes in the roof that caused the classroom to flood during the rainy season, and the
broken metal window coverings which they feared would invite theft of valuable school
materials. This school already had a well-established fundraising committee composed of
several teachers and the school director, Aníbal. During the first half of the school year
the committee was able to secure funding from three different local sources: 1) a sugarcane export company, 2) the municipal government of San Lorenzo, and 3) parents of
students. While in the end the sugar-cane company did pay for forty percent of the
project, the municipal government another forty percent, and the parents of students the
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While such fundraising activities are common at North American schools, too, they are more likely to be in support
of extra activities than aimed at urgent repairs such as fixing a roof.
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remaining twenty percent, director Aníbal and the teachers at this urban school had to
negotiate through conflicts with each group in the process of receiving funds for this
urgent school infrastructure project.
Since municipal governments now decide how to administer the school
infrastructure funding they receive from the central government, and different schools are
now expected to compete for a finite amount of funding, the municipal government in
San Lorenzo first wanted to see that teachers were soliciting funds from other sources.
According to some teachers this was so that municipal governments could then report to
the central government that they were managing the transferred funds in an effective
manner that also distributes the cost of these projects to other non-state entities. The
teachers’ fundraising committee therefore approached the sugar-cane company first, and
negotiated the amount of money it would donate toward the project of reconstructing the
classroom. The municipal government of San Lorenzo then offered to match the funding
that the sugar-cane company had donated. The parents of students were sought out as a
last resort for the remaining funds necessary to complete the project. Most teachers find
asking parents for money to support a school project to be one of the most difficult
aspects of their job.
In order to convince students’ parents to contribute toward financing school
projects, teachers relied on their argument that ‘education is the only way for their
children and for future generations of Hondurans to escape poverty.’ Reflecting on their
own personal and collective lived experiences – and speaking with the authority of the
state – teachers develop a well-rehearsed argument as to why parents should consider
investing in the future of their communities by contributing to an essential public service.
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This is nonetheless a difficult task, especially when poor parents say they cannot afford
the extra expense, or when outspoken parents contest teachers’ arguments with the
counterpoint that the central government should be financing all aspects of national
‘public’ education, including infrastructural projects – something with which most
teachers agree.
Even while working against these elements of their own political opinions, the
teachers at this San Lorenzo urban school were able to convince parents to finance twenty
percent of the project. They were even able to persuade them to keep financing it after a
heated interaction among some parents and Director Aníbal during which the parents
demanded that he show them official receipts and justifications for the purchase of
construction materials. By citing the Ley de Participación Comunitaria and saying that
they were at the school to demand to see the receipts “not as organized parents of
students” but as members of the “CED” these parents enacted their recently-established
legal right to audit the school director.
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Both the sugar-cane company and San Lorenzo municipal government also
presented obstacles for the teachers, given that they demanded public recognition of their
contributions as philanthropic. This occurred in a variety of ways. Both entities received
large paintings of their official emblems on the front wall of the classroom (see Appendix
I). This happened despite the fact that no other emblems or symbols were painted on the
classroom walls, not even that of the school itself.
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In Chapter 5 I discuss some of the background of the José Cecilio del Valle school that informs instances like this
when parents began to question the use of the school’s internal funds. Here my emphasis on this outcome is intended to
demonstrate that such audits of schoolteachers’ behaviour do indeed occur.
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In a similar fashion the company and municipal government received additional
paintings of their emblems in the form of a sign constructed outside the school premises.
The sign points toward the school, but the letters of the school’s name are miniscule in
size compared to those of its sponsors (see Appendix J). Similar signs appear throughout
the south wherever the sugar company has funded a school project. In addition to these
physical representations, both the sugar-cane company and municipal government
received formal invitations to attend the inauguration ceremony of the classroom. At this
important event teachers gave their sponsors a warm welcome, providing them with
entertainment from the students’ dance and music organizations, during a televised
ceremony where teachers, parents, and students thanked them with certificates honouring
their donations. The sponsors were then invited to a formal lunch with the fundraising
committee in the school’s air-conditioned computer lab, while everyone else stayed
outside in the hot sun without any refreshments.
In other contexts these same teachers had protested in the streets against powerful
actors like these empresarios and politicians. Honduran schoolteachers who are also
members of the Resistencia in fact have led the condemnation of politicians elected to
office during the coup-installed government. Moreover, the FNRP and the LIBRE Party
argue that large companies should pay a higher percentage of their revenues toward tax,
not devise clever schemes for offsetting their tax obligations (in which they also receive
free advertising opportunities). It was thus surprising for me to see teachers welcome
these powerful individuals with such open arms. In fact, one of the politicians present
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was José Alfredo Saavedra,
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the former president of the national congress who was

appointed by the coup-installed de facto government. There was no mistaking this man’s
identity, every teacher present knew who he was. Nonetheless my research participants
stood up in front of everyone, shook his hand, kissed him on the cheek, and thanked him
for supporting “a poor school in the south.” I sat next to the sub-director throughout the
ceremony where he whispered to me the reasons why he believes Saavedra has betrayed
the Honduran population. Yet as the infamous politician approached us, the sub-director
joined his colleagues in welcoming him with a firm handshake. He even took the time to
introduce me, as their “foreign friend” who “enjoys hanging around the school” and
“learning about education in Honduras.”
We might analyze these actions as a performance in which these teachers believed
it strategic to promote the image of their cooperation with other state and non-state actors
for the benefit of their school. After all, they had different supervisors and interested
parties to please. Such actions should not be interpreted to mean that these teachers are
easily manipulated. They were conscious of the political implications of seeking out
funding for school projects from a municipal government and sugar-cane company rather
than the central government. They were keenly aware that this is precisely what the
reforms are demanding that they do. In fact, they often expressed frustration about the
extent to which Honduran schoolteachers ended up supporting neoliberal state projects,
even though they disagreed with the underlying premises. At the same time however they
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As I show in my MA thesis, Saavedra was also a Valle diputado (departmental delegate to the national congress)
during a previous four-year term, up until the time of the June 2009 coup when he was appointed to the national
congress (Levy 2010). Saavedra is thus well known locally, and his support for the golpe de estado has provoked
resentment among Resistencia supporters who thought of him in the pre-coup context as a rather progressive politician
who later betrayed the population and became a key figure in the Micheletti regime.
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were working diligently to meet basic schooling needs. As Director Aníbal explained to
me one day while the classroom was still being constructed:
Look, here the state doesn’t take care of the people. The corrupt, indebted
governments that we have had, and this political crisis that has been going on
since 2009, makes each president try to avoid any unnecessary expense. And
that’s just the thing – they are thinking about education as just another expense for
the state. They should be thinking about it as a social investment in our nation’s
future. These children are the future of Honduras. But who does this government
blame for all the shortcomings and structural problems that we have with
education? Us teachers! They demand quality education, and they pass laws to
demand it… but they don’t want to pay for it! Here in Honduras all the politicians
care about are their own careers, and taking care of their own families, and their
own wallets. And who knows what this next government [after the November
2013 elections] will tell us, or what changes it will want. But meanwhile, here [at
this school] we have some big holes in the roof of our largest classroom, which
we need for assemblies and important events. The students can never focus if
there is water leaking from the roof. This is one reason why they misbehave. And
parents will complain if their children come home with wet clothes. We can’t
teach class like this. Nobody can. Look at the conditions in which we work here.

67

During the 2012 school year, schoolteachers were still working through the implications
of these new laws by reading the implicit and explicit signals of the Lobo government
and the overall political climate since the June 2009 coup (cf. Schwegler 2012). As we
will see in the remainder of this thesis, teachers’ selective implementation of these new
laws and resistance to certain aspects of them are shot-through with political action,
which often occurred in very confined political spaces and in subtle contexts.
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Interview, 11 July 2012.
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4.10 Conclusion
As leaders of the nation-wide social movement that proposes to re-found the state,
Honduran schoolteachers are thinking through the ways policies of governance can serve
the needs of the majority. Ensuring that rural schools continue to exist, that teachers are
competent, that school infrastructure is adequate, and that academic programs connect
with local aspirations, are all things that most teachers would otherwise want – hence the
difficulty in disagreeing with an “audit culture” (cf. Strathern, ed. 2000). In attempting to
meet basic needs for schooling in the context of wide-spread poverty and political
uncertainty, the schoolteachers with whom I work set aside aspects of their own political
opinions on how education ought to be funded, in order to work through what challenges
they were facing in their everyday work activities. In the process they ended up
implementing certain elements of the new laws they found useful, even desirable, while
they simultaneously rejected the neoliberal spirit of the reforms as a whole. As Esdras
told me, “If I don’t go to these politicians for the money, se me cae la escuela [the school
will fall down around me].”
These front-line state agents found themselves entangled in a complex web of
bureaucratic mandates where they needed to develop strategies to keep their jobs and
carry out national public education in the name of the state. Taking advantage of certain
aspects of the new laws in order to deal with previously-existing problems, attempting to
maintain positive relations with students’ parents, and working with what financial
resources did exist locally should not be interpreted as teachers’ enthusiasm or support
for the reforms, but an insight into the complex and contradictory ways in which
neoliberal policies are actually put into practice. From these ethnographic examples we
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can observe that Honduran schoolteachers’ conscious rejection of neoliberal policies does
not directly undermine this legislation, but rather contributes to the contradictory ways
these policies play out in practice in specific places. As we will continue to observe,
teachers chose to speak out explicitly against governing policies in a variety venues –
such as parents’ meetings – at the same time that they were implementing them
selectively. The implementation of any new legislation is never a straightforward matter,
as those responsible for carrying out the policies have their own lived experiences and
political opinions which influence how they interpret the significance of laws and
approach how to best enact them in varied local contexts.
We have seen here that such local particularities and the agency of the actors
involved have a keen influence on the ways that legislation becomes a lived reality.
Esdras, Aníbal, and the other teachers referenced here each have particular experiences
that inform their political opinions and their development of visions about what the
education system should be in Honduras. When they were normal school students, for
instance, these schoolteachers learned that the central offices of the Ministry of Education
is the principal provider of education services and that their work is in the name of the
state and its project of forming subjects who are able to fully participate in civic life, as
the common slogan for each civic event illustrates: ‘formando ciudadanos para
engrandecer a Honduras’ (forming citizens to enrich Honduras). We should also keep in
mind that both of the schools examined here had the privilege of already having access to
electricity and their own computer labs, which permitted their teachers to comply with
these particular demands of the Ley Fundamental. But as Esdras pointed out, access to
such resources is far from the standard for schools in rural Honduras. We can therefore
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see the potential for a range in reception of legislation – not only by members of ‘society’
but also by front-line agents of the state – the individuals responsible for policy
implementation.
Insights from the examples presented here support the broader theoretical premise
of this thesis: processes of governance and state formation are socially produced and
variable depending on the context in question. The ways schoolteachers in Honduras
have interpreted and acted upon these new laws interact with their positions as leaders of
a social movement and political party that seek to re-found the state. The ethnographic
examples described here support the notion that state formation occurs not only through
such formal projects as re-writing the constitution, but also through everyday discussions
and actions in mundane situations (for very clear examples of how this happens see
Joseph and Nugent, 1994 and Painter, 2006).
It is in contexts such as local schools – places that can be included in what John
Clarke calls the “dispersed outposts through which projects are turned into practices”
(2012: 211) – that legislation becomes a lived reality. Such important aspects of state
formation merit sustained ethnographic analysis, especially in Latin American countries
experiencing the deepening of neoliberal development policies, as is the case of postcoup Honduras. The ethnographic method directs our attention to the everyday activities
of those who are responsible for implementing policies of governance, which they are
likely to do in ways that connect and translate between the desires of the designers of
those policies and the needs and desires of the recipients of those services, a process that
necessarily transforms those policies at least in part. The remaining chapters of this thesis
will continue to reveal the various ways in which Honduran schoolteachers, as front-line
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state agents, navigated through “the huge difference” between the “theory” of state
policies and their implementation “in practice.”
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5

New Responsibilities to Fund Primary Education

5.1 Introduction
In 2012 Honduran schoolteachers were primarily concerned with how to secure
funding locally and prove to local interested parties that they were abiding by the new
laws governing the education sector. In so doing they began to take on new
responsibilities not previously associated with their positions. This happened in a variety
of ways. Whereas in Chapter 4 we saw examples of how teachers sought funding for
school infrastructure projects, this chapter will present examples of how teachers sought
funding for two different kinds of academic-related school projects. This will illuminate a
different set of political processes involved with what Esdras meant by the difference
between “theory” and “practice.” These examples will also underscore how the
heightened levels of scrutiny of schoolteachers’ everyday work played out in the context
of them soliciting funding for local academic projects. These projects included: 1) the
expansion of curriculum and of the number of teachers in primary schools, to offer
courses for completing grades seven, eight, and nine; and 2) extra-curricular education
programs that aim to provide practical skills that could potentially enhance local
employment opportunities, which were each sought through different avenues.
While these projects differ in important ways, they both require funding; because
teachers are now required to seek such support locally, this process is dependent upon the
maintenance of positive relationships with local politicians and other potential donors.
Here I examine what it means for schoolteachers to solicit promises from politicians for
different kinds of school projects that teachers themselves have wanted to promote
among the people from the communities in which they work. In showing this relationship
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between teachers and local politicians in the context of the reforms, my aim is to reveal
how teachers are manoeuvring within the neoliberal system to find ways to make
education useful for the populations with whom they work. This can be considered
simultaneously resistance to a repressive neoliberal education system and conformity
with the reforms, given that the new laws require teachers to be innovative and develop
new school projects while seeking funding locally. The ethnographic examples to follow
illuminate some of these contradictions.
Based on their own reading of the political landscape, teachers are conscious that
they now have less job security. As they attempted to maintain positive relations with
parents and other local interested parties in 2012, they also tried to find ways to make
education and opportunities for youth a priority – two processes that are not mutually
exclusive. The examples presented in this chapter thus support another larger argument of
this thesis: as Honduran schoolteachers manoeuvred through the reforms, they were also
enacting their own visions for what the national public education system could be with
FNRP/LIBRE-initiated state re-foundation projects. By showing the particulars of how
teachers at these two schools worked to forge a society in which the state plays a central
role in funding education, and by showing the significance of teachers’ political
connections in order to secure local funds, this chapter also lays more of the groundwork
for my analysis in Chapter 7 of how teachers’ daily acts of resistance merge into broader
visions of what the Honduran state itself should be like.

5.2 Primarización and Centros de Educación Básica
What is the significance of the relationship between local political authorities and
schoolteachers in Honduras? How do broader neoliberal policies toward national public
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education manifest in local schools? Here I address these questions by focusing on the
expansion of curriculum and staffing numbers in primary schools within the framework
of the broader process of ‘primarización,’ or an increased emphasis on government
investment in primary education. This concept was introduced into Honduras’ national
public education system in the latter half of the 1990s.
The logic of this broader regional phenomenon was that although poor countries
should cut their public service budgets to pay off foreign debt and attract foreign
investment, even these cash-strapped governments still need their populations fluent in
basic literary and numeracy skills in order to create a productive workforce.
Subsequently, poor countries – such as Honduras – would receive a “higher rate of return
to investment” with a primary education system than with a secondary (much less a postsecondary) system (Arnove 1997: 87, 90; cf. Gershberg 1999 on Nicaragua); they should
thus focus their limited education budgets on primary education. Under this view, public
investment in secondary education is an unaffordable luxury for poor countries. In
Honduras, this transformation toward funding mostly primary education occurred in a
variety of ways,
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and it has contributed to conflicts within the magisterio among

schoolteachers who live through this process.
In this section I write about centros de educación básica (CEBs), also known as
centros básicos. I explain how both Carías Andino and José Cecilio del Valle became
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Another phenomenon that emerged in Honduras during this time, which we might also think about in terms of
‘primarización,’ were the community-managed semi-private primary schools known as Programa Hondureño de
Educación Comunitaria (Honduran Community Education Program, PROHECO) about which Daniel Altschuler has
written (2010a, 2010b). These schools have been modeled on their success in neighbouring countries (cf. Arnove 1997;
Gershberg 1999 on Nicaragua), and are jointly funded by the private sector, municipal governments, parents, and
churches – much like what the Lobo reforms envision for the public education system on a national level. Here my
focus is on CEBs, since they are the type of school where I conducted almost all of my fieldwork, and because they are
more widespread than the limited number of PROHECO pilot projects.
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CEBs, and analyze the phenomenon both as part of this general framework of a move
toward ‘primarización,’ and in terms of the relationships between schoolteachers and
local politicians in Honduras. We must first begin by describing the theory of CEBs in
order to then analyze their effects in practice. The initial argument in favour of the
development and maintenance of centros de educación básica was to provide school
children in rural areas, where there are no high schools (grades 7-12), the opportunity to
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get some secondary education in the form of ‘ciclo común’ or ‘ciclo básico’

– the first

three years of secondary education (grades 7-9) – without the need to travel to a colegio
outside their communities. As the logic goes, more poor peasant children will get at least
some secondary education with CEBs, whereas if they had to support the costs of
transportation and food while outside their communities, they would be less likely to
continue studying ciclo básico.
Following this line of reasoning, the opening of the first 35 CEBs in 1996
(Hernández 2004) signified a new attempt to provide much-needed access to some
secondary education for poor youth from rural areas in Honduras.
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Although in some

cases there were attempts to establish and maintain CEBs in this spirit of meeting local
desires for some secondary education, in many cases CEBs were actually started and
maintained based on other variables – including relationships with local politicians. The
remainder of this section shows how some of these contradictions of CEBs played out in
practice at the two centros de educación básica where I conducted research, as teachers
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I use these terms interchangeably, as do Honduran schoolteachers.
Some Honduran schoolteachers say that the idea of a CEB originates in Chile. I am unfamiliar with the complete
history of CEBs in Latin America broadly, but attributing these ideas to Chilean policies during this moment in
Honduras is an understandable perception given that the Chilean carabineros were invited by Pepe Lobo during this
time to reform that Honduran police, and people who opposed this process were critical of the influence of Chilean
governing policies in Honduras in general.
70
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navigated through a complex web of political and social relations. As elsewhere in this
thesis, we will see here how schoolteachers were reading the political landscape and
making difficult, yet sometimes opportunistic, decisions by assessing the resources,
constraints, and possibilities available locally.

5.3 The Formation of CEB Carías Andino in Rural El
Garrobo
During the initial tour that Esdras gave me of his rural school (as I briefly
describe in Chapter 4), he took the time to explain that when he first started working
there it was just an ‘escuela’ and that under his mandate as director he was responsible
for its conversion to a CEB in 2007. The story of how this happened reveals how
Honduran schoolteachers’ specific political connections directly influenced the means
through which the state project of public education has been carried out in practice. In
early September, after eight months of experience conducting participant observation at
his centro, I asked Esdras to describe to me exactly how it was transformed from an
escuela into a CEB. In the informal environment of cooking seafood chowder at his home
on a Sunday afternoon, Esdras explained to me:
Saavedra and I were on good terms back then, you know, before the golpe de
estado. Now he’s a total golpista jerk, and he knows that I am mera-resistencia.
Now there’s no way he would have anything to do with me, but back then I
thought he was an alright guy. Anyway, he was in charge of determining which
rural schools in Valle would become centros de educación básica. Since there
was only enough money to change a few, it was his job to figure out which ones.
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As a diputado for Valle, Saavedra ran the budget for changing them into centros
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básicos.

I asked Esdras whether the Valle Ministry wouldn’t look at population levels and
proximity of existing colegios in making these decisions (which would be consistent with
the initial logic for their creation).
Ha! Maybe in theory, but that’s not the way it works here in practice. Here it’s all
about politics. Here in Honduras things only move because of politics. So,
Saavedra was a Liberal Party diputado and I used to be a Liberal too, you know,
before the golpe. I even voted for him. So we got along OK. But he didn’t even
really know me that well. He just knew I was a school director. So one day he
calls me up on the phone and asks if I knew this other school director from
outside of Alianza [a rural municipality in Valle]. Saavedra told me that he needed
to get in touch with this guy to talk with him about important matters to do with
his school. I already knew that he was going around changing certain schools into
centros básicos, so I lied a little bit – I told him that I had no idea what the other
director’s phone number was…. And then I said that in the meantime, he should
come out to my school, which serves the needs of other children in the
neighbouring [rural] communities too. I told him that I had been wanting to ask
the departmental director what needed to happen in order to change my school
into a centro básico, since we already had so many graduates who wanted to study
ciclo básico, yet only a handful of them could actually afford to travel to
Nacaome.
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Since teachers often receive an increase in salary for the new positions they take on, I
asked Esdras why he wanted his escuela to become a centro básico in the first place, and
if there was any increase in salary for him as the director of a CEB.
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No. There’s no increase in salary at all. Maybe there should be… it’s a lot more
work! But every [primary school] director wants to be in charge of a centro
básico. It’s much more prestigious. And you can be known as the person who
changed the community forever. Imagine all of those poor children who would
otherwise just leave school after sixth grade. Thanks to me killing myself out
there, they can now study seventh, eighth and ninth grade too. And their parents
are happy about it. More education means that someday they can escape the
shackles of poverty. Everyone prefers a centro básico to an escuela – there are
more opportunities to grow and do things. Look at all the soccer tournaments we
have. People love that stuff. And the possibility exists that someday it will
become a colegio. Imagine that. You see, it’s easier for the state to change a
centro básico into a colegio than just a primary school into a colegio. Those
students of ours who want to study a [high school] carrera afterward can do so.
Our centro has a great reputation with the high schools in San Lorenzo, Nacaome,
and Pespire. We have had students go on to all of these places. They are few and
far between, but we do produce them. The majority leave school after ninth grade
– you know, people are quite poor in El Garrobo. But at least now they have a
ninth grade education, and not just a sixth grade education. So anyway, Saavedra
came out a few days later. I guess he was never able to get a hold of that other
director over the phone…. And there I was, persistently asking him to come out to
our school. And we received him really well. You would have enjoyed it – we had
students’ mothers cooking tamales and sopa de frijoles, and I invited a group of
students who had already graduated, but who didn’t go on to study ciclo básico.
And he approved it. But then it was an uphill battle with the departmental
Ministry offices to get them to approve the budgets for ciclo básico teachers.
Profe Marlon was the first one there, you know. First we needed a math teacher –
someone with an undergraduate degree in math. Later we had Profe Laura for
food security, Profe Marilu and Profe Katrina for the Spanish reading and writing
classes. Profe Marlon has two jobs, you know: one at Carías Andino and one at a
high school where he also teaches math. So, Saavedra and I got along well before.
I even went drinking with him after that meeting, back when I would drink a lot.
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And I told him that I was grateful for the nice gesture…. But now he’s a total
golpista asshole. You know that he was president of the de-facto national
congress during Micheletti? And he knows that I am mera Resistencia. Now
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there’s no way I would let him into my centro! I don’t care what he offers me.

This account illuminates several important phenomena. First is the general
understanding among teachers that political connections – not just the needs of the
community – are necessary in order to form a CEB. Indeed, this reflects teachers’ general
understanding that they need to maintain positive political connections in order to
accomplish any kind of school project. However, Esdras also emphasized his separation
from Saavedra’s realm of influence as a result of the polarizing of political relationships
after the 2009 coup. Esdras is well aware that his current positioning as a local leader of
the Resistencia and LIBRE Party undermines his previous connections with diputados in
charge of departmental education budgets, as by definition they are all golpistas.
Esdras’ reading of the political environment, his fluency in the type of language
needed to work within this web of connections, is clear in this account. Esdras assessed
realistically the possibilities available, and did not hesitate to put his school’s and
students’ interests ahead of others, by neglecting to give the diputado his colleague’s
contact information in what he knew was a zero-sum game. Esdras also knew how he
needed to represent his school (as serving other rural communities in the area) and his
students (without the means to study ciclo básico in the distant colegios) to align his
description with the logic for establishing centros de educación básica. He added a final
strategic touch by inviting some of the school’s sixth-grade graduates to be present when
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the politician came to visit. The combination of these factors contributed to achieving
CEB status at Carías Andino. Rather than being a technical exercise, this process was
shot-through with political understandings, connections, and calculations. This is
consistent with the ways in which Honduran schoolteachers conduct business with local
political authorities in general.
In subsequent years it was up to Esdras to negotiate with officials from the
departmental Ministry the staffing levels at the school to meet CEB needs. Esdras
considered this a slow process, as each year officials had to re-evaluate the need for CEB
teachers. This resulted in prioritizing which teachers were most needed – first one with an
undergraduate degree in mathematics, and later those with degrees in food security and
Spanish to teach home economics, reading and writing courses. During this initial period,
students taking natural science, social science, and physical education courses at the ciclo
básico (secondary education) level therefore were taught by teachers without specialized
undergraduate degrees, who had only graduated from the normal school.
Herein lies some Honduran schoolteachers’ strongest critique of centros de
educación básica: the Ministry of Education approves schools with CEB status, but the
approval of departmental ministry budgets for hiring qualified teachers for secondary
education courses in these new CEBs happens much later. Teachers themselves speculate
that this occurs whenever a diputado gets around to doing it; there are probably
operational constraints also at work. In any case, during this time of what I call the ‘CEB
limbo period,’ students taking ciclo básico at CEBs receive instruction for these courses
from teachers who do not have the Ministry-defined credentials for these positions.
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A ‘CEB limbo period’ is widespread in Honduras, and the resources provided to
CEBs vary considerably, another example of what Esdras astutely pointed to as the
chronic distance between theory and practice in Honduran education. Teachers also
criticize the Ministry practice of appointing a teacher with an undergraduate degree in
one subject and expecting her/him to teach courses that do not correspond to her/his
degree. For instance, frequently teachers with mathematics degrees are asked to teach
courses in physics, chemistry, and biology. This critique of the centros de educación
básica is especially common among secondary schoolteachers – who have sacrificed in
order to obtain their own university degrees – who complain that CEB students arrive at
their colegios ill-prepared academically, especially when compared to students who
completed ciclo básico at their high schools. Teachers who work at CEBs are also critical
of this practice because of the effect on their workload of being asked to teach courses
outside of their areas of expertise. They recognize that, at the expense of their own
workloads, they are contributing to the government being able to claim it is expanding
education opportunities without investing in training and employing more schoolteachers
with advanced degrees.

5.4 The Formation of CEB José Cecilio del Valle in Urban
San Lorenzo
During my fieldwork at the centro de educación básica José Cecilio del Valle,
the ‘CEB limbo period’ had already continued for three years, after a Liberal Party
diputado promised Director Aníbal that his school would become a CEB in late 2009
(during the de-facto coup government of Roberto Micheletti). Whereas by 2012 the CEB
Carías Andino already had enough secondary education teachers to cover its CEB
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courses, the teaching staff at José Cecilio del Valle did not include any full-time
secondary teachers for their CEB courses. Director Aníbal, a coup-supporting Liberal
himself, attributed the limbo status of his CEB to the fact that the National Party
government of Pepe Lobo chose for political reasons not to respect the changes that a
Liberal Party diputado made during the preceding de-facto government. He also
expressed commonly-held views among schoolteachers during one of conversations
about the ‘CEB limbo status’:
It is ridiculous what our education system has come to in this country. Can you
believe it? I have to ask a sugar company to come in here and fix the roof! This
is the responsibility of the state. Now they want to privatize toditito (every little
thing). I know that the education system in the US is decentralized too, but there
they have a tradition of respecting laws. It’s not like Honduras. Here nobody
cares about respecting the laws, even though that’s the way things should be.
This is why the Honduran is so accustomed to begging. We are told to go out of
our way, to ask if some rich people might want to help us. The state wants
quality education, but they don’t ever give us the materials to carry it out. They
just look to blame us teachers. It’s as if you were a pilot, and I’m there flying
with you in your plane. And then you say, ‘here Aníbal, you take the controls,’
and I tell you that I don’t know how to fly, and that you should do the flying.
But you insist that I fly the plane. And then, once we start to crash, you yell at
me and say that I had better look for some [body of] water before we both die,
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because it will be my fault!

Director Aníbal’s comments express the frustration among teachers that the
Honduran state is divesting itself of its responsibility to fund national public education.
We spoke in a moment of desperation for Aníbal as he was struggling to maintain the
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CEB limbo status of his school in the hope that it would someday become fully funded.
To this end Director Aníbal appointed CEB teachers ‘ad honorem’ (pro bono), asking
them to teach CEB courses (grades 7-9) as volunteers, without any contract but
sometimes with a small stipend from the school’s internal funds. The exact amount of
money depended on the individual’s situation, and ranged from simply paying her/his
taxi fare and lunch, to paying her/him close to half of what beginning primary education
schoolteachers make. This situation resulted in criticism of Aníbal on several fronts. On
one level, the ‘teachers’ who he hired were not qualified as such. On another level, as a
school administrator, Aníbal was criticized by teachers and parents for using so much of
the internal budget on teachers’ salaries.
In Honduras, a school’s internal budget is completely independent from the
Ministry of Education, and since well before the reforms has been used to pay for
expenses that the central government has never sought to fund. These expenses include
janitorial services, hiring a school security guard, and supplying bottled water in
communal areas for teachers and visitors. The funds are managed by a joint committee of
teachers and parent representatives from the Sociedad de Padres de Familia. Together
they usually elect a teacher to manage this budget as treasurer of the school’s internal
funds. If there is any surplus left after funding basic expenses, additional expenses may
be approved by the committee. For instance, some teachers have received stipends from
their school’s internal funds to help cover the costs of attending conferences; some
schools will also use these funds for special school events. While the size of schools’
internal budgets is highly variable, the money usually comes from the proceeds earned by
renting out glorietas to venders, donations from teachers and parents alike, and from
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fund-raising activities which can vary widely (from Bingo nights to selling produce from
a school garden, as was the case with the Comayagua normal school).
While internal budgets for these types of expenses have existed for some time,
since the reforms teachers are pressed to seek out more funding locally. It is through the
careful management of internal budgets that schools contribute their portion of any
infrastructure projects (as we saw in Chapter 4), and these funds are also how schools
have begun to pay for the kinds of projects presented in this chapter. At first, the CEB
José Cecilio del Valle had enough surplus in their internal budget to allow Director
Aníbal to pay a small stipend to the teachers he hired ‘ad honorem.’ Initially, teachers
and parents alike were in favour of spending some internal funds as an interim measure to
pay CEB teachers until the school received its official and complete CEB status and the
Ministry of Education began to pay the salaries of CEB teachers.
Finding a mathematics teacher was the most difficult task. During the first half of
2012, CEB mathematics classes at José Cecilio del Valle were taught by the parent of a
primary school student, who worked as the manager of a retail establishment in San
Lorenzo. While this man had studied at the normal school in Choluteca, he took a
different career path after graduating and had no experience teaching school children. He
also did not have an undergraduate degree in math from the UPNFM as all secondary
teachers at colegios are required to have. At the time of his volunteer appointment at José
Cecilio del Valle, he was pursuing an undergraduate degree in business administration at
a private institute. At first this was a convenient arrangement for Director Aníbal since
this volunteer did not require any payment at all: he offered his services as a concerned
parent and normal school graduate. A few months into the 2012 school year, however,
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the math teacher decided to emigrate to the United States, leaving his position on very
short notice.
Director Aníbal frantically sought a new math teacher, worried about potential
criticisms of his centro. Especially in the context of the Ley de Participación
Comunitaria and the fear of teachers and schools being spied on by the network of the
COMDE and the CED, Director Aníbal was fearful of repercussions. He even asked me if
I knew of any mathematics teachers in the region who might be willing to volunteer.
While he put in a request for a volunteer from the Japan International Cooperation
Agency ‘JICA’, he still needed a full-time Honduran mathematics teacher.
The 2012 school year was particularly important for Aníbal, not only because of
the political environment of heightened public criticisms of schoolteachers’ work, but
also because this was the first year that CEB José Cecilio del Valle was to produce
graduates from the ciclo básico cohort, three years after its initial founding in January
2010. Within a few weeks of the departure of the first mathematics ‘teacher,’ Aníbal was
able to convince an unemployed civil engineer to teach the CEB math classes. This
engineer had no training in a classroom environment, he had never studied at the normal
school, and he only had minimal experience in public speaking. To make matters even
more difficult for the school, the engineer insisted on receiving a generous stipend paid
twice per month.
When the internal budget committee and Director Aníbal initially agreed to pay
the stipend demanded by the engineer, the school’s internal budget had a surplus. Once
the classroom re-construction project was underway, however, the albañiles told Director
Aníbal that the project would require both significantly more construction materials and
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labour time than anticipated. The combination of unforeseen construction costs and the
demands of the volunteer math teacher quickly exhausted the school’s internal budget.
By the engineer’s second month teaching math, Director Aníbal had to tell him that there
were not enough funds to continue paying him the agreed-upon amount. Aníbal tried to
entice the engineer to stay with an argument about the benevolent service he would be
providing the community’s children during a time of economic crisis, but the engineer
threatened to withdraw his services. Aníbal, worried about potential criticism of a
situation he himself had helped to create (as the school’s director), took out a bank loan
in his own name to pay the engineer.
Meanwhile, the school’s treasurer, teacher María Elena, asked to speak at the
next teachers’ council meeting about the matter, where she described the deficit in the
school’s internal budget to her colleagues. It was there that Aníbal explained that a group
of parents had confronted him, demanding to see itemized receipts for construction costs
paid through the internal budget, given that the parents had donated monies for the
classroom reconstruction, but not for paying a math teacher. As Aníbal put it:
These people… this group of parents who have been critical of me, they came in
to my office the other day demanding to see the details of our internal budget.
And the thing that really upset me was that they said they were here to check our
school’s budget – not as the Sociedad de Padres de Familia, but as the CED!
This is what really pissed me off! We have known these people for years…. So
we have a very delicate situation on our hands, and I am here telling you all that
I am fed up. I don’t know what to do. I have been taking out loans in my own
name for some time now; few of you know the details of this, but those who do,
know that I have been suffering. As María Elena describes, we cannot continue
like this. We need to somehow cut down on our expenses. But as I have told
these parents with the CED, our expenses here at this school are not for any
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luxuries – they are for things of necessity! How can we not pay our math
teacher? How can we not pay for our security guard in times like these?
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Director Aníbal went on to describe the receipts that he had on file. He asked
specific teachers to gather other receipts they might have, in order to show them to the
CED. He then asked teachers to turn in the donations that they had been collecting. Each
classroom had been asked to contribute at least five Lempiras per child, to help off-set the
internal budget deficit. The teachers had asked the students to go home and ask their
parents for more money above and beyond the initial donations each family had made.
None of the dozen teachers present had received complete funding from all of their
students. This provoked discussion of parents’ argument that they shouldn’t be expected
to pay for a ‘public’ school system. As teachers described in turn the particulars of the
situation in their classrooms and the reasons some students were unable to pay the
money, María Elena redirected the conversation to suggest that the teachers themselves
cover the budget deficit. She and Aníbal asked their colleagues if everyone would agree
to each donate an extra hundred Lempiras per month toward the school’s internal budget.
Not everyone agreed. As consensus could not be reached, they decided instead to
consider firing a part-time janitor who several teachers believed wasn’t doing a good job
in any case. This was a more popular option, but required developing a rotating schedule
for students from different grades to clean the restrooms themselves.
I described this discussion at length because it shows the difficulty of balancing
previously-existing inadequate financial resources with the various increasing demands
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on schools and teachers with the onset of the reforms. Without more resources, services
would have to be reduced, and this involved a downloading of responsibility onto the
shoulders of teachers, parents, and students in a range of ways. Aníbal was well aware
that it was the school director who would become the lightning rod for criticism when
attempts to manage these conflicting pressures – such as the need to offer a higher level
of training without the funds to do so – failed.
The debates surrounding the CEB limbo status of José Cecilio del Valle continued
throughout the 2012 school year. Some teachers donated an extra amount to the internal
budget even though no consensus was reached to require this of everyone. This led to
internal tensions between those who had donated and others who had not yet done so.
Indeed, this was so divisive that I would often arrive to conduct participant observation
only to find most teachers too upset to talk with me about the implications of the reforms.
Instead, many teachers used their conversations with me as an opportunity to express
frustration about their colleagues. Internal tensions became so extreme that a teacher was
suspended from work for disciplinary reasons after having thrown a pot of boiling beans
on the sub-director, which resulted in scalding that required immediate medical attention.
In the rumours that circulated about the cause of this dispute, some teachers
acknowledged that such behaviour was inexcusable but explained it as a result of the subdirector pressuring the teacher to donate her extra hundred Lempiras. The effects of these
pressures on the working environment and collegial relations were profound.
In addition to these internal budget problems caused in part by the need to hire
CEB teachers, a deeper critique of centros de educación básica can be observed through
the case of the José Cecilio del Valle school. Whereas the initial rationale for establishing
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CEBs was to provide poor rural children with access to some secondary education
without shouldering the expense of traveling to an urban colegio, the CEB José Cecilio
del Valle is located within urban San Lorenzo where the colegio El Felipe (the largest in
Valle) is located. The fact that José Cecilio del Valle was granted CEB status at all
contradicts this logic, hence the difference between “theory” and “practice” of governing
policies in Honduras. However, it would be inappropriate to blame Director Aníbal for
these problems, since a Valle diputado told him that the Ministry of Education would be
changing his escuela into a centro básico.
Director Aníbal has been caught in the middle of the dilemma of trying to convert
his school into a fully-funded centro de educación básica while it has become evident
that in practice the resources for CEB classes simply have not been allocated to his
school. In 2012 he was fearful that if he discontinues the CEB courses, the Ministry
would eliminate the plan to change his centro into a CEB, which would have probably
led to understandable criticism from those parents who had sent their children to José
Cecilio del Valle for ciclo básico. An additional component to Aníbal’s willingness to
hold on was his hope for a Liberal Party victory in the November 2013 presidential and
congressional elections, which he believed would have been a way for his CEB to
become fully funded. Given his on-going political connections with regional Liberal
Party politicians, Aníbal considered this his best chance at full funding. As he understood
it, “the problem is that I am a Liberal and these Nationalists don’t want to give it to me”
(an example of how the allocation of education funding in Honduras is a political, rather
than a technical exercise). In the meantime, Aníbal continued to work on funding
possibilities and tried to keep the ad honorem teachers from leaving.
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During the 2012 school year, Director Aníbal made frequent trips to the central
Ministry of Education offices in Tegucigalpa. Paying for his own transportation
expenses, he drove to the head offices in the capital city hoping to convince someone
there that his centro needed to be properly funded, persistently reminding the Ministry
authorities that a diputado awarded his school CEB status in 2009. As he told me:
When I go to Tegus, I am told not to worry, that soon they will approve the
budget for my centro básico teachers. It’s as if they just want to see me smile,
come back here, and continue waiting. And it’s not easy to get in to see these
guys. You have to go really early in the morning, and wait in line all day. And I
have to pay for the gas myself – nobody is going to reimburse me. But after
every visit, nothing ever gets done at the departmental level. I don’t have any
connections there right now. So we’ll see what this next government does.
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Director Aníbal’s experiences with waiting in the central Ministry offices
resonate with the analysis of political scientist Javier Auyero, who has argued that
waiting for state services produces a particular type of knowledge among citizens about
how to interact with different kinds of state bureaucrats. He writes about how the poor in
Argentina learn to manage the demands of local bureaucrats when seeking out welfare
services (2012). Here we see a similar process among a different group, schoolteachers,
who themselves work for the state. Aníbal has learned that waiting for Ministry of
Education funding, and keeping the needs of his school before the eyes of government
officials despite the lack of effective response to his petitions, is simply part of the job of
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being a director of a school in ‘CEB limbo status.’ And he continues to see the state,
rather than the private sector, as the answer.
Amidst the circumstances described here, while still waiting for the central
ministry to fund his CEB, Aníbal began to ask fellow CEB directors for advice. He even
called Esdras one day to ask how he managed to change Carías Andino from an escuela
into a centro de educación básica. I was with Esdras when he received this call. Esdras
urged Aníbal to remember that in addition to the common practice of disregarding
promises made under a previous government, any Ministry official at the Tegucigalpa
level would be unfamiliar with and indifferent toward what happens to a CEB in
peripheral Valle. He reminded Aníbal of the implications of a decentralized, semiprivatized education system, and advised him to discontinue his efforts in Tegucigalpa,
and to instead channel his energy to influence those officials at the Valle departmental
Ministry. Esdras suggested that Aníbal should remind the departmental Ministry officials
that a new CEB cohort would be graduating soon, and that if they did not act quickly to
adjust their budgets, they would be at fault for misleading a group of students and their
parents. Esdras further recommended that Aníbal try to manoeuvre a politician to commit
publicly to funding their CEB budget – perhaps on local television or over the radio.
Finally, Esdras reminded Aníbal that additional criticism would be levelled at him, if he
were to lose the volunteer math teacher before the end of the 2012 school year.
Throughout the 2012 school year, Aníbal, María Elena, and other teachers on the
CEB José Cecilio del Valle fundraising committee continued to seek funds to pay the ad
honorem teachers. This was no easy task, as they were already paying for unforeseen
construction fees. To gather these extra internal funds the schoolteachers decided to have
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a ‘día de colores’ in which students were allowed to come to class without their uniforms
(dressed ‘in colours’), provided that they pay a fee for such a privilege. They also asked
fellow teachers and mothers of students alike to prepare traditional, labour-intensive
Honduran dishes and sell them to other parents and community members at school
events, just as they also hosted a community-wide raffle together with the Sociedad de
Padres de Familia.
The kinds of fund-raising activities that the José Cecilio del Valle staff engaged
in were common in Honduras prior to the reforms, just as they are common practices
outside of Honduras. However, these efforts are now designed to help cover the costs of
basic schooling needs in Honduras, rather than extra, non-essential expenditures. At this
CEB, since these events didn’t produce enough money to fund the mounting of additional
expenses, teachers developed new ideas for generating funds for the internal budget. One
controversial way they did so was by altering how the CEB would elect a ‘school queen’
for the September 15 Independence Day parade. For the first time in the school’s history,
teachers at the CEB José Cecilio del Valle made the election of school queen among
female student candidates dependent not on student votes during the beauty pageant
event, but rather it was determined by which candidate collected the largest amount of
money in sponsorships. One Lempira equalled one vote.
These initiatives were not well received by some students and parents, who saw
this tradition as a source of prestige. Determining who gets to march in the parade, and
who is the school queen, has been a question of social status locally. As hundreds of
community members gathered to watch the Independence Day parades, the participation
of school children is viewed as a reflection on their parents. Comments about how well
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dressed, well behaved, or handsome a child is tend to create a sense of pride among
parents (see, also, Fiona Wilson 2001: 337 on how Peruvian teachers recognize the
importance of these civic events).
The sudden change in the criteria for the most prestigious position of school
queen was not popular. As school treasurer María Elena explained to me: “This is the
first year that we have done the election of the queen this way. Usually it is based on
which one is prettiest. But this year they have to go collect funds themselves. Whoever
has the most Lempiras wins. Some parents don’t think it should be based on money, but I
can tell you that we are basically without other options.” The schoolteachers at CEB José
Cecilio del Valle were well aware of the local repercussions against them for changing
this beauty pageant, yet they had decided that these changes were necessary, given the
limbo status of their CEB, the deficit of their internal budget, and the political
environment of scrutiny of schoolteachers’ work. Under far from ideal circumstances,
they had to weigh whether they would be more criticized for changing this tradition, or
for not being able to reconstruct a classroom and pay CEB teachers. They were, as
Hondurans often say, “entre la espada y la pared” (between a rock and a hard place).
At the end of the school year, Aníbal and the teachers at the CEB José Cecilio
del Valle had managed to keep the school operating under these considerable constraints,
and they graduated the first CEB cohort. The CEB limbo status did however continue,
without any resolution. It was cause for greater internal tensions among the teachers, and
the issue of whether it made sense to maintain a CEB so close to El Felipe seemed to be a
constant question on the minds of staff. Aníbal told me that in his opinion it did make
sense. He argued that the students at CEB José Cecilio del Valle choose to attend his

201

school rather than the colegio in San Lorenzo because they could offer smaller class
sizes; their teachers know the students by name and have known them since the first
grade. He further argued that El Felipe requires students to pay higher student fees which
go toward the construction and maintenance of a growing high school, whereas such fees
are lower at his CEB. Overall, Aníbal argued that the students at his CEB are better off
with a smaller class size, at a slightly more affordable price.
Other teachers at the CEB José Cecilio del Valle were more critical of what they
recognized as a lower-quality education, even if that meant putting their own work and
qualifications into question. The CEB English class teacher is a prime example. Profe
Norma was always quite supportive of my presence at the CEB José Cecilio del Valle.
She was however critically conscious of the status of her centro and the implications of
the reforms. She has been a primary education schoolteacher during her entire career, and
was asked to teach CEB English classes once the school received CEB status. Norma
cannot hold a conversation in English; she cannot write full sentences in English; she
does not understand the majority of spoken English; and she is aware that she lacks the
knowledge to teach English. She didn’t want to be assigned the English classes in the first
place. Rather, she was selected by Aníbal to teach CEB-level English classes because she
had taken a couple of weekend English workshops in the past, and because she had
traveled to the United States to visit family during school holidays. She was quick to see
me as a useful resource. Throughout the school year we spent considerable time
discussing pronunciation and grammar. Norma also asked me to give occasional guest
lectures to her CEB English students.
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Throughout my fieldwork Profe Norma and I discussed the implications of the
reforms, and how she interpreted the recent political changes. She often spoke about how
“even if we do get the teachers we need, centros básicos are not respectable institutions.
Every good teacher knows that!” When I enquired with other teachers about this, many
agreed with Norma’s sentiments; some even told me that they would not risk their own
children’s education at a CEB.
For Honduran schoolteachers critical of centros de educación básica, these
schools represent a lower-quality education at the secondary level of ciclo común. This
understanding has several implications. At one level these teachers question what this
means for the poor peasant students of Honduras, who they believe already receive
lower-quality primary education, given the commonly-held perception that the best
teachers opt for jobs in the urban setting. They wonder if rural students who graduate
from CEBs will ever be as competitive as those who graduate from colegios. Although
these schoolteachers recognize that a ciclo básico education is better than nothing at all,
the argument is that CEBs have not solved the problems of poor peasant children
accessing the secondary education system. Thus under this conception, an education from
a CEB offers little room for class mobility and access to the job market based on
education credentials. Chapter 3 demonstrated that most schoolteachers themselves have
experienced the benefits of having gone through the education system successfully and
obtained good jobs despite their humble backgrounds; they want others to have similar
opportunities. These arguments connect with a concern that with only a poor quality
education and no high school carrera (to enter a specific trade) poor peasant children will
be more likely to join the pool of cheap labourers employed precariously by multinational
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corporations. Thus discussions of CEBs also connect with schoolteachers’ overall
solidarity with the Honduran working class and peasantry.
At another level, teachers who criticize CEBs view them as complementary to
and a product of the current neoliberal reforms to the education sector and the reduction
in public funding for national public education in general, which they see as regressive.
They are aware that it is significantly less expensive for the Honduran state to change
escuelas into CEBs than to properly invest in hiring more (qualified) secondary education
schoolteachers and building more high schools in rural areas. Secondary schoolteachers
are, on the whole, better paid because of their specialized undergraduate degrees, and the
construction of a new high school is far more expensive than simply an extra classroom
or two in an already-existing escuela to house the addition of ciclo común students, as
Esdras attested. As we have seen however, in Honduras the mere construction of an extra
classroom or getting the official status of ‘CEB’ – even while funds for teachers are
pending – all depend upon a school administrator’s political connections.
While there were less internal conflicts surrounding the centro básico debate at
CEB Carías Andino, and they had enough CEB teachers to teach the necessary ciclo
básico courses, schoolteachers there were conscious of the controversy surrounding
CEBs. Yet this was never an unambiguous situation. Profe Marlon for instance, who also
held a position at a colegio, echoed on different occasions the same set of arguments in
favour of CEBs as Director Aníbal expressed (smaller class sizes, lower fees). Yet when
Director Esdras attempted to expand CEB Carías Andino – as the reforms require him to
do – by encouraging students who have dropped out after sixth grade to come back and
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finish ciclo común, and by convincing students in sixth grade to stay at CEB Carías
Andino for their ciclo común studies, Sub-director Mercedes had a different agenda.
As a sixth-grade teacher, Sub-director Mercedes was acutely aware of which
students showed the academic potential to continue on and study a high school carrera.
And she was of the opinion that their CEB would not prepare students well enough to go
on to compete with students who studied ciclo común at high schools in Nacaome, San
Lorenzo, or Choluteca. To the dismay of Director Esdras and other teachers at CEB
Carías Andino, who had gone out to rural communities to convince students who had
dropped out of ciclo común to come back to finish and who had worked to convince
others finishing sixth grade to stay on, Profe Mercedes attempted to convince some
students to pursue their ciclo común studies elsewhere. This situation generated conflicts
between Mercedes and other Carías Andino teachers who agreed with Esdras’s argument
that most of their students, from peasant backgrounds, were too poor to travel elsewhere
for their ciclo básico education, and that therefore they were doing the community a great
service in providing otherwise unavailable secondary education at CEB Carías Andino.
While the issue of how to promote the best interests of students is a matter about which
reasonable people can disagree, these tensions were heightened because of the need under
the reforms to increase student enrolment numbers. While Esdras and other teachers
travelled to neighbouring rural communities to argue that their centro has the potential to
bring these children out of poverty, Mercedes argued otherwise.
During the 2012 school year, Sub-director Mercedes was not completely
successful in convincing students to go to elsewhere for their ciclo común education. This
can be partly attributed to the fact that area students were indeed from poor households
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that really could not finance the extra transportation and food expenses (supporting
Esdras’ position), and partly due to Esdras’ campaign to promote the image of their CEB
in the community. In either case, this on-going conflict between Esdras and Mercedes
highlights again the internal tensions among schoolteachers that have been deepened by
new pressures upon them, even two school administrators who have shared interests in
supporting each other in the current political environment.
As we proceed to analyze how Honduran schoolteachers navigated the reforms
and competed for limited funding to build their schools and maintain their internal
budgets, we must keep in mind these internal contradictions and politics within the
magisterio about centros de educación básica. We should remember that although CEBs
do offer some secondary education (grades 7-9), for teachers critical of centros básicos
they vividly represent a withdrawal of state funding for national public education in
general, especially for pursuing the ultimate goals of secondary education, like training
for a specific trade through a high school carrera. For these teachers, CEBs thus
represent a move toward the primarización of the Honduran public education system.
They argue that this process is complementary to the post-coup government’s reduction
in funding for secondary education, which in turn encourages high schools to charge
higher tuition fees. This situation as a whole, they argue, is likely to discourage or
prevent poor students from pursuing a high school carrera, and thus only the wealthy
youth of Honduras will have access to a specialized diploma; the rest will enter the work
force with only a primary school (or CEB) education, which they feel is inadequate.
These arguments are connected to the widespread understanding in the
magisterio that with decentralization and privatization of education funding, not only will
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schools in the rural areas be forced to close due to low enrolment numbers, but cashstrapped municipal governments will only be willing (and able) to support education in
the urban areas (although even there such support is inadequate). As this happens,
teachers fear that high schools (colegios and normal schools) will receive the least
amount of funding, as poor municipalities will seek to prioritize and will only support
primary education (escuelas and centros de educación básica).
Even teachers who strictly teach primary education and support CEBs see clear
connections between the overall decrease in government support for the national public
education system and this process of ‘primarización.’ Most Honduran schoolteachers
today therefore argue that the reforms will eventually lead to abolishing the high-school
carrera and perhaps public secondary education in general. They fear that as is the case
with other neoliberal processes, the poor will have less access to basic services, while the
rich will continue to benefit from such arrangements. As one teacher reflected on this
aspect of the implications of the reforms, she told me: “The message from this
government is clear: If you want an education, you have to buy it yourself. If you don’t
77

have the money, then go work in the maquilas [sweat-shops].”

5.5 Education Initiatives to Create Opportunities for Poor
Rural Youth
The schoolteachers with whom I work are vehemently against the idea that their
students – many of whom come to class without having eaten breakfast or dinner the
night before – should simply give up after primary education and find poorly-paid work.
As part of their own visions for what the state could be (a subject I expand upon in
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Chapter 7), schoolteachers want to forge a society in which education is seen as the
responsibility of the state and in which opportunity for youth is prioritized. They contrast
this hope with the current reality of a government that divests itself of its responsibilities
for national public education. Teachers criticize this situation as a golpista-initiated
privatization scheme, and argue that it will result in more unequal access to the education
system, which they consider a basic human right. They say this will result in more social
inequities, and the abandonment of the majority of Honduran youth (as Wolseth 2011
illustrates so vividly when these youth resort to joining gangs).
To combat this reality during the 2012 school year, teachers at Carías Andino
designed workshops for students to learn practical skills to enter a specific trade, and
encouraged even the poorest of their students to apply to high school, telling me they
hoped that despite the cutbacks to their own wages and benefits, some of their students
might still want to study at the normal school and become schoolteachers. Most
significantly, teachers at this rural school held meetings to talk with students’ parents
about how the reforms would negatively affect their children’s futures if there is no
longer a public secondary education system. They took advantage of these discussions to
communicate to parents that they were doing everything they could to combat the
reforms, communicating that magisterio struggles are in the interest of working class and
campesino (peasant) struggles, and that they would be stronger with parental support.
Such an astute approach to generating parental support for teachers’ struggles did not
happen in the urban José Cecilio del Valle school – perhaps partly due to the internal
conflicts generated from the CEB limbo status at that school – but it did take hold at the
Carías Andino rural school.
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At Carías Andino, conversations about how education can provide meaningful
opportunities for young people culminated with two inter-related projects: extracurricular clubs and contacts with a state-run trade school that offered technical degrees.
The following two ethnographic examples illuminate how teachers were navigating the
new pressures of the reforms and attempting to maintain a positive image of their efforts
among local interested parties, while also trying – with the limited resources they had – to
work within the current repressive neoliberal system in ways that forge a model of what
education could be (which includes the ability to use education to find dignified
employment). This includes training students with practical skills they could use ‘beyond
the four walls of the classroom,’ as teachers would put it.
Understanding quite well the political environment aimed at blaming teachers for
all the problems with the public education system, Esdras decided to explain to parents
directly that although certain aspects of the reforms will be unattainable for some schools,
he and teachers at Carías Andino would be improving the academic programs offered. He
even went a step further than what the reforms require, and developed extra-curricular
programs that he said would teach practical knowledge to members of the community,
which could then be used to generate employment locally. After the first month of classes
Esdras explained his plans at the first meeting between the teachers’ council and the
Sociedad de Padres de Familia:
The new law states that every child in Honduras will now be taught English,
computer literacy, and that we will soon reach the same academic levels in Math
and Spanish as all the most developed countries… that’s a total lie! You all
should know by now that this government lies to us – they haven’t followed
through with even one of their promises. Not every school in Honduras has the
resources to be able to do something like this from one day to the next…. But I’ll
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tell you what we will do here at our school: we’re going to continue teaching
computer literacy in our regular curricular program, and more. We plan to work
really hard for you by organizing extra-curricular clubs to teach your children
practical things that can be used beyond the four walls of the classroom. We’re
going to have a natural science club, a sports club, a home-economics and food
security club, a dance club, a math club, and even an English club. We’ve seen the
need for this sort of thing here in the community, and the parents with whom I
have spoken seem to like this idea. This way your children can learn how to run
their own small business and contribute to the economic development of this
community.
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Esdras’ initiative was met with an adequate amount of parental support for him
and his fellow teachers to begin the extra-curricular clubs. He even asked me to help
design the English club and teach English classes to the club participants, just as he also
recruited a volunteer math teacher from JICA to help with the math clubs. After a few
months had passed and the clubs became an established program, Esdras and the subdirector of the school invited their municipal and regional Ministry directors to come out
and inspect their work.
This self-initiated evaluation went over well: the supervisors liked Esdras’
enthusiasm and ingenuity for new ideas for education projects at his school. Esdras and
teachers at the rural school were in turn able to rest assured that, at least for the moment,
their efforts to maintain positive relations with local interested parties had been
successful. In addition to going over well with these local interested parties, Esdras and
other teachers from the Carías Andino CEB also commented how such clubs work
toward providing students with practical training that could hopefully become relevant
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for their lives after they graduated. These ideas were further extended with a second
project, involving the trade school technical degree initiatives.
While Director Esdras was being interviewed on local television about his school,
he was able to recruit a state-managed trade school, El Instituto Nacional de Formación
Professional (INFOP, the National Institute of Professional Formation) to offer
extension courses at Carías Andino. The LIBRE-supporting journalist was asking him to
comment on the effects of the reforms and of the decentralization project for his school in
poor rural El Garrobo. As Esdras explained that less state funding is being allotted to
poor areas in general, he took advantage of the opportunity to promote his efforts to make
education opportunities useful for local youth, and the journalist asked him what he
thought about the work of INFOP. He responded positively and then asked the journalist
if they could call the regional manager of INFOP together over the air to ask if they
would help with initiatives at Carías Andino. Once the INFOP manager realized that his
conversation with Esdras was being transmitted on live television, he accepted the
proposal. Director Esdras later boasted to his colleagues about how this strategic idea just
came to him during the interview, and how he considered it to be a success in their
struggle to get a state institution to contribute something to the youth of the poor rural
community where they are working.
Normally people pay some tuition money and travel to the INFOP offices for their
services – a commute which most young people from the rural community would not be
able to afford. Conscious of this reality, Esdras persuaded the institute to come directly to
Carías Andino in the rural community, thereby itself incurring the transportation expense.
He asked them to facilitate free six-week technical training workshops for upper-year
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students and graduates of the CEB to earn diplomas as ‘técnicos en refrigeración’
(refrigeration technicians) to be able to fix refrigerators and air-conditioners. Such jobs
are considered more prestigious locally than working in the export sector, since the
worker can determine his/her own fees and schedule, and because they depend on a
specialized set of skills.
The extent to which these refrigeration technician diplomas actually provide
employment locally is an open question. Nonetheless this is an example of how, under
the education reforms, teachers have been going about their daily work in a different way
and in the process assessing what should be the goals for education even before the state
re-foundation they hope will come in the future. In 2012 they considered meaningful
employment opportunities for young people to be an essential dimension of what an
education system should do and were willing to work toward that end – even if it meant
soliciting extra-curricular programs from a quasi-state institute outside of the traditional
realm of the magisterio and the Ministry of Education.
This example illuminates some of the contradictory processes involved with this
kind of work in the name of the state, and some of the debates within the magisterio in
the current historical conjuncture. Teachers are dealing with the difficulties of attempting
to manage daily issues with whatever resources do exist, all while understanding that
some of these actions contradict the magisterio’s visions of what state institutions should
be doing in general. As teachers think through what the state could be like in the future,
and the different possible ways to make education helpful for local populations who seek
dignified employment opportunities, they promote the advantages of bringing in an
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institute outside the realm of the Ministry of Education, asking INFOP to train students
and former graduates in the community.
On the one hand this practice goes against certain aspects of what Honduran
schoolteachers ultimately want: a national public education system that assumes these
responsibilities under the mandate of the central Ministry of Education. In this sense,
asking local offices of INFOP to come in to one school could be seen as supporting the
project of decentralization. Especially for those teachers who teach at high schools
offering a technical carrera, this would mean asking INFOP to do their jobs. On the other
hand however, at the CEB Carías Andino bringing in the trade school was something that
these particular teachers did indeed want. Teachers at this rural school saw it as an
achievement locally in their struggle to get something from a state institution, and in the
process, do something that the community members felt was worthwhile in their hopes
for more decent employment opportunities locally. In this sense recruiting INFOP could
also be seen in the context of teachers’ critique of state practices and golpista authorities
that chose to abandon national public education for neoliberal agendas which negatively
affect the poor. In this sense, teachers were seeking out every possible space for political
action as they necessarily implemented aspects of the reforms, in the process stretching
the boundaries of the meanings of these policies. As Profe Marlon told me in relation to
what INFOP means for Carías Andino:
There are many people in this government who would like to see these poor kids
without any education at all. They pass these laws knowing full well what it is
doing to the working class and the peasantry. They want the people to remain
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ignorant and with no other choice but to work in places like the ciudad modelo
(model city). But here in El Garrobo we’re not going to let that happen!
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5.6 Conclusion
As teachers imagine the implications of abolishing the high school carrera for
young poor Hondurans, they frequently talk about how they believe neoliberal
development policies are a step in the wrong direction for Honduras. Teachers are against
the idea that their students have no other choice but to sell their labour in the export
economy under precarious working conditions.
The model city project that Marlon mentions is one example of this type of
neoliberal economic development initiative promoted by the Pepe Lobo government. It
was inspired by the ideas of US economist Paul Romer. The project consists of a specific
geographic region within Honduran territory not subject to the jurisdiction of Honduran
laws, but rather, completely in the hands of investors (whether foreign or national)
through the concession of a large area of land, which Lobo said would be 33 square
kilometres (Romer recommends 1,000; see Charter Cities 2011). As an ‘autonomous
zone,’ the area would have its own bureaucratic authorities, private security forces, legal
and judicial system to realize its governance of Honduran industrial workers – in
whatever ways the investors see fit, using whichever currency and language the investors
themselves decide. The workers would live within the boundaries of the ciudad modelo,
and would have to rent their own living quarters, as the land would be leased to the
investors and thus not for sale to the Honduran workers who would live there.
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The model city project resonates with Aiwa Ong’s descriptions of similar
neoliberal projects already underway in various Southeast Asian countries. This
anthropologist writes of “Export-Processing Zones” (EPZs) first established in Asia
during the 1960s through UN and World Bank mandates as a “combination of old
customs areas and export-oriented manufacturing. Thus EPZs combine tax-free holidays
with other incentives for foreign investors to set up factories that produce export goods,
train low-skill workers, and facilitate technology transfer” (Ong 2006: 103).
Not only are Honduran schoolteachers, as a group, against this type of
development project, but they also seek a new model for what the education system
should be about – providing practical benefits for students that can hopefully be
translated into dignified employment opportunities. They want the state to play a central
role in funding national public education, but they recognize the power that any given
government in office has in dismantling this broader state project (as has been the case
since June 2009). Honduran schoolteachers themselves exemplify how life projects can
be realized through the national public education system. They believe that maintenance
of the high school carrera – be it through the normal school or otherwise – is the method
for assuring that the Ministry of Education continues to provide such opportunities to
Honduran youth.
One of the primary arguments that the magisterio has been making against the
Ley Fundamental de Educación is that it will lead to the abolition of the high school
carrera. While this has been one way in which teachers have been successful at gaining
support from parents – by telling them that these reforms put their children at a
disadvantage – such solidarity is not enough. The magisterio has not been able to reverse
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the reforms, despite their paros and protests on the streets. In 2012, teachers saw the
potential for a LIBRE government (if elected in the November 2013 elections) to reverse
the reforms and forge a state that takes responsibility for funding its national public
education system. Despite this recognition, not every teacher was a supporter of LIBRE
in 2012, and the divisions within the party and the FNRP movement interacted with the
divisions within the magisterio in ways that were often counter-productive to other goals
of the Resistencia and the magisterio. We now turn to a chapter with ethnographic
examples that capture these debates and illuminate how teachers were assigning blame
for the reforms – not only to golpista politicians, but to their own magisterio dirigentes as
well.
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6

Conflicts within the Magisterio

6.1 Introduction
In September 2012, the official order from the Federación de Organizaciones
Magisteriales de Honduras (FOMH, Federation of Teachers’ Organizations of Honduras)
was to refrain from participating in local September 15 Independence Day parades. The
presidents of all six colegios magisteriales asked teachers to suspend their usual civic
holiday celebrations in order to protest the reforms – just as the magisterio had done in
September 2009 to protest the coup. While some school directors abided by these
instructions, the teachers at both Carías Andino and José Cecilio del Valle decided to
participate in the civic celebrations, thereby defying the official instructions from their
profession’s national leaders in the FOMH.
In this chapter I explore the ways in which divisions within the magisterio
articulated with teachers’ abilities to challenge the reforms, and how at the onset of these
laws teachers were beginning to question the sincerity of their own leaders and
colleagues. The examples presented here direct our attention to questions such as: How
do divisions within the magisterio manifest in the daily lives of regular schoolteachers?
How is association with the Resistencia and LIBRE Party debated at magisterio events?
How do the experiences teachers have had with their dirigentes and colegio leaders affect
their enthusiasm or inertia for collective political actions? How do seemingly banal
interpersonal conflicts among co-workers connect with broader conflicts within the
magisterio in the current historical conjuncture? In this chapter I aim to explore some of
these processes as teachers sought to reverse the 2012 reforms and began to see LIBRE
as a vehicle for creating viable solutions to these problems. Whereas Chapter 5
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illuminated the controversies among teachers regarding questions of how to administer
primary and secondary education, this chapter shows how internal conflicts in general
can hamper teachers’ abilities to unite and achieve their goals as a gremio. In support of
this analysis, I will present ethnographic examples from three different arenas: 1) the
difficulties in carrying out a nation-wide paro and organized public protest; 2) the
relationships between magisterio dirigentes/members of the FOMH and common
schoolteachers who are not in leadership positions; and 3) the ways teachers are using the
laws as tools to criticize each other during workplace disputes. I have deliberately
attempted to separate these three categories for the analytical purposes of this chapter,
although in teachers’ everyday work such experiences are more fluid.
While the José Cecilio del Valle school had its own band and was able to parade
through San Lorenzo, the Carías Andino school was not so fortunate. Since they did not
have their own band they first attempted to borrow one from another school. When that
fell through at the last moment they had to cancel their plans for a community-wide
parade. In both cases however, the directors and teachers at these CEBs all intended to
participate fully in the September 15 celebrations, and they developed well-articulated
arguments to explain their decision to disobey the direct orders of the FOMH. As
teachers talked amongst themselves about these issues, I enquired about their decision to
disregard the FOMH orders regarding the parades. There seemed to be a consensus that a
key consideration was that, given the popularity of these events locally, participating
would help them to maintain positive relations with community members and the
Sociedad de Padres de Familia. Teachers also referred to recent post-coup September 15
celebrations where there have been two different parades, one for Resistencia supporters
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and one for golpistas. This highlights how complex the decision to march in any civic
holiday parade is currently in Honduras, especially for the magisterio. As one teacher at
Carías Andino described his sense of the situation:
Look here… Even though the golpistas try to make patriotism theirs – saying that
LIBRE is anti-Honduran – we can show people that this is not the case. We are
still going to march in the name of Honduras, for the day of independence, even
though we are LIBRE… well, the majority of us. And we can promote our own
schools in the process. Those in the FOMH have no idea what we are dealing with
here every day due to the reforms…. They just think about causing a ruckus, but
we’re the ones who have to go back to work tomorrow, and face the angry
parents, and the COMDEs and the CED. So we’re going to parade. People like
this stuff. They love seeing their children out there waving to everyone. Electing a
school queen, that’s a big deal here in Latin America – it’s not like in the United
States. Parades are a big deal to us – people go crazy for them. That’s why we’re
going to march – to promote our centro. And to show the people of this
community that even though we have our own struggles as a gremio, and we
strike and hold paros, we’re still a part of this community, and we care about
these events just as much as they do…. Some [teachers] will say that we’re
golpistas just for participating in the Independence Day parades, but that’s simply
not true.
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This teacher’s comments point us to additional ways that teachers are caught between
conflicting mandates: their professional leaders gave them specific instructions not to
participate in the September 15 civic events; some LIBRE Party members and
Resistencia supporters viewed these events as associated with the golpistas; and yet
maintaining good relations with community members has taken on heightened
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Interview, 12 September 2012.
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importance for Honduran teachers in the political environment of the education reforms.
These processes were especially relevant during moments in which teachers withheld
their labour by choosing to not conduct classes.

6.2 Paros Nacionales (Nation-Wide Work Stoppages)
Paros were rather frequent throughout my fieldwork, occurring about once every
other month.
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While attending asambleas – the colegio-initiated formal meetings where

dirigentes rally support for subsequent protests on the streets – I noticed that less than a
third of the teachers participating in my research joined the paros on a regular basis.
Teachers who were present would also criticize their colleagues who chose not to come.
There seemed to be a sense of disillusionment and apathy among most teachers, many of
whom treated the paro as simply another day off of work. Especially when the FOMH
would call for a paro on a Friday, the event seemed rather ineffective. My closest
research participants would usually go fishing.
When I inquired about this, many teachers explained that this is how their paros
usually work – the teachers who are known for protesting come, but most stay home. And
in many cases economic factors played a role. The asamblea was usually held in either
Nacaome or San Lorenzo, which for a good portion of the teachers were locations even
farther away from their homes than their workplaces were (which as described earlier
often involved difficult commutes). Yet there is more to teachers’ decisions than just
matters of convenience and expense. There is also a deeper debate occurring within the
magisterio today, which deters some teachers from attending these events. At the centre
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However, as I suggest in the introductory chapter of this thesis, I do consider paros and protests on the streets to be
extraordinary activities, and thus they do not constitute the type of everyday work that I am most interested in studying.
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of the debate is whether or not it is appropriate to support LIBRE and the FNRP at a
magisterio protest.
In this section I describe how these conflicts take shape in the magisterio, as
teachers attempt to situate their struggles within the context of broader popular struggles,
while debating the extent to which the magisterio should be associated with the
FNRP/LIBRE Party. Far from simply a matter of congruence with a teacher’s support for
the party, some LIBRE-oriented teachers also argue that magisterio paros should strictly
be about the challenges facing the magisterio rather than demonstrating support for any
political party. On the one hand, those who agree with this argument are quick to remind
people that the magisterio has never had a good relationship with any government, and
that they should therefore not endorse any political party. They also suggest that since not
all teachers are LIBRE supporters, associating their paros with a LIBRE event would
discourage other teachers who are against the reforms and who do wish to protest. As one
LIBRE-supporting recent normal school graduate told me:
The magisterio paros are for teachers – they’re about our rights and benefits. I am
LIBRE and will vote for Xiomara, but that support should be shown at LIBRE
and Resistencia marches, not at those of the magisterio. It’s OK to support one’s
colegio, I’ll proudly say that I am COLPROSUMAH. But if I say that I am out
there because I am LIBRE, there will be some [teachers] who will criticize this.
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On the other hand, during the 2012 school year, most teachers recognized that
electing a LIBRE government to power was the only hope that the magisterio had to
reverse the reforms. Even teachers who were not strong LIBRE supporters themselves (a
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Interview, 3 December 2012.
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minority) recognized this as fact. As Profe María Elena explained to me when I asked her
about her opinions on these issues proceeding the November 2012 elecciones internas
(primary elections):
I’m not sure yet who I will vote for. Xiomara seems like a good candidate but I
have always been a Liberal my entire life. My parents were Liberals and we are
from a family with that tradition…. But I’ll tell you one thing: a LIBRE
government would be the best thing for the magisterio right now. Every teacher
should vote LIBRE. It would be to our own benefit as education workers.
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María Elena’s comments express a general consciousness that teachers had in 2012: if
elected to power, LIBRE would be the political party most likely to support the interests
of the magisterio (although in the end the party was not successful in winning all
teachers’ votes, as I discuss in the concluding chapter).
More important than the fact that there was a minority of teachers who were not
strong LIBRE supporters in 2012, a more fundamental debate was occurring in 2012
through discussion about why the magisterio should not formally support LIBRE at their
events. As Esdras himself – one of the strongest LIBRE-supporting teachers I knew –
told me while entering an asamblea before a march:
I took off my FNRP headscarf at the last minute because I knew others would
criticize me for bringing LIBRE propaganda to the march. I am mera-Resistencia
and everyone knows that. They all know about me – and my time in Nicaragua
and at the Brazilian Embassy…. But they also know that I am the director of a
centro básico. Look here, this paro is about the magisterio struggle against the
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privatization of our education system. And it’s to protest against these golpistas
who haven’t paid our vacation pay. It’s not about LIBRE.
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Another reason why some teachers decided to not participate in the paros was
their fear of receiving harsh criticism from students’ parents. The conflicts between
parents and teachers at the José Cecilio del Valle school led teachers there to ask the
Sociedad de Padres de Familia if they would support their causes in holding a paro. This
had been an effective strategy for Honduran teachers in the past, during moments of
prolonged nation-wide strikes. While conducting NGO work in 2004, for instance, I
attended numerous meetings between community members and schoolteachers in various
rural communities, where the teachers were trying to determine whether or not the
community would support them during a prolonged strike. But a paro is not a strike, and
in the post-coup political environment, magisterio struggles are viewed by many student
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parents as in support of LIBRE. In 2012 the magisterio held no strikes.

And while the

parents at José Cecilio del Valle initially supported teachers’ reasons for cancelling
classes and holding a paro – as teachers convinced them that a privatized system is not in
their own interest – as the school year progressed and the CED began to increasingly
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Interview, 24 July 2012.
Whereas in some other Latin American countries a ‘paro’ (work stoppage) and a ‘huelga’ (strike) may be
synonymous, in Honduras these are two different kinds of actions. For the magisterio, a paro refers to a period in
which workers withhold their labour to protest a given situation on a particular day. After the demonstration is over,
teachers usually return to work – sometimes even the next day – even if no resolution is reached. For instance, during
my fieldwork schoolteachers would often hold their paros for only one day at a time, march through the streets with
signs and cries demanding that the state pay for public education, but then return to class the next day without having
achieved any change in policy. On the other hand, in Honduras, a huelga is when workers withhold their labour until
specific demands (a change in policy, respect for a previous law, or even an increase in salary or benefit) have been
made, or a compromise has been reached. This also means that in Honduras paros usually only last one day (although
they can be extended for longer periods as was seen immediately after the coup), while huelgas generally last for longer
periods, until a resolution is reached.
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scrutinize the decisions of Director Aníbal, the teachers at José Cecilio del Valle lost
parental support.
While other schools respected the FOMH’s decision to hold a paro, on several
occasions there were still classes at José Cecilio del Valle. For Profe Suyapa, one of the
few teachers who never missed a paro, this situation posed a particular problem. Like
several of my research participants, Suyapa worked shifts in two schools. Her morning
shift was at another San Lorenzo school that would always respect the FOMH’s orders
and would therefore always cancel classes because of the paro, yet she had to arrive to
José Cecilio del Valle at noon regardless. Suyapa’s situation was further complicated by
the fact that she lives in Nacaome, and both of her schools were in San Lorenzo. Despite
her desire to march on the streets against the reforms, she told me that her participation
would only be possible when the FOMH announced a march in San Lorenzo:
When they gather in Nacaome, you can imagine my excitement and desire to
march with my own neighbours. It would otherwise be easiest for me to march
there, since I live there. But I have to think about my job here [at José Cecilio
del Valle]. Between the police checkpoints and our own roadblocks, there is no
way I could attempt to protest in Nacaome in the morning and then reach San
Lorenzo in the afternoon. You never know what will happen at these events. So I
have to miss all the marches that happen there, which are the majority. It is only
rarely that the FOMH announces San Lorenzo as our home base – those are the
times that I am able to get out on the streets and march, because I can just walk
off the streets and right into my classroom here.
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Suyapa is a well-known Resistencia and LIBRE Party organizer. After the 2009 coup she
became one of several teachers from the south to organize nation-wide magisterio
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Interview, 24 July 2012.
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movements to protest post-coup governing policies. It is frustrating for her to see such
limited support from her colleagues for the paros, although she understands the dire
situation of José Cecilio del Valle (and argues in favour of CEBs).
An additional reason why some teachers do not participate in the paros is because
the Lobo government often declared a given magisterio paro illegal, threatening to
suspend or fire any teacher who participated. Some schoolteachers told me quite simply
that a paro, without a greater likelihood of being able to reverse the reforms, was not
worth risking their jobs for. Yet even if these teachers wanted to go to work, if their
school administrators decided to recognize the orders from the FOMH and thus closed
the school, then they couldn’t work in any case. Such variables caused frustration and
apathy about the paros among those teachers who chose not to participate.
In recognition of this situation Director Esdras took it upon himself to devise a
creative strategy during one paro that teachers predicted would be subject to additional
scrutiny by the Ministry of Education.
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The day before the paro he held a meeting with

the Sociedad de Padres de Familia to announce that the decision to hold a nation-wide
paro was not his choice, but a direct order from his superiors at the FOMH. That
afternoon before all the teachers left for the day, Director Esdras called an emergency
teachers’ council meeting. There he told every teacher that if all agreed, he would allow
them to sign in for the next day’s work before leaving that day. Thus he could submit this
paperwork at the end of the month to the departmental Ministry directors showing that
they taught classes that day. He explained:
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This was prior to, but in the same political environment of, the unprecedented firing of several teachers in other
departments for ‘not showing up to teach classes.’ The teachers with whom I work knew many of these individuals,
despite the fact that few teachers from Valle were fired. The event provoked additional fear of participating in the
paros, as was undoubtedly intended.
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I know that it’s not the most ethical practice, compañeros, and please don’t take
this to mean that you can always skip classes – we need you here, and some of
you have had real attendance problems in the past. But what these golpistas are
doing to us is una barbariedad completa (complete barbarity) and we have to
fight back. I’ll gladly stamp these hour logs with the official stamp of our centro
if you do your part in helping your fellow teachers and go out to the march. Profe
Marlon has offered to take people to Tegus. So get out there and protest – either in
Nacaome or Tegus! And don’t worry about your log in sheets, I’ll send these off
to the departmental supervisors as if you were really here.
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A slightly higher than usual number of teachers from Carías Andino participated
in the paro marches on that occasion. But when I inquired about their experiences, the
responses from most teachers emphasized yet another complication. As Marlon and
others reported, in Tegucigalpa there were some well-known dirigentes who participated
in the marches during the morning, and abandoned their colleagues in the afternoon.
When a few teachers investigated their whereabouts, they reported that the dirigentes had
gone to work during their afternoon shifts at their nearby schools – out of fear of losing
their own jobs. Despite having a school director sympathetic to their participation in the
paro, amidst their preoccupations about the probability of getting fired, teachers at Carías
Andino began to ask: How can it be that the FOMH declares a paro and then our own
dirigentes are fearful of participating? As Marlon later put it:
I usually go with a bunch of people from COPEMH, my colegio. The last time we
woke up at dawn to get to Tegucigalpa on time for the march. We had a truck full
of people from the south – the more teachers who go the less it costs everyone for
gas. Some people can’t make that kind of sacrifice to travel the entire day, but I

88

Teachers’ council meeting, 27 September 2012.
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am fortunate to be able to. We marched through Plaza Miraflores to really show
those damn golpistas who they’re messing with. We were right next to the
dirigentes, which I love to do – I like to see what they say and how they act…
when they participate, that is. Some dirigentes have been bought.
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Teachers’ comments about this event were connected to their broader critique of
the magisterio leadership at that conjuncture – although teachers also recognized that
internal divisions left them weak and that the golpistas wanted them to distrust their own
dirigentes. As Profe Larissa from Carías Andino told me in the privacy of her classroom:
I know that we should trust our dirigentes and that the magisterio has been
plagued with dividismo…. But, I’ll tell you, I often wonder just what the hell our
dirigentes are doing with all their time and money…. I pay good, hard-earned
money to my colegio, and for what? I am killing myself out here, putting up with
all these new demands and disgruntled parents who are always looking over my
shoulder. I am one of the few colleagues who never misses a protest: in Nacaome,
in Tegus, I’m always there, fighting against the police, the military, putting up
with the hot sun on the streets all day long…. And meanwhile, our dirigencia and
those from the FOMH are in some air-conditioned office in Tegus taking it
easy!
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In 2012 Honduran teachers were questioning whether or not their leaders had been
paid off by the Lobo regime. They were frustrated by the fact that their own colleagues
made promises to fight on their behalf, claiming to be strong supporters of magisterio
causes (and those of the Resistencia in most cases), and yet once teachers elected them to
the leadership positions of the FOMH, they failed to deliver on such promises. My
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Interview, 28 November 2012.
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research participants found an intolerable irony in the fact that after the June 2009 coup
they became more aware of who was a Resistencia-oriented activist, and despite their
best intentions to elect such progressive leaders, the new laws passed in 2011 were the
worst setback their gremio had ever experienced.

6.3 The Relationship between Dirigentes and Common
Teachers
The teachers with whom I work criticize the fact that some teachers are treated
with political favouritism – receiving their plazas because of their party affiliation, and
even their leadership positions based on political alliances they form, not merit. In 2012
some teachers also recognized that they themselves participated in a similar practice
when securing local funding and promoting the image of their schools. In the next
chapter I examine how teachers envision a new type of Honduran politician with state refoundation. Here I want to emphasize that this relationship with politicians has affected
magisterio leadership. In fact, the teachers with whom I work were questioning the
motives of their dirigentes, asking if they have been paid off (through bribes or promises
for political positions) by politicians in the Lobo government. Ultimately they asked, how
is it that our Resistencia-oriented dirigentes have allowed this golpista government to
pass these reforms?
As much as teachers criticize their leaders, when it comes time to meet with them
to discuss their progress with battling the reforms, a similar type of performance occurs
as when teachers meet with politicians who promise funding for their schools: they smile,
shake hands, and talk about non-controversial subjects. Honduran schoolteachers are
conscious that their elected dirigentes in the FOMH are trying to reverse the reforms, and
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that it is in their interest to get along with them. The following ethnographic example
comes from my participation in a weekend class at the Choluteca campus of the
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH, the National Autonomous
University of Honduras). These classes were designed for teachers to earn their
undergraduate degrees in pedagogía (pedagogy) in order to have the option of
subsequently becoming a member of the Colegio de Pedagogos de Honduras
(COLPEDAGOGOSH, College of Pedagogues of Honduras).
Normally any undergraduate degree for schoolteachers is earned from the
Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Francisco Morazán (UPNFM, Francisco Morazán
National Pedagogical University), and teachers study a specific subject that they can then
apply in their classrooms. They study the subject in order to learn how to teach it. The
carrera de pedagogía at the UNAH is controversial among the magisterio as a whole.
Part of this controversy has to do with the idea that the UNAH is now offering a major
for schoolteachers, when historically the UPNFM was the only post-secondary education
institution accredited to offer an undergraduate education specifically for schoolteachers.
Some of these arguments against the UNAH offering this degree also carry over to a
movement within the UPNFM to separate from the academic oversight of the UNAH
(arguing that this would facilitate more academic and financial autonomy for the
UPNFM).
These aspects of the debates aside, secondary education teachers with UPNFM
degrees in particular see the carrera de pedagogía as a nonsense major. As one high
school social studies teacher put it:
We [teachers] have made all sorts of mistakes in recent years. Allowing our
dirigentes to approve CEBs, for instance, has been a real step backwards. Another
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horrible mistake is this carrera de pedagogía – now we have all sorts of
‘pedagogues’ who don’t really study anything important. What nonsense!
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Teachers who have sacrificed to earn their undergraduate degrees from the UPNFM, who
are critical of this new career, would often tell me that these teachers do not really
studying pedagogy per se. Instead, they see the degree as closely aligned with what the
UPNFM Nacaome campus is also offering, administración educativa (education
administration). While in classes for both degrees, I also sensed that these majors are
designed to orient teachers in becoming competent school directors – fluent in the latest
Honduran education laws and capable of managing a staff under these changing
circumstances. This also made it a valuable dimension of my fieldwork.
The teachers with whom I spoke about these two majors – beyond Esdras and
Mercedes – also seemed to agree that these majors do indeed train teachers to become
better directors. However, as they point out, these are the only two viable options for
distance education in the south that could be undertaken while working full-time. The
teachers I knew who were taking these university courses were doing so primarily
because they wanted to earn a degree that would in principle allow them to become a subdirector, a director, or at least have an increase in salary. But they also did seem to
receive useful information during the process of their studies. The subject matter of all
classes for both majors at both instructions was grounded in different aspects of teachers’
daily work in the context of the reforms. The following example comes from one of the
last days at the UNAH Choluteca campus when the teachers taking the course had to
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deliver group presentations on the impacts of each new law and stimulate group
discussion.
In April 2012 when I accompanied Esdras to this class at the Choluteca campus of
the UNAH he was making last-minute preparations for his group presentation and final
project for the course Macro-Educación (Macro Education), while the instructor spoke
about what teachers should expect after earning their undergraduate degrees in Pedagogy.
Similar to other weekend university courses offered to normal school graduates already
employed as schoolteachers, this one asked experienced professionals to rethink how they
approach their work in light of the reforms.
While Esdras waited for his turn to speak, other teachers presented on how the
magisterio has responded to these neoliberal reforms. One group presented on the
unconstitutionality of the new Ley de INPREMA, the law which increases the
contributions that teachers are required to make to the state-run pension institute, while
allowing the Ministry of Education to pay less overall toward their retirement funds and
life insurance. The teachers discussed the on-going efforts of the FOMH and other
dirigentes magisteriales to hire lawyers to pressure the Honduran Supreme Court to deem
the law illegal, on the grounds that it negated the labour achievements institutionalized in
legislation that as a gremio they had won through previous struggles.
These presentations point us to the FOMH and their efforts to reverse the new
INPREMA Law. Since February 2012 the dirigentes magisteriales had been telling their
members that they were working diligently with lawyers to present arguments to the
national congress that this law reducing teachers’ retirement funds was unconstitutional.
This is an interesting premise, especially since members of the Resistencia and LIBRE
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Party argued that the current constitution is obsolete and does not represent the interests
of the vast majority of Honduras. Nonetheless in this case a group of (mainly) Resistencia
supporters used aspects of this same constitution as the basis for their arguments, as they
sought to fight the educational reforms on multiple fronts.
The arguments as to why the INPREMA law was considered unconstitutional
were not clearly articulated by the majority of teachers. When I probed further, many of
my participants told me that that it was illegal to take away the rights of a gremio; others
would simply say that Lobo’s government was elected during a coup-installed
government, and that therefore every law it passed was illegal. While these arguments are
persuasive to people in solidarity with the magisterio and the Resistencia broadly, many
teachers recognized that they would need a better-articulated argument about
unconstitutionality if they were to have a chance to reverse the law while the Lobo
government was in power.
Another incident from this same UNAH Choluteca class that highlights these
difficulties was when the professor invited the president of COLPEDAGOGOSH to
speak to teachers in the class on this very subject. The teachers had paid to rent a hotel
ballroom with a catering service for their final presentations (each paying enough to
cover the cost of the food for their professor and the president of this colegio, as well as
their own meals). Once their presentations were finished, the teachers waited patiently for
the president of COLPEDAGOGOSH to arrive. As the clocked ticked on, the course
instructor reminded the students that their guest was a busy man, and that travelling from
Tegucigalpa just to speak with them about the efforts of the FOMH was a huge sacrifice
(insinuating that they should be grateful that he took the time to come to the south and
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speak with them). The president of the colegio finally arrived, nearly a half hour late,
close to the time that the catering service was to serve the meal.
The guest began by saying that the Constitution of the Republic prohibits any
government from taking away the benefits that a gremio has won in their labour
struggles. Since the reforms aimed to do just this, he said, the FOMH was arguing that
they were unconstitutional. He then gave examples of teachers who had been negatively
affected by the law. This colegio president articulated very clearly the shared sense that
the law was unjust, in a similar fashion that many of my own research participants would
do. His comments were well received, although few people found them original.
However, this FOMH member failed to inform his fellow teachers (and as
pedagogos, future colegio members) about the progress the FOMH had made with their
arguments before the national congress, leaving the teachers in the class with several
questions about what exactly the FOMH was doing. Following his talk the teachers lined
up to ask their most pressing questions. Esdras was one of the first to rush up to the
microphone. He wanted to ask what common teachers (without leadership positions)
could do to support the effort to challenge the constitutionality of the law. He and his
group members were also curious to understand the exact process through which the
FOMH solicited their lawyers, and when they could expect news about their progress.
However, just as the teachers were about to ask their questions, the catering service
arrived.
The professor of the class announced that first lunch would be served, and after
the meal the teachers could approach the microphone in another single-file line. Nearly
an hour went by during lunch, with the colegio president and course instructor at their
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own table on the stage and all the other teachers below. Nobody approached the colegio
president until after lunch was over and it was officially time to ask questions. By then
Esdras’ eagerness had dissipated. Instead of demanding an explanation of the progress
with the FOMH he simply asked the colegio president if he was hopeful that they could
reverse the law. The dirigente enthusiastically said yes, without giving any concrete
details of the progress. None of the other teachers present asked any questions about the
FOMH’s progress. In any case, the number of students who lined up after lunch was less
than half the number who had lined up initially. After only a few minutes of questions,
the colegio president announced that he needed to leave to attend another meeting while
in Choluteca.
No doubt this colegio president really was pressed for time, and he probably did
have some answers to share with the group beyond what we heard that day. But the fact
that his answers were brief and vague, and without the possibility for any follow-up
questions, is revealing of the type of relationship that regular schoolteachers have with
members of the FOMH. The professor’s announcement that the colegio president “will
now eat lunch,” combined with the teachers’ nervousness and hesitation in talking with
him, suggested a treatment of this teacher as a superior rather than as an equal. This
distance between members of the FOMH and teachers who did not hold elected positions
was also reflected in many teachers’ sense of distrust of their colegio leaders, expressed
when they question if they may have been paid off by the Lobo government to not take
the type of legal action that they could. Several of my research consultants – none of
whom held positions as dirigentes in 2012 – were questioning if their magisterio leaders
were corrupt. As one teacher told me, in desperate frustration: “I don’t have the slightest
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doubt that our dirigencia has been bought by the oligarchy!” Similarly, as Marlon
commented at the end of November:
We teachers have never been able to work through our differences for the good of
the group. We’ve also always been so individualistic – always looking to see what
we each can get at the expense of the majority. This is why there has been so
much dividismo historically. This is why we are not able to reverse these
reforms.92
What the FOMH did manage to do with the problems resulting from the new
INPREMA law was something that helped move the retirement process along, but also
could be the source of more dividismo between members of different colegios. They
established that an equal number of teachers from each colegio could retire, rather than
basing the process on who had submitted their retirement paperwork first, independent of
their colegio affiliation. Even though teachers are against these reforms for reasons
beyond their own rights and benefits as workers – they see them as a step in the wrong
direction for the country’s national public education system – these action regarding the
INPREMA law deserve our examination given that the new law remains a primary
concern of the magisterio and is a key source of internal conflict.
Right before the law took effect teachers who were qualified for retirement under
the old law raced to Tegucigalpa in January 2012 to submit their retirement paperwork
(my father-in-law included). The official response of INPREMA was that there were too
many retirement applications to process all at once, and that therefore only a handful of
teachers would be able to retire during the 2012 school year. This response was supported
by the reform-supporting argument that ‘INPREMA is bankrupt’ – a misleading
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statement that the Lobo government had been making to justify the new law. However,
from the perspective of teachers, the reality of INPREMA is the following: because it is a
state-managed institute, governments can remove money from INPREMA to loan it to
other government programs, provided that they pay back the funds with interest. The
problem, they say, is that Micheletti withdrew an unprecedented amount of money from
INPREMA, an estimated 3.7 million Lempiras (roughly $194,000 USD), and never paid
it back (see, also, Honduras Culture and Politics 2010). Teachers mention that previous
governments had also borrowed money without paying it back in full, or without paying
any interest to the institute, but that the de-facto government of Roberto Micheletti Bain
was by far the worst case in recent history. Thus from the standpoint of schoolteachers,
rather than INPREMA being ‘bankrupt,’ it was bankrupted. As Marlon told me:
Micheletti and all the golpistas stole this money because they knew they could….
They knew that nobody was going to investigate them, or do anything about it.
These guys really should be in prison for this and so many other things that they
have done, but they’re free. They have impunity…. INPREMA is a state-managed
institute, and Micheletti was the de-facto head of state. Nobody has put him on
trial. The truth commission is a total fraud. There is no justice in Honduras….
Now they tell us that our institute is bankrupt, and that there are simply not
93

enough funds for us to retire.

Without question, the new INPREMA law is of primary concern to schoolteachers
as it directly affects their current livelihoods and financial futures. Several other teachers
(including the president of COLPEDAGOGOSH) echoed these sentiments. As so many
teachers rushed to retire during a moment when the INPREMA funds really were in fact
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low, it probably is true that there were not enough funds for everyone to retire at once.
But, as Marlon points out, this happened for a reason. And the golpistas who stole from
INPREMA now have impunity under post-coup regimes.
As teachers rushed to submit their retirement paperwork in January – before the
new law came into effect – an estimated 7,000 were qualified to retire, of which 3,500
submitted their requests to begin the process. Regardless of how INPREMA became
bankrupt, as the situation stood in 2012, they simply could not afford to process all the
3,500 retirement requests that they received. According to my research participants who
were fortunate enough to have their retirement paperwork processed during 2012, the
FOMH was able to negotiate the following scenario with INPREMA: they would process
a total of 1,800 retirement applications in the 2012 school year, which would be divided
evenly among the six colegios (at 300 per colegio). Each colegio would allow processing
of the first 300 of its members who had submitted retirement paperwork.
This action was celebrated among the FOMH and among some teachers as a
victory. Teachers who supported this decision said that it was necessary because of the
fact that lawyers from different colegios were competing against each other for the rights
of their own members and had reached a standstill. However, instead of designing a
retirement process based on who submitted their paperwork first among all teachers, what
the FOMH designed negatively affected teachers who submitted their paperwork earlier
than those from other colegios, but whose own colegio had already reached its
established limit. For example, one of my research participants was far past the first
1,800 total number of teachers to retire, and would have otherwise been disqualified to
retire under the old law, but since he was among the first 300 in his particular colegio, he
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was able to retire. This decision from the FOMH was thus beneficial for members of
colegios with fewer members, while several teachers from the larger colegios (such as
COLPROSUMAH and COPEMH) who had submitted their retirement paperwork early
were told they had to wait, and therefore retire with significantly reduced benefits under
the new INPREMA law. By departing from past practice that informed teachers’
expectations of how their applications would be processed, this provided yet another
reason for division among teachers from different colegios. As one COPEMH member in
this situation put it:
I travelled to Tegus during the second week of January to submit my retirement
paperwork with a group of friends from the south. One of them just made the cut
off and will soon retire…. But I and others who were also there with him that day
94

just missed it…. I think we would have all made it if we were COPRUMH!

Now who knows when we’ll be able to retire, and under what conditions. This
new law is screwing us all. Imagine all of what I could have saved myself if I had
put that money away in a private fund.95

This set of internal conflicts affects teachers’ most immediate concerns with the
negative financial consequences that the Nueva Ley de INPREMA imposes on them.
However, most of the Honduran teachers with whom I worked were not even in a
position to retire in 2012, and thus had to continue working under different pension plan
conditions with these reforms. Teachers have reduced financial benefits and job security
at the same time they are now expected to abide by new standards of soliciting local
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COPRUMH is the Colegio Profesional Unión Magisterial de Honduras (Professional College of Teacher Union of
Honduras), and is much smaller in size than most colegios. Both primary and secondary education teachers can become
members, but usually find their colegio-specific benefits (such as loans from the colegio, or even lower colegio
membership fees to fund such programs) to not be as good as those of larger colegios.
95
Interview, 22 December 2012.
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funds for new types of resources and the new requirements of the Ley Fundamental de
Educación. We now turn to analyze the ways that these tensions at the workplace played
out at the CEB Carías Andino, where teachers’ interpretations of different laws and the
political environment of the reforms intensified previously-existing internal conflicts.

6.4 Workplace Disputes
When Esdras recognized at the beginning of the school year that aspects of the
reforms aiming to monitor schoolteachers’ behaviour could in fact be useful to him as a
school administrator, this was neither random nor abstract – he had specific teachers in
mind at his centro. The chart he used to depict teachers’ absences in his office was a
method for publicly communicating to potential interested parties that he and Mercedes
were supervising their staff. It was also a way of communicating to other teachers that he
was aware of the behaviour of those CEB Carías Andino teachers who already had high
numbers of absences. Throughout my fieldwork, Esdras had continuous disputes with
teachers who the departmental Ministry officials had assigned to Carías Andino, but
whom he suspected did not want to be there. Here I aim to show how these previouslyexisting conflicts among personnel at Carías Andino intersected with the reforms.
According to Esdras, he and these teachers never got along. Esdras attributes this
to the fact that they had also applied through the concurso process to go to other schools,
but failed (at which point they were then offered their positions at the CEB Carías
Andino). Esdras’ personal conflicts with these teachers worsened when in early 2010
they organized a group of students’ parents against him. That year they held clandestine
meetings with the Sociedad de Padres de Familia at night, where they argued that Esdras
was unfit to run the CEB Carías Andino. Indeed they convinced a group of parents that it
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was necessary to replace Esdras, collecting signatures from many parents on a letter that
they wrote themselves and later submitted to departmental Ministry officials. Esdras was
subsequently called into a meeting in Nacaome. But the Ministry was not in a position to
oust Esdras, given that there was no substantial evidence of misconduct, and as he
pointed out, any disciplinary action against him needed to be based on such evidence.
The departmental Ministry directors did warn Esdras of the dangers of attempting to run a
dysfunctional centro, and that having teachers organize against him is often a sign of
poor management. Esdras argued that these teachers were jealous of his position and that
this was the source of their problem (reminding them that at least one of these teachers
had applied to become a school director in the past, and was unsuccessful).
At the end of the 2010 school year when the CEB Carías Andino inaugurated its
computer lab, several teachers asked Esdras if they could be in charge of teaching
computer literacy classes. Being in charge of the computer lab means being in charge of
expensive equipment, and teaching courses that both students and parents find exciting
and useful.96 The teacher in charge of computer literacy also spends her/his entire shift in
an air-conditioned room, the most desirable location in the entire centro. Indeed,
meetings between the school directors and important visitors always take place in the
computer lab, as it is considered the most comfortable room in the school. That year two
teachers in the afternoon shift stood out as potential candidates to teach computer
literacy, one of whom Esdras got along well with, and the other of whom was one of the
teachers involved in organizing against him. Both teachers had taken seminars in how to

96
Whereas teachers apply through the concurso process to teach certain subjects such as math, Spanish, and natural
science, by contrast, computer literacy is something that each school director can decide which teacher is most
qualified to teach.
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teach computer literacy, but Esdras assigned the classes to the teacher with whom he was
friendly, who in fact did have some actual experience teaching computer literacy at her
previous job.
Putting this person in charge of the newly-inaugurated computer lab for the entire
2011 school year made the other teacher furious with Esdras. She then enrolled in another
seminar on teaching the latest computer programs (thus arguably becoming more up to
date than the teacher who was assigned to it), and once again asked to be assigned the
computer classes (for the 2012 school year). In early February 2012 following the first
teachers’ council meeting – in which I was introduced to everyone – Esdras gave his staff
their teaching assignments. He once again assigned the computer literacy classes to this
same teacher who he had chosen before. By March 2012, some teachers presented an
argument to the departmental Ministry officials that Esdras was an incompetent director
because he had made a poor decision in deciding who should be in charge of computer
classes.
During the first half of the 2012 school year, while Esdras was submitting funding
requests to Nacaome and Valle politicians and the departmental Ministry directors, this
internal dispute at his centro was well underway. Esdras would enter the departmental
Ministry offices in Nacaome to discuss funding (as the reforms require him to do), but
also to discuss his problems with these teachers. Since the case was still under
consideration during the first half of the school year, these conversations did not resolve
anything. Rather, they were a way for Esdras to become aware of the situation.
Throughout the school year he was worried that his disputes with these teachers could
limit his ability to solicit funding from Ministry directors who might associate his school
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with such internal conflicts. His self-initiated evaluation of the centro – where he asked
the departmental Ministry directors to come observe that they were abiding by the
reforms – can thus also be seen in this context: the reforms imply more scrutiny of
teachers’ work, and this complaint against Esdras meant that he was being observed more
closely anyway.
When the departmental Ministry directors came to Carías Andino and Esdras
described the extra-curricular clubs he had designed (boasting to his superiors that he had
a ‘foreign volunteer’ to help with the English clubs), he was quick to emphasize the
importance of the computer literacy club that he and other teachers had designed for
students’ parents and other adults from the El Garrobo community. The directors were
impressed by the clubs themselves, and Esdras was able to emphasize that the ideas for
the computer literacy classes for adults were thanks to the teacher he had assigned to
teach those classes.
In subsequent months the teachers involved with this dispute continued to insist
that the departmental Ministry directors reconsider Esdras’ decision on the computer
classes, and Esdras continued to travel to the Nacaome Ministry offices both to see what
might happen with this case, and to solicit local funding. He argued that the Estatuto del
Docente granted him the right (and the obligation) to determine which of his teachers was
most qualified to teach which subjects. He communicated his enthusiasm for the Ley
Fundamental de Educación in the presence of these Ministry directors, arguing that he
had taken the initiative to go above and beyond the requirements of teaching computer
literacy to students: he had put a qualified teacher in charge of teaching adults too
through the extra-curricular clubs. By September the departmental Ministry directors told
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Esdras they agreed with his interpretation of the Estatuto del Docente – that these
decisions about who should teach the computer literacy classes were within his mandate
as the CEB director. The Ministry officials further pointed out that Esdras was following
the Ley Fundamental by soliciting funds for construction projects and education
initiatives.
As rumours began to spread within the centro about who would take over the
computer literacy classes for the 2013 school year, Esdras decided to hold a teachers’
council meeting to discuss teacher behaviour. That day everyone gathered in the airconditioned computer lab, awaiting Esdras’ arrival. At first it appeared as though he was
late, but the school’s security guard came to let everyone know that Esdras had requested
the meeting take place in his office, instead of the computer lab. Esdras managed to
squeeze enough chairs into his office to accompany most of the teachers, although many
stood up near the wall during the meeting. The teachers who had organized against
Esdras were standing toward the back of the room. Esdras began to talk with his staff:
I have called you all to this room specifically, because I want you to look at this
attendance chart together. As you can see compañeros maestros, some of you
have been doing better with missing less days of class. But others of you are very
close to maxing-out your excused absences. Throughout this school year I have
been telling you to please change your conduct. I am here today telling you, again,
that if any of you have unexcused absences I will have to report this to the
directores departamentales. If I don’t do this, then I will be the one who gets into
trouble. By now you should all know how these new laws are affecting us.97
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Teachers’ council meeting, 31 October 2012
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At the time of this teachers’ council meeting some of these teachers who had
organized against Esdras had in fact already accumulated their maximum amount of
excused absences. Upon hearing this message from the director one of them left the
room, got into her car, and drove away from the school. While everyone was commenting
about how that teacher had just left, Esdras continued the meeting with a loud, stern
voice:
I also want to remind all of you that the Estatuto del Docente establishes that it is
within the mandate of any director of a centro educativo to determine which
teacher is most qualified to teach which class. Our directores departamentales
have recently confirmed what I have already known about this. And the Ley
Fundamental requires us to gestionar funding from the municipal government and
from the private sector, which I have been doing since January. It also requires
that we teach computer literacy, and fortunately we have our own computer lab
here. I want you all to know – and you can communicate this to those teachers
who are irresponsible enough to have failed to come to this required meeting –
that I will continue to assign the computer literacy courses of the afternoon shift
as I see fit – to the most qualified among you to do this job, and it is my decision,
as the director of this centro educativo.98

These micro-level processes illuminate how the reforms intersected with what
teachers were already dealing with, and how even the most mundane internal disputes
among personnel at a rural school became interconnected with broader processes that the
gremio was dealing with. How to best administer new resources – such as a computer
laboratory – while projecting an image of the school as completely functional and
effective (despite these internal conflicts) has become a more pertinent question with the

98

Teachers’ council meeting, 31 October 2012.
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political environment of the reforms. If it were ever determined that the Carías Andino
school had a dysfunctional staff due to poor management, departmental Ministry
directors could have easily chastised Esdras or forced teachers to relocate. Likewise, as
the school director, Esdras needed to project an image of efficiency and innovative
approaches to education among his staff, not one of internal tensions and disputes.
During the last teachers’ council meeting of the school year, teachers at Carías
Andino took the initiative to offer their critical feedback to Esdras about how to improve
his gestión (solicitation of funding and management). The group began by congratulating
Esdras and Mercedes in their efforts to improve the main classroom. While they
mentioned that the funding for the multi-sport court never came through, there was
recognition that as local funders prioritize, they would not be likely to receive money for
such a project in the near future.
Esdras’ staff had an additional message for him: in spending so much of his time
soliciting funding from local sources, they argued, he had abandoned his responsibilities
to supervise personnel. These teachers felt they needed their director at the school more
often. Some teachers mentioned how Esdras’ personal conflict with some teachers (who
were absent from the meeting) could have been handled better if he had been physically
present at the centro more often throughout the school year.
Esdras responded to the critical feedback, recognizing the concerns of many
teachers, but he also reminded them that he is doing exactly what the reforms are asking
directors to do by spending more of his time soliciting funding and less time supervising
his staff. He mentioned how nonetheless he thought of everyone as mature adults,
competent teachers, and that from his viewpoint the only major problem they were
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having was that of attendance and tardiness. Esdras once again emphasized the
importance of always coming to work in order to fulfill the 200 days of class required by
law, but to also promote the image of their centro as one staffed by responsible teachers.
A discussion emerged among some teachers about Esdras’ hypocrisy with the
publicly-displayed attendance log sheets, and some teachers commented among
themselves, but in a voice loud enough for Esdras to hear, that Esdras himself had missed
quite a number of days. Esdras responded by saying that in the 2012 school year he had
not missed more than a few days in total. One teacher stood up and told Esdras, in front
of everyone, that while Esdras had improved his own behaviour for the 2012 school year
because of the reforms, he had missed nearly a month of classes during the summer of
2009, which was more consecutive days than anyone else had ever missed. Another
teacher responded by saying that Esdras had a pre-approved personal emergency, and the
first teacher snickered at the remark. Esdras stood up in front of everyone and defended
his actions:
Compañeros maestros, it is true that I was absent for a prolonged period of time
in 2009, but I had good reason to do so: I was in Nicaragua defending our
democracy during the first coup of the 21st century! Only a few of you have
known the truth about this, but all of you – everyone that is – know that I am
mera-Resistencia, and I am proud to say that I made this brave decision. What is
more, I was accompanying a group of teachers from our country who wanted to
support Mel. I was one of many teachers who made the personal sacrifice to
travel. But that was three years ago.99
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Teachers’ council meeting, 15 November 2012.
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In the next chapter I relay Esdras’ story in Nicaragua as part of a broader analysis
of how recent experiences among teachers are allowing for reflection and the
development of visions for what national public education and broader governing
practices should be like with LIBRE-initiated re-foundation projects. Here we should
recognize that arriving to the point of unity in these decisions remains the difficult task at
hand for the Honduran magisterio as they deal with the ways in which the reforms have
intensified previously-existing conflicts they have had.

6.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents internal conflicts at various levels and in different venues
that connect with the education reforms that teachers were struggling to manage in the
2012 school year. On the one hand such divisions weakened teachers’ labour organizing
efforts, and as Chapter 3 demonstrates, there is a history in Honduras of dirigentes
magisteriales fighting to ensure that their colegios remain united. On the other hand
however, these internal conflicts can lead to reflection about what has been important to
the magisterio as a whole, and how teachers have been successful (or not) during
previous and on-going struggles. That is, these internal conflicts might strengthen the
ways in which teachers are able to “fight like a community” (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009).
As anthropologist Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld argues, this
means replicating a limited political repertoire across dozens or hundreds of
localities. Operating without central control from an overarching leadership,
decisions are made and enforced in parallel, with power growing as separate
collectivities reinforce each other (2009: 209).
As teachers struggle against post-coup policies together, this can happen despite (or even
in terms of) the internal conflicts they are experiencing as a gremio. Yet as this chapter
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reveals, such an endeavour is not without considerable struggle as teachers find ways to
unite their colleagues in order to then connect their interests with the broader goals of the
Resistencia and LIBRE Party.
Lessons from Antonio Gramsci are instructive in this regard, in as much as the
“subaltern classes” are divided by definition (1971). In order to successfully win control
of the state they must find ways to work around their divisions by forging hegemonic
projects (however fragile) capable of resonating with the lived experiences of the
majority (see Grasmsci 1971; Crehan 2002). In 2012 Honduran schoolteachers were
struggling to first reach a consensus about what their own goals for the gremio should be,
and the best ways to fight for them together. These internal conflicts within the
magisterio thus seemed to act as deterrents for teachers’ abilities to realize fully their own
visions for what the state in Honduras should be like through LIBRE-initiated refoundation projects, although they certainly developed such visions while they navigated
the reforms. The next chapter will examine this process in more detail.
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7

Resistance and State

7.1 Introduction
This chapter foregrounds the ways in which schoolteachers were developing their
own visions for what re-founding the state should mean during the 2012 school year.
Drawing on concepts and examples introduced in the six previous chapters, here I show
how teachers’ range of experiences with the carrera del magisterio, these neoliberal
education reforms, and the Resistencia movement and LIBRE Party merge together in a
process of reflection about what their roles should be as front-line state agents who
deliver a service that the population seeks out, and which they believe the state has a
responsibility to provide.
The 2012 school year was a unique time to observe these processes, given that the
Resistencia had already formed in the immediate aftermath of the coup to support Mel
following his ousting, and then developed additional goals for the movement and a
political party that was projected to win the November 2013 presidential and
congressional elections. As we saw in Chapter 3 there were no clearly-defined political
paths in the immediate outbreak and aftermath of the coup. Three years afterward,
however, it was clear who had sided with the golpistas and who was in support of the
new Resistencia-initiated political party.
The 2012 school year was thus significant for teachers not only because it was the
first year in which they were expected to implement these unprecedented education
reforms, but also because with the emergence of Xiomara Castro as a strong presidential
candidate and the increasing popular support for LIBRE, it was the climax of teachers’
own leadership with the FNRP since its foundation in June 2009. However, as Chapter 6
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demonstrates, the 2012 school year was also a time of considerable internal conflict
within the magisterio, which many teachers understood as a hindrance to their abilities to
organize (even though they were conscious of the implications of such conflicts and
could point to specific reasons as to their occurrence). To the extent that 2012 was a time
for reflection on the many different achievements of the Resistencia, we should
understand that from the perspective of teachers, such achievements were viewed in the
context of the bleak reality of the reforms on the one hand, and the possibility of radical
political change with LIBRE on the other.
The ethnographic examples to follow are organized into four different sections. I
begin by sharing the story of Esdras’ initial involvement with the Resistencia movement
immediately after the coup, when he travelled to Nicaragua in support of Mel. Esdras
shared the details of his experience not only with me, but in the presence of other
schoolteachers who were fellow Resistencia supporters. The details of his experiences
reveal not only the ways in which some teachers’ initial experiences with the movement
continue to inform their understandings of LIBRE and the meaning of re-foundation in
2012, but also of how teachers themselves see their own positions in Honduran society
(to which I have alluded throughout this thesis). This chapter thus also shows how
teachers were reflecting together about what their positions meant in the post-coup
political context.
From this story of formal resistance – in La Resistencia – I move to the second
section of this chapter that focuses on more subtle everyday actions at the school where
teachers refused to conform to specific aspects of what the reforms mandated. Here I
return to the process of soliciting funding for the classroom reconstruction project at
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Carías Andino, to examine what happened after the local politicians found out that
teachers were able to build the classroom without their patronage. I analyze teachers’
responses to this situation not only in terms of their challenges to aspects of the reforms,
but also in terms of how this instance connected with other experiences they had in the
political environment of 2012 when many LIBRE Party members were asking themselves
what kind of politician would be needed for real change in state practices to be achieved.
The third section analyses similar processes about what the role of the Honduran
state should be in promoting national public education – and what the roles of teachers
are in a privatized, de-centralized education system – with ethnographic examples of how
teachers were using what they learned at the UNAH and UPNFM to reflect upon such
questions. Here I return to the Macro-Educación UNAH class in Choluteca, and also
introduce the Gestión y Administración Educativa class at the UPNFM in Nacaome. I
show how both classes aimed to teach teachers the best ways to approach implementing
these new laws, although the most experienced teachers enrolled in these classes were
quick to see these new ideas through the lens of schoolteachers’ everyday realities at the
schools where they work. Then I show how teachers were thinking through the
implications of conceptualizing their own work as funded by the state versus funded by
private entities, and what that implied.
The fourth and final section analyzes the strategies through which teachers in
Valle negotiated with departmental Ministry officials about when the last day of school
should be. In this process they challenged the orders from Minister of Education, Marlon
Escoto, to extend the last day of classes until December 21, convincing departmental
Ministry officials that such a measure was in fact not necessary for them to comply with
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the new education laws. As teachers from different schools talked among themselves
about education governing policies, they shared ideas for developing strategies for
challenging these unprecedented actions by the Minister of Education. In this section I
describe ethnographically a meeting that took place in late November in a Nacaome
school between Valle departmental Ministry officials and all the different school
directors in Valle. The departmental Ministry officials called the meeting to discuss how
directors should properly submit their year-end paperwork (one of the ways in which
directors and teachers alike can be audited), while the Valle school directors had the
agenda of convincing their superiors to disregard the orders from Minister Marlon
Escoto.
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7.2 Esdras’ Experiences in Nicaragua
It wasn’t until the end of March 2012 – three months after having been formally
introduced to Director Esdras and well into my research at his school – that he decided to
share with me details of his experiences joining the Frente Nacional de Resistencia
Popular ‘La Resistencia’ (FNRP, National Front of Popular Resistance) in the immediate
aftermath of the 28 June 2009 coup d’état. When I had asked him about it before, he only
briefly mentioned that he was in Nicaragua. Most of my knowledge of this story had in
fact come from the perspective of his mother, who worried about his safety during this
time (see Levy 2010). In the context of talking about how Nicaragua’s highways have no
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The installment of Minister Marlon Escoto was an interesting case in point because he had a reputation as
supporting the Resistencia and LIBRE Party, having protested against the coup in the streets of Tegucigalpa. Once in
power as Minister he even used his affiliations with LIBRE as an argument about how other members of the Lobo
government are to blame for poor education policies, not him, as a LIBRE supporter. Now however he is responsible
for helping to design and implement these neoliberal education reforms. Many schoolteachers use the example of
Escoto to show how post-coup governments can buy out Resistencia supporters (which they fear has also happened to
some of their dirigentes in the FOMH, as alluded to in Chapter 6).
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potholes, that their healthcare and education systems seem to work better than those of
Honduras, and how if elected LIBRE would have to attempt to fund public services
similar to the ways that the government of Daniel Ortega achieved (despite however
these policies may be viewed by Nicaraguans themselves), Esdras began talking about his
admiration for what he considers progress and good policies of governance in Nicaragua
that he had observed during his brief visit. In the informal social setting of our backyard
patio, among other FNRP-supporting friends and fellow schoolteachers, Esdras shared
with us his experiences from late July 2009:

We made the decision to cross into Nicaragua and support Mel, but it was not
without certain risks. The armed forces had military checkpoints set up every few
kilometres and we heard that they were arresting anyone who was travelling
outside of their place of residence without legitimate business. Our truck made it
just past Choluteca. After having lied to so many cops along the way – saying that
we were only going [to Choluteca] to run errands, we decided to get off the [PanAmerican] highway. We managed to get closer to San Marcos de Colón through
the back-roads, and then we had to continue by foot. There we knew that if any
cop or soldier saw us we were screwed. They had orders to arrest anyone walking
around so close to the border. But we continued through what are blind spots,
trusting those who knew the area best. I remember calling my wife right before
we crossed this one river, where I figured I would no longer have reception
afterward. I told her that I was doing this for our Honduras – it was the first golpe
de estado of the 21st century; how could I not participate in this great movement
[against it]? We were making history! I felt like I had a responsibility to support
our president and do whatever I could to demand that he be reinstated. Don’t get
me wrong. I was scared. My youngest son was just born and I had certain
responsibilities. And I didn’t have a whole lot of money with me either – just
what I could manage to bring from the last vacation pay. I kept thinking about
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how dangerous it was for me to make this trip and what I was risking. But then I
looked around me – at the others who were also crossing by foot. There were
dozens of us. I realized how many other compatriots were going hungry too, and I
saw humble – you know – really humble people. And then I thought to myself: if
all of those poor obreros and campesinos are going all the way to Managua for
Mel… then certainly I, with my higher social status as a teacher, could also make
the trip.
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As Esdras continued to tell us about his journey to Managua, his words reveal some of
the ways in which schoolteachers view their positions in Honduran society: individuals
with a responsibility to take action against social injustice, who have limited resources
but who are better off than general labourers and the peasantry. This is an understanding
about themselves that continues to inform teachers’ actions today. Esdras continued to
describe what this meant for him as he travelled through Nicaragua.
When we finally crossed I didn’t even realize it – we were still hiking through the
mountains and it all looked the same to me. But people who knew the area began
to tell us that we were now on Nicaraguan soil, and we knew that we were safe.
The Honduran Armed Forces could no longer arrest us – as if what we were doing
was somehow illegal. But they sure made us feel that way. I felt as though I had
been a prisoner in my own land – imagine that! But once I got to Ocotal, I knew
we would be OK. And that’s where we met up with others from the Resistencia.
They hired buses to take us to Managua where we would meet up with Mel, el jefe
de jefes [the boss of bosses]. And when we finally got to him we were in this
plaza someplace in downtown Managua, and Mel asked us to all show our
cédulas de identidad [identification cards], to prove that we were Honduran. The
thing is, there were some Nicaraguans that had infiltrated our group clandestinely
– trying to pass as Hondurans, so Mel held up his identidad and we all showed
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Informal gathering among teachers, 30 March 2012.
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ours too. And one compañero behind us told Mel that he wanted to be there to
support him, but that he didn’t have anything to support him with. And Mel
reached into his pocket and pulled out a one hundred US dollar bill and gave it to
him. And then everyone else said that they didn’t have money either, but Mel said
‘no… just the first person.’ And he told us about the meetings he was having with
all of those big shots from the international community, and how they all said that
he is the only real president of Honduras, and that we – since we were the ones
who had come all this way to support him – were the true pueblo hondureño. You
know how Mel talks right? I was right there next to him! And I remember that we
were all hungry, and there was a huge mango tree above us in the plaza, and while
Mel was talking one fell down right next to his feet. And I guess he was hungry
too because he just picked it up and took a bite, while he was speaking, just like
what I, as a poor person, would have done. He didn’t even bother to clean it off!
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There’s no other president like Mel.

Everyone who was listening to Esdras’ story commented that although Mel was a
president, and had lots of money, he is human too. Esdras continued to tell us about the
meeting in Managua and how they rallied support for Mel during their time in Nicaragua,
and received Nicaraguan and international press coverage of the events. Esdras described
one instance when a fellow Resistencia member showed him a colour photograph from a
mainstream Nicaraguan newspaper where he appeared with other members and Mel
Zelaya. Esdras explained why he wasn’t able to bring this clipping back to Honduras with
him:
Some people decided to stay in Nicaragua. I guess they figured it was better for
them to stay longer than to come back to a country ruled by golpistas. But after
the first ten days I had to come back. My family was worried about me, and the
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truth is that I ran out of money too. A couple of compañeros were in the same
situation and we decided to go back by ourselves. This was the hardest part. We
knew that the [Honduran] armed forces had increased their surveillance of the
border, and we knew that if we were caught crossing back in through a blind spot,
then we would for sure be arrested. So we decided to cross back via the legal
route, into San Marcos de Colón. This is why I knew that I didn’t want to bring
anything with me that would suggest I was in Nicaragua to support Mel. I had a
really nice Resistencia t-shirt that they gave us there; I gave it away to some
humble guy. The compañero who was with me told me that I could tuck it inside
my underwear, but I didn’t want to take any chances. So I had to leave the
newspaper article there. But we figured the immigration officers would ask us
where we were, so you know what we did [he says, chuckling]? We went to
Somoto, to the town fair – which happened to be going on – and bought all sorts
of crap from that town. You should have seen us, just like tourists. We spent our
last Córdobas on all the artisan crap we could find. And it worked! They asked us
if we were in Nicaragua to accompany Mel, and we just played dumb. We told
them that we were in Somoto the entire time, and that we didn’t know about Mel
or care where he might be…. It was a risk, but it worked. You know how these
immigration officials only go through high school anyway, I don’t even think they
have to graduate. And let’s not even talk about the lack of education of those in
the armed forces – they only need to get through primary school! Idiots.
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Esdras continued to describe his return to San Lorenzo and the widespread interest that
other Hondurans had in learning about his experiences in Nicaragua, and with the
formation of the Resistencia movement. While others present continued to ask Esdras
about his experiences with Mel in Nicaragua during this time, I asked him the more
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mundane question of what happened to the CEB Carías Andino while he was away. He
explained:
The orders from the FOMH for the initial paro were already done. Officially, the
magisterio was back at work, and Micheletti was making a fuss about how we
weren’t conducting classes. Those teachers who continued to protest in
Tegucigalpa and other places were beginning to be persecuted by the golpistas.
We were supposed to be back in classes – and I was at first – until I left for
Nicaragua with a group of other teachers and Resistencia supporters…. I didn’t
tell any of my colleagues what I was doing. Well, I told Mercedes that I was sick,
and that I was going to plan on being sick for a while…. She understood me. She
knew what I was up to. That woman is pura Resistencia! She knew that I was
going to Nicaragua, but I told her to tell everyone at the centro – the other
teachers, the students, and the parents – that the director was out sick.
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Despite the official orders from the FOMH to protest the coup, and the fact that most
teachers supported, and became directly involved with, the Resistencia movement as it
began to emerge in support of Mel, not every teacher at CEB Carías Andino supported
the idea that their school director would leave for Nicaragua during the middle of the
school year, as Chapter 6 demonstrates. Honduran teachers who become involved with
the Resistencia are thus caught between what they perceive to be their social
responsibility to participate (and be ‘out on the streets’ protesting post-coup policies of
governance), and at the same time, not missing class because of their involvement.
Esdras’ story about accompanying Mel in Nicaragua merged into conversations
that teachers frequently had in 2012 about what type of political leaders Honduras needs
with the LIBRE-initiated re-foundation project. Everyone present that night agreed that in
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order to move away from the ruling elite that has characterized governance in Honduras
historically (see, also, Barahona 2005), the people would need to elect a politician from a
humble background, who could relate to the economic realities of the majority of the
Honduran population. Other teachers present commented how although Mel was a good
president, neither he nor Xiomara even fit this category – they are still elite landowners.
Nonetheless, teachers frequently mentioned how this is a difficult transition when the
majority of the Honduran population is used to rule by politicians from wealthy
backgrounds. As one LIBRE-supporting schoolteacher put it:
La gente está bien acostumbrada a la oligarquía [people are well used to the
oligarchy]. They know that when elections come, it means that rich politicians
will give them stuff – promise them more crap. The people elect these guys to
power, and then wonder why they don’t follow through…. Naturally it’s because
they don’t have the same interests as the people – all they care about is getting
elected, so they can enrich themselves. They don’t love Honduras. With LIBRE
we are trying to get away from this. But it’s hard…. Who will vote for a poor guy
from a [rural] community? Nobody here! Think about who are all the local
LIBRE candidates – they aren’t empresarios, but they aren’t campesinos either.
People who are running with LIBRE, they are those who have small humble
businesses…. They cannot afford to give away money, and the kind of stuff that
the Cachurecos [Nationalists] and the Liberals do, you know, like Juan
Hornilla
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…. But here in Honduras people are used to that kind of stuff. There

are some people who just haven’t woken up yet.
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Juan ‘Hornilla’ is a reference to the National Party’s 2013 presidential candidate Juan Orlando Hernández (who was
the President of the Congress during the Lobo regime, and a strong supporter of neoliberal state projects). Throughout
his campaign for president, Orlando Hernández gave away hornillas (Lorena stoves) to poor families and displayed
images of these actions in campaign ads. The understanding in LIBRE is that this was done in exchange for votes, and
that by doing it publicly, Juan Orlando Hernández was promoting an image of himself as someone who cares about the
poor. But as this teacher’s comments suggest, designing policies that benefit the poor goes far beyond simply giving
away Lorena stoves.
106
Interview, 2 December 2012.
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As teachers navigated through the first year of these reforms and the primary election
season, they were particularly conscious of the negative consequences that unfulfilled
promises by politicians have had.

7.3 Visions of What Kind of Politician Honduras Needs
Teachers see their success in securing local government funding as dependent
upon knowing the right people in office and developing a positive relationship with those
people (although they may disagree with the legitimacy of this process). This was no easy
task in 2012, especially for LIBRE-supporting teachers who had developed reputations as
de Resistencia – people who boycotted the very elections that brought these politicians to
power. Moreover, most schoolteachers in the south already knew these local politicians,
having had some interaction with them in the past. Honduran teachers in the south are
especially conscious of who has been in support of (and responsible for) which post-coup
policies; they are quick to mention who has collaborated with the golpistas.
While they may disagree with their policies, navigating through the reforms
meant that teachers needed to maintain positive relations with golpista politicians to
secure funding for their schools. Teachers also recognized that these politicians in turn
needed to demonstrate that they were supporting public education with their regional
budgets. In the interest of promoting the image of a state still capable of funding
(however minimally) ‘public’ education, teachers engaged in a performance that
communicates mutual cooperation with politicians. Honduran schoolteachers would
appear to get along well with their local sponsors at school fund-raising events. They
would smile, shake hands, and talk about non-controversial subjects – remaining on good
terms with these authority figures publicly in order to get want they want for their
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schools. And once the golpista politicians would leave, teachers would tell me what they
really think.
As schoolteachers envision a different type of state – one that forges economic
policies that benefit the majority – they have become especially critical of unfulfilled
promises. The following recurring joke that teachers tell illustrates this process:
The diputado candidate comes into the [poor, rural] community with gifts for
those who were eager enough to want such crap – you know, blue [National
Party] T-shirts and some of yesterday’s food. He begins to rally support at the
town park. He screams out with his microphone a list of all the things he will plan
to build for the people if elected to office, and everyone gets really excited. He
says: ‘If you give me your vote, I’ll build you a school [and everyone cheered];
I’ll build you a health clinic [and they cheered]; and I’ll even build you a bridge!’
And the people reacted with confusion and frustration. Everyone was silent and
then some people shouted: ‘Un puente… ¿para qué? ¡Aquí ni siquera hay río!
¿Para qué ocupamos un puente?’ [‘A bridge, but what for? Here we don’t even
have a river! What would we need a bridge for!?’] And the politician responded:
‘Ay pues… ¡también les hago el río!’ [‘Oh… well then, I’ll make you a river
too!’].
When talking about the promises that politicians would make for a given construction
project in their school, some teachers recurrently communicated their disapproval (among
107

themselves) with the phrase: ‘Les construyo un río.’

It was funny because it grasped

everyone’s recognition that politicians in Honduras make unrealistic and irrelevant
promises just to get elected.
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This joke is supposedly based on a real story about a Valle candidate for diputado who went into a southeastern
rural community where there was no river. Like any other oral story that gets retold among different people, with
slightly different versions (with additional promises made before the promise for a bridge, and where ‘I’ll make you’
gets replaced with ‘I’ll give you’ (les doy) – which is sometimes communicated in the future tense. Here I have
attempted to write the most common version.
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As we saw in Chapter 4, when Nacaome municipal officials refused to fund the
classroom remodelling project at Carías Andino, teachers sought funding from a private
sugar cane company and donations from students’ parents by hosting a Bingo night.
There were several teachers at Carías Andino dissatisfied with this practice of securing
funding for such a basic necessity, and Mercedes pointed out that the company was
claiming a higher amount of money as a tax deduction than what these empresarios had
actually donated toward the school construction project. That chapter sought to show how
teachers were working with what limited resources they had access to in their efforts to
meet the basic needs of schooling in the context of poverty. Here I wish to highlight
another set of processes involved when front-line state agents approach implementing
policies: they reflect upon the meaning of their interactions with these local political
authorities, and think through what state practices and governing policies should be like.
When the classroom construction was completed and the news spread of the
inauguration ceremony, aspiring candidates for Nacaome municipal positions and
candidates for Valle diputado (including some running for re-election) decided that they
wanted to attend the ceremony. Some parents suspected that if the politicians were to
attend they might offer to donate money if elected. But because of their resentment about
not receiving local government funds for the classroom reconstruction project, teachers
convinced the organized parents to bar any politician from attending the ceremony,
despite teachers’ overall attempt to maintain positive relations with local politicians for
future fund-raising endeavours – thus expressing their discontent with the politicians and
challenging the reforms in a mundane everyday context.
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As a mechanism to prevent politicians from entering the public space that is the
school campus, the teachers at Carías Andino asked one parent who was a police officer
to instruct the local police to support them in their attempt to prevent political candidates
from entering their school – using another state institution as a resource to prevent
political authorities from entering what is in fact property of the state. During a spirited
conversation about the matter, Esdras told the parents and his fellow colleagues:
I would love for us to have their money, but I know at this point it’s pura paja
[total bullshit]. Where were they when we needed them for our re-construction
projects? Now we’re in the primary election season. Unless they come with
100,000 Lempiras in cash, they are prohibited from entering the property of this
school! This is the property of the state, for sure, but here I am the director, the
one in charge, and no politician will come crash our party. I spoke with the police
here in El Garrobo and they agreed to help us prevent those who are
politiqueando [seeking political support] from entering our centro educativo. It’s
election season, and these guys will say anything to get your vote – it’s as if they
think we’re still the same ignorant people that we used to be. Not anymore. Now
the people are awake.
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As they critically reflected upon their relationships with politicians in 2012 and
acted upon their visions for what policies of governance could be like with state refoundation, teachers were invoking the Resistencia discourse that with the coup, the
people finally woke up. LIBRE-supporting teachers argued that Hondurans were
becoming aware that a new type of politician is needed if real change in governance is to
take place. They would say that this new politician should be from a more humble
background; have some real experiences outside of politics; be completely familiar with
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the Honduran reality on-the-ground; and understand what it means for a community to
109

live through a history of unrealistic, unfulfilled promises.

With little discretion, Resistencia-supporting teachers would denounce certain
politicians as ‘golpistas’ and ‘of the oligarchy’ in front of a wide range of people, some
of whom might be coup- or Lobo-supporters themselves. Teachers were not afraid to
defend their claims about what re-foundation should be like. Mercedes, one of my closest
research participants and a true organic intellectual, told me in front of her students, some
of their parents, and other teachers:
I have always told my colleagues that our role is not only to inform, but to form
citizens. We need our young people to understand when a situation is exploitative.
They need to know what happens in the maquilas [sweat shops]. They need to
learn about the negative effects of gangs, of family disintegration; learn about
rape, and violence. Honduras is living through a very difficult time, but we can
change things, little by little. I have faith. We hope that with Doña Xiomara the
government will be better. We hope that she will be a good president. But only
God knows. Since the golpe de estado, I have seen my role as one that educates
my compatriots about all the injustices that we, the poor, are living through. There
is so much injustice in Honduras. But the people are becoming more conscious.
We can no longer be conformists if we are ever going to re-found the state and
change this country.
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That same day Mercedes talked to me and other parents who were present about
how granting concessions to large foreign companies has never brought the quantity

109

Through this same set of ideas some schoolteachers and others from humble backgrounds have entered the 2013
elections as political candidates. Unsurprisingly, this concept is not however limited to the LIBRE Party. I have teacher
research participants from the National Party who also suggested that they were good candidates on the basis that they
have not been ‘viviendo de la política’ (living off of politics).
110
Conversation among teachers, 29 March 2012.
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much less the quality of jobs that it has promised.
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Throughout my fieldwork it was

clear to me that Mercedes has shared the same ‘fundamental’ economic realities and
political interests of the class for whom and about whom she seeks to develop awareness
of their function in the economic and political arenas. I have observed her doing this by
engaging colleagues, students, and community members in routine articulations of her
own experiences (see, for instance, Crehan 2002: 115, developing the insights of Antonio
Gramsci). As she told me in a subsequent conversation about the history of the banana
enclave economy in Honduras:
That’s one of the lessons from Prisión Verde, you know the book the state would
prohibit us from reading. This is why we need to become critically conscious of
our politicians and the empresarios operating in our country. They should abide
by all the same laws as everyone else. But now the empresarios have kidnapped
our Honduras!
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Several teachers who became involved with LIBRE during the 2012 school year
began to develop arguments about why Honduras needs mechanisms to reprimand
politicians who do not fulfill their promises during campaigns, and likewise, to hold
empresarios accountable for paying taxes and abiding by all Honduran laws. The history
of such powerful actors breaking the rules is nothing new in Honduras, but when teachers
experience failed promises from local politicians and empresarios who devise clever
schemes to avoid their tax obligations they reflect upon what type of state should be
created with re-foundation.
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As Chapter 2 demonstrates, the enclave economies of silver ores near Tegucigalpa and bananas on the north coast
never produced the amount of state revenue or kind of development projects that the ruling elite of the Liberal
oligarchic state had envisioned (cf. Barahona 1989; Euraque 2000, 1996, 1998; MacLeod 1973; Meza 1991).
112
Interview, 19 September 2012.
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In the context of the problems that the reforms are causing, in 2012 teachers were
analyzing their own positions as workers, as local intellectuals, and as agents responsible
for the delivery of a state service that the local population seeks out. They were conscious
of the fact that they now have less job security, that during the first year of these reforms
it was especially important that they respond to local interested parties in new ways, as
the central government is no longer going to support them in ways that they have been
used to (however limited or fragile such support might have been in previous periods).
Although aspects of this consciousness are formed while seeking out funds
locally, other components of such awareness are cultivated through the exchange of
experiences with fellow schoolteachers. Classes at the local universities where teachers
received training on how to approach implementing these polices created another space in
which teachers could share their own experiences with the Resistencia and with these
education reforms in an environment that was conducive to reflection on what sort of
education system teachers should aim to forge.

7.4 University Classes
After the President of COLPEDAGOGOSH left the ballroom and teachers in the
Macro-Educación class at the Choluteca UNAH campus presented on the Ley de
Participación Comuntaria (Law of Community Participation), it provoked a group
discussion about different teachers’ experiences with the COMDEs and the CED.
Everyone seemed to agree that in practice this law creates a network of coup-supporting
spies that seek to denounce those teachers whose actions they find do not support the
reforms. The professor, a LIBRE-supporting dirigente for COLPROSUMAH herself,
allowed everyone to describe their sense that Honduran teachers are no longer in charge
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of their own classrooms due to this increase in scrutiny of their work. Further discussions
emerged about how such new legislation undermines the achievements made by the
Estatuto del Docente (Teachers’ Statute), a law which the magisterio considers a labour
achievement and has struggled to defend since its initial passing in 1982.113 Such
discussions are one of the many ways in which teachers were sharing their own
experiences with one another in 2012 – a process that contributed to the development of
their political consciousness and awareness of their own positions in Honduran society.
When Esdras and his group presented on the Ley Fundamental de Educación (the
law that most directly affects how teachers go about doing their jobs by requiring that
they solicit funding from local sources and offer new academic programs such as English
and computer literacy), he and his group members spoke about how impractical many of
the goals of the law were, given that the Lobo government was not willing to pay for
these programs. Teachers in the audience also mentioned examples of how the Lobo
regime demanded that they work harder to improve academic programs and school
infrastructure at the same time the government itself withdraws funding from the
Ministry of Education for that project – that although money is being transferred to
municipal and departmental governments, the amount that actually reaches local schools
is much less.
A discussion emerged about how in Honduras national public education occurs in
the context of poverty and chronic underfunding, where teachers have to ‘ver cómo
hacer’ (see how to manage) all by themselves – a phrase which also captures the Lobo
government’s abandonment of the state’s responsibility to fund the national public
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While 1982 was the year that the magisterio achieved the passing of this law, it has since been reformed numerous
times with additional articles (see COLPROSUMAH 2011; República de Honduras 1997, 1999).
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education system. Esdras’ group presentation reaffirmed the idea that these reforms are
simply a way for the Lobo government to demand quality education at the same time it
withdraws financial support for it. They contended that new academic programs such as
computer literacy and English classes would be good, but that the reforms simply don’t
account for the Honduran reality.
Esdras worked into his presentation to the group what he had previously told me
about how computer literacy classes can’t happen when there are schools in rural areas
without electricity. However, when discussing some of the new mechanisms to discipline
teachers, Esdras argued:
There are good aspects about this law compañeros… the lazy teacher who doesn’t
come to work – now there are mechanisms to punish this person. At my school
the Padres de Familia get really angry whenever something like this happens.
They come yell at me, as if it’s my fault. And up until now we’ve been paying to
maintain people like that, and for what? We can no longer permit this sort of
behaviour. We can no longer continue to pay the lazy teacher who doesn’t show
up for work – it’s a waste of money for the state. In fact, permitting this is stealing
from the state. And who is the state? Compañeros maestros, the state is every one
of us!114
Esdras’ sentiments were undoubtedly influenced by his experiences in dealing
with attendance problems at Carías Andino (and with the teachers who had organized
against him in particular). In the broader context of the reforms and attempts to re-found
the state, such experiences coalesced into similar critiques that teachers have developed
about politicians abusing authority in other contexts. Just as teachers opined that
politicians need to fulfill their obligations to deliver relevant development projects that

114

Comments during university class designed for schoolteachers, 21 April 2012
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benefit the majority of the Honduran population, they were also reflecting on the
disciplinary aspects of the reforms – not only to see how these could assist them in the
workplace – but in terms of the reality of chronic underfunding, and the problems
associated with any sort of public resource that is not put to optimal use. Esdras included
incompetent teachers in this general category; for him, it is considered ‘stealing from the
state.’ Such a position is beneficial for the magisterio as those in favour of the reforms
often talked about teachers as ‘government employees’ who were ‘lazy’ and do not
conduct class. As misleading as these comments may be, teachers are reflecting on what
their own roles need to be with the re-foundation project. When individual teachers show
up late or do not come to class at all, it gives the magisterio a bad name. In the context of
heightened scrutiny of teachers’ work, it is understandable that they wanted to prevent
such poor work ethic.
What teachers want is a state that has mechanisms to control any sort of abuse of
public funding (not just work-shy teachers!), but also one that prioritizes opportunities for
youth, and invests an adequate amount of funding to cover the basic necessities of
national public education. They are adamantly against the idea that they have to ver cómo
hacer, without the assistance of the central government, and they are reflecting on why
this is a bad thing.
One group at the UNAH class presented a counter-argument to the idea that
INPREMA is bankrupt (pointing out how Micheletti stole funds), and to the idea that the
central government cannot afford to pay for all aspects of national public education. The
group showed how much international development funds are devoted toward ‘security’
in Honduras – funding the armed forces and the national police, while the post-coup
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government withdraws funding for basic public services. The group made a compelling
argument about how easy it would be to fund all aspects of national public education by
reducing the budget of the armed forces, including the salaries of elite military personnel,
and diverting these funds toward school infrastructure projects. A discussion then
emerged about how such a project would be possible with LIBRE, but that the right-wing
post-coup governments would never allow such a project – how instead they prefer to
blame schoolteachers for the shortcomings of the education system, and demand that
individual schools solicit funding from the indebted municipal governments and private
companies.
At Mercedes’ UPNFM class on Gestión y Administración (Education
Management and Administration), teachers were learning exactly how to approach
soliciting such local funds. The class focused on teaching teachers about the legal
consequences of the Ley Fundamental, explaining what could happen if individual
schools did not gain access to sufficient funding to cover such basic needs. The class had
a practical module in which teachers accompanied NGO officials in their daily routines,
and attended workshops led by NGO officials that aimed to show teachers how an NGO
solicits funding for a range of development projects. This was a significant component of
this UPNFM university course, and teachers were expected to write individual reports on
how they planned to implement strategies they learned about from the NGO in their own
gestión at the schools in which they worked.
When Mercedes enrolled in this workshop for the class, she was assigned to the
San Lorenzo office of Save the Children (coincidentally the same NGO I had volunteered
for in 2004 and 2001). Given my familiarity what that particular NGO, it was easy for
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Mercedes and I to speak extensively about their practices. She would often comment to
me that there were aspects of the NGO work that she admired, especially their efficiency
and ability to complete a given construction project in a short period of time. But, she
commented one day,
I think this professor [in my UPNFM class] is expecting us to begin working like
an NGO or a private company, and the reality is that our education system is not
like this… much less now that we are left by ourselves. The state has abandoned
the magisterio! Here we’re the ones who deal with disgruntled parents who
complain if it’s one way, and complain if it’s the other. For example, I got these
new textbooks last year, thanks in part to our own gestión. The Ministry never
sends us the books we need – we have to go get them ourselves! And they are nice
books, with lots of colourful pictures that the students like. But they also have lots
of Mexican folklore, and things about what happens after one dies…. And there
are many parents who do not like this; one parent told me it was satanic….
Personally I would like to see more Honduran folklore in the books. I agree with
those parents – I don’t like reading about this Mexican stuff either. The students
don’t even know where Yucatán is; they should be reading about Olancho
instead! What about our Honduran authors?... But you see, this is not my fault.
And yet the Padres de Familia treat us as if it were! Look here, this is something
the NGO doesn’t know anything about…. The NGO is always well received by
the people in the [rural] communities because they go in to give stuff away… a
115

latrine here, a pila

there…. I have seen them [the NGO officials] in San

Lorenzo. I go there twice a week for workshops. They just sit there in these airconditioned offices, thanks to the money they receive from the people who live in
rich countries…. I wish I could someday be in an office in Tegus with my feet up
doing the same thing! I hope to someday be working in a nice office like that – it
would be great. I could imagine myself like that. But that’s not how our schooling
system works. Here we are asked to plead with politicians for little amounts of
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These are cisterns – cement water storage units – considered a basic necessity in every Honduran household.
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money, that they might spare if you are of their party, so that we can then ver
cómo hacer, and maybe fix up our classrooms just a little bit more. Or else we go
to the empresarios, who work for a profit…. The NGO doesn’t behave like this.
116

So now what, we’re supposed to go gestionar to foreign entities too? How?

Mercedes’ comments highlight the impracticality of teachers soliciting funding
the way NGOs are accustomed to doing, and yet she is encouraged to adopt such
practices. One of the messages from this UPNFM course was that with the Ley
Fundamental, teachers will have to begin operating in much the same way and could
therefore learn a good deal from how NGO officials are already soliciting funding.
Mercedes recognized the good intentions of the instructor to ask that she learn from Save
the Children, but she points out that these are two very different kinds of work.
Although perhaps an unintended consequence, both of these university classes
were successful in persuading teachers to critically think through how the new laws
would affect their everyday activities – both through new policies and a political
environment in which their work came under even more scrutiny on various fronts. In so
doing, they shared their thoughts with other teacher colleagues who were their
classmates, and together they pushed their political analyses of their situation forward.

7.5 Ending the 2012 School Year
Another way in which teachers’ work experience with the profession in 2012 was
altered because of the reforms had to do with ending the school year. By early November,
the time when schoolteachers would normally be finishing their regular course materials
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and preparing students for final exams, Minister Escoto called for the extension of the
2012 school year through December 21. Normally the school year ends in late November.
The minister’s justification for this action was that by law, schoolteachers have to
conduct classes during a total of 200 days – a requirement that was in fact established by
the Estatuto del Docente, not one of the new laws that compose these reforms (see
República de Honduras 1999, Artículo 12). Most teachers agree that 200 days of class is
appropriate; where this becomes an issue is when there are labour disputes that lead to
strikes or paros, which result in students missing class.
In principle (or in ‘theory’ to use Esdras’ words), students in Honduras always
make up every day of class that they miss due to a paro or strike. In ‘practice’ however
the final day of school is decided through a process in which different governments
extend the school year for specific political reasons, and the final extension usually does
not reflect the actual number of days missed. More often than not, the decision to extend
the school year is a means for the government in power to leverage against
schoolteachers’ demands they made through paros. For instance, the de facto government
of Roberto Micheletti first threatened to extend the 2009 school year through January (far
more time than teachers had actually spent on paro to protest of the outbreak of the
coup), but then this government later ended the school year in October, earlier than
normal, which in fact made students miss even more classes. While that particular
instance was highly irregular, it illuminates the fact that there are more variables at work
than simply a matter of how many classes were missed.
The final determination of the timing of the end of classes is thus never as
straight-forward as teachers not wanting to conduct classes. It is a political process, rather
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than a technical exercise. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, not every school, much less every
teacher, participates in all paros. In this section I show how teachers at Carías Andino
navigated through these variables, and negotiated the last day of class with departmental
Ministry officials, thereby invoking the new laws in order to achieve their own particular
goals.
Despite the fact that the decision to extend the school year is never made by
individual schoolteachers, they have to endure angry parents who often have quite
heterogeneous opinions on the matter. It is true that the Padres de Familia want their
children to attend 200 days of class. It is quite understandable that for this reason
students’ parents often do not support teachers’ paros and strikes. However, different
Honduran governments have taken advantage of this in their arguments about why they
extend the school year, and not all parents want the school year to be extended so long.
Especially in the rural setting, teachers told me that many parents disagreed with
extending the school year through December because several labour-intensive
agricultural activities take place early that month, when Honduran children are normally
out of school. Teachers at Carías Andino found themselves entangled in a situation in
which they had spent the school year convincing students’ parents that their children
needed to come to school by law and leave their household farming chores until after the
school year finished. Once the Minister extended the school year, they had to again tell
parents that their children needed to remain at the school, and therefore not help with
their usual agricultural chores (including harvesting the corn most families would eat
during several months, and sowing the watermelon they would later sell in the local
market).
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During the last week of November, Mercedes and Esdras held a meeting with the
Sociedad de Padres de Familia to discuss the matter. Esdras addressed the parents:
I want you all to understand that this is not our decision. For my part, I am tired
and want to go visit my grandmother in Choluteca…. This minister wants us all to
be here teaching classes even when we’re eating tamales and torejas!
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But what

can I do? I have to abide by whatever final date our current minister orders….
And I know that many of you are also upset by this news because you have your
milpas
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to attend to… but here at Carías Andino we follow the law.
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Teachers at Carías Andino commented about how they had worked in December in
previous years when there were many paros, but that no Minister of Education had ever
extended the school year until December 21. As they exchanged comments and ideas
about this situation with other teachers, this same day Marlon shared with everyone what
the director at his other school planned on doing to end the school year:
Over there what we have done is calculate the exact number of days that we, at
that school, were on paro during the entire school year…. We were absent for a
total amount of nine days due to paros, which were of course orders from the
FOMH…. This director that we have always respected any paro that our
dirigentes called for. So what he and the sub-director have done is propose to the
director departamental [the departmental (Ministry) director] that we extend our
school year only until we will have fulfilled the required 200 days of class at our
school…. At least this is what we have done, I don’t know about what the process
will be or if they will accept it, but it’s unfair to ask that our students attend more
than 200 days of class…. Normally we’re all at the beach by now!
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120

Esdras was making a somewhat sarcastic reference to the idea that the Minister of Education wanted students to stay
in classes until December 24, as these are common Christmas foods in Honduras.
118
This is a Nahuatl word for a farmer’s field.
119
Meeting between teachers and students’ parents, 28 November 2012
120
Meeting among teachers, 28 November 2012
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Esdras, Mercedes, and the other teachers at CEB Carías Andino were enthusiastic
about this type of strategy. However some teachers expressed their anxiety over not
knowing when the last day of class would be. These teachers argued that it was important
to know when their classes would end, in order to plan their teaching activities
accordingly. A few days later, Esdras called the director of Marlon’s other school over
the phone to discuss his strategy. Part of this conversation seemed to simply confirm
what Marlon had told the group, while another part was about what specifically this
school administrator planned to do, given that this was the first time that they, as
individuals, had approached the debate about the last date of the school year in this
manner. Normally the Minister of Education and the FOMH came to some sort of an
agreement, and teachers trust that the FOMH had done all that it could to arrange a fair
last day. With the exception of the case with the Micheletti government, this is usually a
matter of a few days in the beginning of December in either case. However, given that the
FOMH neglected to successfully renegotiate the last day of class, and given the
unprecedented length of the Minister’s extension, Esdras liked the other director’s idea of
proposing their own last day of class to the departmental Ministry officials.
In subsequent days after this phone conversation, teachers at Carías Andino were
informed that other school directors in Valle had been utilizing similar strategies as what
Marlon described, but they were also writing formal proposals about what specifically
they would be doing during (what they calculated as) their last days of class at their
schools – showing exactly when the students would prepare for and take their final
exams. Esdras even heard of some schools collecting signatures from students’ parents to
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complain about the extension of the school year. He was enthusiastic about all of these
strategies, but in the end what he did was calculate the days his teachers were absent, a
total of nine days, in which they had participated in nation-wide paros (while not
counting the one occasion when he marked everyone as present, even though he asked
them to go protest). Esdras then wrote a letter to the departmental Ministry officials
describing why his school will have fulfilled their 200 days of class by December 13, and
when they planned to administer final exams. He then submitted this letter to his
superiors at the Nacaome Ministry office.
On December 6 Esdras invited me to accompany him to the final meeting
between directors of all primary schools in Valle and the departmental Ministry officials
in Nacaome. The official purpose of this meeting was to discuss new procedures for the
school administrators to submit their year-end paperwork. This year the departmental
Ministry officials had contracted out to a special commission of individuals in Nacaome
to conduct the review of year-end paperwork. The departmental Ministry assigned the
director distrital (district director) of the Nacaome municipality to run the meeting for
directors from the entire department.
The director distrital had specific instructions he wanted to communicate to these
primary school directors about how and by what date they must report on: their year-end
student enrolment numbers; how many students had dropped out or changed schools;
how many students would graduate; each teacher’s pedagogical activity log books for the
entire year; the final amount of their internal budgets; individual teachers’ absences; any
construction projects they completed and how; and students’ final grades in each course.
He reminded them that it would be better to get a head start on this paperwork and be
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able to find any errors prior to submitting it, because this special commission is diligent
and would not accept excuses about inaccurate reports. They served as third-party
auditors who would report directly to the central Ministry of Education offices.
While these were all important processes which schoolteachers have been
interested in learning how to do well, in order to avoid reprimand with the heightened
amounts of scrutiny in their work, during this meeting the school directors present had a
different agenda to discuss. They demanded that the director distrital clarify their final
schedules for the year, and explain why they had to continue until December 21. They
began by reminding him when each of their individual schools would normally have
finished the school year, once having completed their 200 days of class. Most directors
concluded that after having made up the days missed during paros, this would mean
ending during the second week of December. The director distrital informed everyone
that the director departamental cannot grant individual schools different final dates, and
that furthermore, these orders to end the school year on December 21 come directly from
Minister Escoto. He further reminded them that his time was limited and that he needed
to get through his agenda on how to submit their year-end paperwork. This did not go
over well with the school administrators, especially considering that the director distrital
himself had arrived nearly 45 minutes late to a meeting that he scheduled in his own
town.
Different primary school directors raised distinct concerns they each had. Some
directors argued that it was unfair to chastise their school when on different occasions
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their teachers had chosen not to participate in a given paro,

arguing that they knew of

schools in other departments that finished earlier than December 21 precisely for this
reason. Other school directors underscored the unprecedented aspects of the Minister’s
decisions to extend the school year until December 21. Esdras stood up and said the
following:
I have a question for you, Señor Director. Does the final decision about when we
end our duties come from you and the Director Departmental, or from Minister
Escoto? I ask because several compañeros have calculated the days that we
missed because of paros that the FOMH itself called for. It’s true that we need to
make up for those missed days of class. But once we have done this, we will have
fulfilled the required 200 days of class. We will have therefore followed the law.
Where is the law that says we have to do more?

122

Other directors argued that it is ‘anti-pedagogical’ to continue prolonging the
school year when teachers have already covered the materials they had planned to cover
in the 200-day time-frame. This led to arguments about how they were simply keeping
children in the classrooms longer for political reasons (the policies of the current
Minister), and that ultimately it is the students and their parents who suffer because they
cannot help with domestic and agricultural chores during this time.
The director distrital conceded these arguments, without explicitly answering
Esdras’ question. He proposed that teachers figure out their own ways to finish their final
classes and administer final exams. He explained that according to the Minister’s
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This could be considered one way in which the reforms have in fact weakened the magisterio by creating divisions
among different schools. It is now more difficult to conjure support for nation-wide paros (for reasons described in
Chapter 6), and even schools that chose not to participate were asked to extend their school year.
122
Meeting between school directors and Valle Ministry officials, 6 December 2012.
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schedule, the final exams and year-end paperwork duties should take place during the
third and final week of the month (December 17 – 21). However, he explained if school
directors in Valle were to finish these processes earlier, and they turned in their year-end
paperwork during either December 12, 13, or 14, it would be OK with him and the
director departamental. He explained that what he was more concerned with was making
sure that the year-end paperwork was submitted by December 21 for their special
commission to begin its work. Esdras clarified that by his own calculations they could
begin to hold final exams and finish their duties by December 13. The director distrital
gave him a stern look, but did not say that this would be unacceptable.
That afternoon at Carías Andino, Esdras held an ‘emergency’ teachers’ council
meeting in the computer lab to discuss teachers’ duties during the upcoming week. There
he explained what had occurred at the directors’ meeting in Nacaome, and proposed that
teachers at Carías Andino finish their final exams and year-end paperwork by December
13. He emphasized the importance of finishing this paperwork on time, but said that if
they were willing to get through the final exams in the next week, everyone could be
done by December 13 (instead of December 21).
Surprisingly, this was not something every teacher at Carías Andino agreed with.
Many had in fact put off preparing their students for the final exams, since they were
under the impression that they had more time in the classroom. These concerns provoked
further discussion about how many students were doing poorly, and the probability that
some would not pass the exams. This too was connected with the reforms as schools that
have higher rates of academic failure or disenrollment are less likely to receive funding,
and can even face school closures. As Marlon commented:
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Look here, we have been struggling with some students all year long. I didn’t
want to pass a lot of my students, even though I know this Minister wants us to
get students to graduate on time…. The thing is, there are some who really are not
getting it…. But in the end, I know that they will fire me if my students don’t
pass. I don’t know what to do. I have decided to share this with all of you today
because I am really at a loss…. This year we have had some really bad upper-year
students, some who are in gangs and who deal drugs. I cannot just pass anyone,
and just graduate anyone. This is truly horrible behaviour. If they fire me, so be
123

it!

Esdras interjected, and addressed the entire group.

But who is at fault, Profe Marlon? The students, or the teachers? I understand
your point, but we still have to think about what our values are. We have a student
who wasn’t doing well at all, who was most likely to drop out, but who then took
the INFOP workshop on refrigeration, and I believe this course saved him….
You’re right though – if so many of our students are not passing, then it’s a loss
for the state. The state invests in educating young people, well, we all know that
this is changing, but whoever the investors may be, they want to see results.
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In the context of these comments other teachers began to ask if by finishing the
school year earlier than what Minister Escoto planned, they might be able to assign
make-up work, or administer the final exam again to those students who failed. Mercedes
was not in favour of this approach, and stood up to offer her viewpoints.
I agree with Profe Marlon, and worry about what might happen when they
evaluate us and find out that we’ve been passing bad students, who really do not
deserve to graduate. I worry that the image of our centro is going downhill, and
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Teachers’ council meeting, 6 December 2012.
Teachers’ council meeting, 6 December 2012.
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that people see us as easy and quick to give away diplomas. We can’t just give out
our degrees to anyone. Even if the Padres de Familia get mad at us, who cares?
We could get evaluated and reprimanded for not passing students, just as we
could get evaluated and reprimanded for passing students who do not deserve it.
This Sociedad de Padres de Familia will not get affected by this, but we will be!

Esdras offered the opinion that if teachers were so preoccupied with their poorly
achieving students, then they should have approached him or Mercedes earlier in the
school year. He once again emphasized that there had been some teachers who had not
been coming to class, who had not been putting in enough effort, and that since the
beginning of the school year he had been saying that they would be under more pressure
during 2012 because of these new laws.
Discussion continued about poor student behaviour and the effects of gangs and
violence in the El Garrobo community. Marlon told a story about a student who had
deliberately scratched his car after he gave the student a bad mark, and a female teacher
then told a story about a student who had written sexually offensive comments on her car
with a permanent marker. Mercedes addressed the group, offering her own opinions:
Excuse me if I offend any of you. I am sorry for what happened to your cars, but I
do see that some of you are afraid of your own students. Let’s not forget that we
are here in El Garrobo, not Tegus where there really are violent threats to
teachers. Over there people are killed every day. I don’t know who to charge for
the offense, but it is clear to me that many of you are upset. Talk to me with
objective data. We are the authority here, not the parents, not the students. We can
denounce this behaviour, but we have to be careful about how we do it. We need
to be a centro that looks to rescue this community. I will once again say that with
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education we can get out of poverty, and that we are doing the dignified labour of
125

bringing Honduras forward through this political crisis.

Teachers at Carías Andino decided to hold exams during the second week of
December, and allow those students who completed the year successfully to return home.
They allowed students who failed the final exam to re-write it during the third week of
December, and chose to count this exam instead. They were unable however to finish all
of their year-end paperwork by December 14, and instead, came into the centro during
the third week of December to work on it together. During this time the teacher who
wanted the computer literacy classes proposed completing everyone’s paperwork on a
new computer program, if Esdras assigned her the computer literacy class for the 2013
school year. He refused to give it to her, and she then revoked her offer. They finished all
the year-end paperwork by hand on December 19 (leaving before Minister Escoto said
they could finish, but working longer than the departmental Ministry’s deadline for the
year-end paperwork).
Esdras announced on everyone’s last day that he had been approached by the
COMDE, and asked to participate in their organization. He refused, and told his
colleagues why he chose to not become a member.
They wanted me to help them supervise other teachers, and said that they admire
what I have done here at Carías Andino. I thanked them for the offer, but refused.
My obligations are to this centro and to all of you. Besides, everyone knows that
the COMDE serve as orejas (ears) for the oligarchy and for the golpistas!
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Teachers’ council meeting, 6 December 2012.
Meeting among teachers, 19 December 2012.
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7.6 Conclusion
In contemporary Honduras resisting post-coup policies of governance and
imagining the implications of re-foundation go hand-in-hand. From the formal acts of
resistance with the FNRP, to the mundane daily tasks of finding ways to implement the
reforms while protesting them, ethnographic analysis of the everyday work of
schoolteachers illuminates how these processes also occur within the state itself when we
consider the question of who is responsible for implementing policies of governance.
Mercedes, Esdras, Marlon, and the other teachers mentioned here are in a unique
mediating position between the Honduran population that has to ‘awaken’ and the state
that has to undergo ‘re-foundation.’
By focusing on the ways in which teachers shared with each other their own
experiences with the Resistencia and with the reforms, this chapter has shown the various
ways in which teachers were relaying their experiences among themselves and reflecting
on their own positionalities, to form opinions about what the education system and state
re-foundation project should be like. They imagine a state in which education and
opportunity for youth is a high priority, and in which politicians are held accountable for
their promises to the population.
From Esdras’ experiences struggling to travel to Nicaragua, while recognizing
that his position as an educated professional made him better situated to do so than many
Hondurans; to Mercedes’ reflections on how teachers’ work is different and thus cannot
be equated to NGO work when it comes to fund raising strategies; to Marlon’s suggestion
that teachers could count the days they missed because of the paros and his concern over
the school passing unprepared students – these formal acts of resistance and daily
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undertakings merged into larger forms of nation-wide popular resistance, just as they also
forged political consciousness among the magisterio as a gremio. As the political
consciousness about the significance of the reforms within the magisterio articulated with
the growing national political consciousness that the Resistencia and LIBRE Party have
been forging in Honduran society broadly, we can see the vital role that teachers have
been playing in the movement.
As educated professionals and local intellectuals who deliver a state service that
connects with different aspirations of the Honduran population, schoolteachers are
intimately aware of popular desires for political change in the post-coup context. They
are the everyday leaders of the Resistencia and LIBRE Party. Through their social roles
as thinkers and community organizers, they use their mobility and connectedness with
national and international communities to cultivate the revolutionary spirit present among
those who continue to resist post-coup policies, and envision a fundamentally different
path for the country.
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Conclusions
In 2012 Honduran schoolteachers were defending the Estatuto del Docente for all

the rights and benefits it grants them; protesting against the new Ley de INPREMA due to
the financial losses to their livelihoods that it implies; fearing the repercussions of the
COMDE and the CED that the Ley de Participación Comunitaria creates; and becoming
entangled in the complex web of the impractical expectations that the Ley Fundamental
de Educación stipulates. They navigated through the political terrain of post-coup
neoliberal state projects by reflecting on their own lived experiences with the profession
of schoolteacher and with the Honduran state in general. This process was facilitated in
large part through sharing with each other their own experiences, and asking how other
teachers had dealt with similar problems (e.g., when Aníbal called Esdras to ask about
how to properly fund a CEB; when Marlon told teachers at Carías Andino how his other
school was attempting to negotiate the final day of classes to end the school year), which
in turn forged group awareness of the implications of these processes and strengthened
their strategies to deal with this undesirable situation.
Teachers’ own readings of the post-coup political landscape during the Lobo
government informed the ways they approached implementing these new laws in
practice, within and through the social relations they encountered on the ground in their
everyday work in the name of the state, even when the government in power had reduced
its own commitment to funding that project. Yet for as much as 2012 represented un
atraso (a set-back) for progressive social policies in Honduras, it was also representative
of the achievements made by the Resistencia since its initial formation in June 2009.
Despite the controversy around institutionalizing the resistance movement into a formal
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political party, in 2012 most LIBRE-supporting teachers believed the party really could
take control of the government.
In this concluding chapter I provide the reader with an update to the Honduran
political context since my fieldwork ended and LIBRE lost the elections, connecting
insights that schoolteachers themselves had about LIBRE and electoral politics in general
with the larger arguments and theoretical premises of this thesis. I then describe how the
post-election political context has continued to change the working conditions of
Honduran schoolteachers, and provide another example of how they continue to “fight
against these policies from within.” I conclude by showing the significance of this
research for scholarly understandings of Honduran political culture and for the
anthropological study of the Latin American state.

8.1 LIBRE’s Electoral Loss
Despite the broad popular support for Xiomara Castro de Zelaya and for the party
in general, LIBRE did not win the presidential elections. The reasons supporters mention
for this electoral loss are wide-ranging – from electoral fraud, to deeper constraints to the
possibilities for Hondurans to elect a socialist party to power in the contemporary
historical context. During the night of 24 November 2013, National Party presidential
candidate Juan Orlando Hernández prematurely declared himself the winner of the
elections – before the Supreme Electoral Tribune had correctly counted every vote. When
Orlando Hernández did this he was in fact in the lead according to the votes the Supreme
Electoral Tribune had received in their Tegucigalpa offices.
The main problem with this scenario was that at the moment Orlando Hernández
declared himself the winner, the Supreme Electoral Tribune still had not received votes
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from several additional voting centres throughout the country. When LIBRE Party (and
even some Liberal Party) officials at those locations counted their own voting records,
LIBRE was in the lead (causing Xiomara to subsequently declare herself the winner on
national television). In the end the numbers from the different regional voting centres did
not add up to what the Supreme Electoral Tribune in Tegucigalpa claimed were the final
number of votes for each candidate. LIBRE subsequently requested a re-count and the
Supreme Electoral Tribune refused.
Various independent international observers commented that these were not ‘fair
and free elections’ under such circumstances. There were also a series of questionable
practices such as National Party and Liberal Party officials offering to bring voters in
from the rural communities, during which time they bought them lunch and then were
reported to have paid them large sums of cash in exchange for their votes (as several
teachers told me was occurring during the primary elections in November 2012). Such
bribing techniques have been common strategies in Honduras since long before the 2013
presidential and congressional elections. Indeed, many teachers criticized this practice
saying that even if LIBRE politicians were rich enough to do this, they wouldn’t want
their party to conduct itself in that manner. Beyond bribing voters, Hondurans also
experienced newer forms of cheating during the November 2013 presidential and
congressional elections. For instance, teachers have told me that several voters claimed
that when they presented their cédulas de identidad (national identification cards) at their
corresponding regional voting centres, the Supreme Electoral Tribune officials at these
sites claimed that these Honduran citizens were not eligible to vote, because according to
official state records they were already deceased.
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The fact that LIBRE lost the 2013 elections does not mean that its members will
stop thinking through how policies of governance can benefit the majority of Hondurans.
LIBRE is now the primary opposition party in Honduras, which means that its diputados
have a significant ability to influence future legislation by voting in the national congress.
Moreover, the idea of serious constitutional reform by means of a national constituent
assembly is not likely to go away any time soon. However, as I have argued in this thesis,
it was not primarily through electoral politics that Honduran schoolteachers were
pursuing change (although they did work toward a change of government). Rather, it was
through everyday challenges to neoliberal state projects under the Lobo government that
teachers saw the idea of the state as the answer to addressing the country’s problems with
social inequalities. The feeling of excitement and hope when imagining all of what this
future will entail – the revolutionary spirit experienced in contemporary Honduras – is
still being forged through schoolteachers’ everyday practices, despite LIBRE’s electoral
loss. This thesis provides an example of how this forging of political consciousness was
already happening in 2012 among a group of public intellectuals who are also front-line
state agents.

8.2 Concerns with LIBRE and Electoral Politics in General
Teachers identified different kinds of obstacles to electing LIBRE to power in
2013. Most prevelant was the idea that the Honduran population is used to politicians
giving away material things (such as Lorena stoves) in exchange for political support. In
their profound critique of what can be thought of as Honduran approaches to clientelist
politics, teachers argued that LIBRE politicians could not afford to, and did not want to,
engage in this type of practice. Teachers themselves were struggling with the idea that
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they too needed to engage in a sort of clientelist politics with these regional political
authorities, although they disagreed with the practice (as their reoccurring joke, ‘les
construyo el rio!’ illustrates). These constraints notwithstanding, the majority of the
teachers with whom I worked in 2012 believed that Xiomara had the popular support to
be elected president. They did not doubt that LIBRE could gain the majority of votes.
Rather, they worried that LIBRE would suffer an electoral loss at the hands of the same
golpistas who were already in power.
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Given that Juan Orlando Hernández was the President of the National Congress
during the Lobo government, teachers argued, it would be easy for the National Party to
commit electoral fraud because they would surely demand that the Supreme Electoral
Tribune recount the votes once Xiomara had won. Despite its obligation to be a nonpartisan state institution, these teachers considered the tribune to be an entity already
under the control of the government in power. Since the election of Pepe Lobo members
of the FNRP have argued that the Supreme Electoral Tribune is controlled by golpistas
loyal to this group of National Party authorities.
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All of these variables provided a unique situation in 2012 as schoolteachers
anticipated the crucial November 2013 presidential and congressional elections at the
same time they navigated through unprecedented reforms to the education sector. A
recurring question in everyone’s mind was whether or not these new laws would persist
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There are in fact divisions within what some Hondurans, and scholars of Honduran politics, have often referred to
quite generally as ‘the golpistas’ – not only among common folk who supported the coup and who support post-coup
policies, as I attempted to show in my MA thesis (Levy 2010), but among those National Party members who have
been in control of the state since January 2010. The November 2012 firing of Honduran Supreme Court magistrates is
an expression of these conflicts among the golpistas themselves. The Lobo government replaced these magistrates with
others who were more aligned with their ideas for post-coup policies.
128
Indeed, the replacement of the Supreme Court magistrates was another example of how this could happen because
any questions about the Supreme Electoral Tribune’s recount would subsequently go to the Supreme Court, which by
2013 was in the hands of golpistas from the Lobo camp.
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during the incoming regime, or what other policies that government might pursue (as
even Liberal Party and coup-supporting Director Aníbal expressed). In this sense, my
research provides an example of what it means to study how people understand the range
of political possibilities, when the probability of radical change appears imminent.
Schoolteachers developed opinions about what kind of politician Honduras needs
with re-foundation. They also used their experiential knowledge about the difference
between the ‘theory’ and the ‘practice’ of governing policies in Honduras as a method for
understanding some of the difficulties that LIBRE was facing in 2012 (and would
subsequently face if elected). In addition to the pressure to promise construction projects
and present an image of the LIBRE Party as one capable of ruling the country, some
teachers who were critical of the idea that the Resistencia form a political party in the
first place reflected on how Honduran political authorities conduct themselves more
generally through expression of their disagreement with LIBRE. For instance, some
commented that new politicians who had suddenly appeared as LIBRE candidates were
never Resistencia de corazón (full-hearted Resistencia members), and were thus diluting
the progressive agenda that the FNRP had created.
Another common critique of LIBRE among some teachers was that its leaders
were too optimistic and presented a false sense of hope. These teachers believed that such
a political party could not be elected in Honduras, at least not at this time. This was
juxtaposed against those teachers who did believe that LIBRE could win, arguing that if
it was possible for the FMLN to win in El Salvador and the FSLN to win in Nicaragua,
then surely the FNRP could win in Honduras. But as one teacher at the Nacaome campus
of the UPNFM put it:
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I am LIBRE and will vote for Xiomara, but… [he looks to see if anyone else is
nearby] my colleagues would get really upset with me if I said the following:
Between you and me… [he continues to look around], I don’t think we have a
shot. In Honduras, the elections are always so entangled with business interests of
the oligarchy. Just think about which companies fund the campaign ads. There are
no empresarios in LIBRE, and while we like this aspect of the party, and we all
want change, it’s not practical in Honduras, at least not right now. This is not El
Salvador, and it is certainly not Nicaragua!
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Similar concerns about LIBRE reflect the idea that its politicians had been riding
a wave of reactions against the coup and desires for re-foundation without actually
coming to terms with the sacrifices and hard work that such a project implies. These
arguments were often connected with reflections on Honduran history and the practices
of ruling elites historically in a country that lacked a united front of popular resistance.
Some teachers argued that since the Resistencia is so young (that is, the
awakening has yet to mature) it was too soon to attempt to take power. Most of the
teachers with whom I worked did however see LIBRE as a viable solution to reversing
the reforms; most thought they really could win the elections; and most voted for LIBRE
in the 2013 elections. At the same time many developed the critique that LIBRE presents
a distraction to the Resistencia in its more important task of grassroots political actions.
Perhaps not coincidentally this has been the primary contribution of schoolteachers to the
Resistencia movement, as agents of social and political change.
Through their capacities to organize local populations around common goals, and
their abilities to communicate the relevance of good policies of governance to a wide
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Interview, 22 September 2012.
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range of people at Resistencia events and in public venues (as Mercedes does among
different kinds of community members since her divorce, and as Esdras has done on local
television), schoolteachers play a vital role as local intellectuals and organizers of the
FNRP. Moreover, in 2012 Honduran teachers were cleverly finding ways to take political
action in often quite mundane contexts as they selectively implemented the reforms.
Through primarily quotidian acts of resistance, teachers were creatively forging
their visions of what the education system ought to be (through promoting projects like
the INFOP refrigeration courses and adult computer literacy clubs). This was also seen in
the ways they developed visions of what the state could be like. For instance, they
prevented politicians from entering the school premises to send a message to these local
golpista politicians and to the communities with whom they work that if political
authorities were not willing to help fund their school’s basic needs, then they were not
welcome on the school’s premises (despite their own needs to publicly show that they
support education). Teachers did this while working within the confines of the undesired
situation of the reforms and the oppressive post-coup neoliberal political context.
Although neoliberal policies in Honduras began to take hold during the Rafael
Callejas administration (1990-1994), given the aims of these unprecedented reforms to
the education sector (and the fact that they override policy achievements made over the
last half century), I consider them to be an illustrative example of how neoliberal policies
in post-coup Honduras are now more resilient than they were under the governments of
Ricardo Maduro (2002-2005) and Carlos Flores Facussé (1998-2001). The case of the
education sector is one example of how this is happening. While these policies began
with the regime of Pepe Lobo, the government of Juan Orlando Hernández is continuing
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this post-coup tradition of neoliberal state projects that continue to cause the erasure of
social policy achievements made by different gremios since before the coup.

8.3 Continuing Changes to Teachers’ Working Conditions
Since its inauguration in January 2014, the Orlando Hernández government has
maintained Marlon Escoto as Minister of Education (a somewhat uncommon occurance).
Thus far the regime has been successful in another (more devastating) attack against
teachers’ livelihoods by altering their work schedules and decreasing the total number of
hours that teachers are paid to work. Since at least the passing of the Estatuto del
Docente, Honduran schoolteachers working in primary education could hold two
different shifts of five hours (the amount of time students in primary education attend
classes): either the ‘morning shift’ from 7 am to 12 pm, or the ‘afternoon shift’ from 12 to
5 pm. In contrast, under Juan Orlando Hernández, primary education class schedules will
run from 8 am to 3 pm, with an hour dedicated for lunch (a total of six hours of paid work
for instruction in class). Thus whereas during my fieldwork – and throughout the
professional lives of the teachers with whom I work – it was common for teachers to hold
two different jobs to meet their basic subsistence needs, this is no longer possible under
Orlando Hernández.
From what teachers have told me since my fieldwork ended (via text messages
and phone calls), the Juan Orlando Hernández government has argued that these actions
were necessary in order to give primary education students more hours of class, and
because it prevents teachers with two positions from either leaving their first jobs early,
or arriving tardy to their second jobs. Primary education schoolteachers themselves are
aware of the potential benefits of this new system (including allowing other teachers
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access to vacant positions), but insist that they have long since been proponents of longer
class days for pedagogical reasons, and that parents often wanted their younger children
to either come home for lunch (and stay home for the rest of the day), or to leave for
school after having eaten lunch. Moreover, they tell me that that the shorter time allowed
in class has come about during previous periods of struggle not because teachers have
been work-shy – in fact, as educators and as workers, they have wanted more paid hours
in the classroom – but because no government has been willing to pay teachers an entire
eight-hour shift. Having access to two different five-hour shifts has thus allowed those
teachers who needed a second job to work up to 50 hours per week. Only having access
to 35 hours per week represents a major reduction in income for those teachers who now
have to give up their second job.
As I hope to have successfully illustrated in this thesis, Honduran schoolteachers
are quite adept at finding ways to challenge policies they feel are a step in the wrong
direction for their country’s education system. They do this not only as employees who
are protesting their working conditions, but as agents of the state, who criticize specific
oppressive policies and forms of governance with which they disagree, while forging
visions for what the state could be like – figuring out together what larger political
projects Hondurans should pursue.
While Honduran schoolteachers did not fully obtain those goals in 2012, I believe
that as a gremio they were able to reflect upon the effectiveness of their own strategies. In
the process they devised creative ways to improve their situations, even when they called
into question the sincerity and effectiveness of their organizations’ leaders in the FOMH.
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These practices continue beyond the 2012 school year. One example of how this has
played out since my fieldwork ended will suffice.
Esdras was once again approached by the COMDE after I returned to Canada. To
my surprise, this time he did not reject their proposal to join (as he had previously done
by claiming that he would never serve a group of orejas for the golpistas). When Esdras
called me over the phone he described his enthusiasm for what he believed was an
effective strategy for improving the situation of teachers at his school. Given what I knew
about the COMDE, and the Ley de Participación Comunitaria, I was initially confused
by this news. When I asked Esdras if he had changed his mind or opinion about what the
COMDE do, he responded:
Ha! Not at all…. At first I didn’t want to join, but then later I did… not because I
agree with the COMDE itself – we all know that they are against the magisterio –
but because this is a good strategy for us at our centro, to stay on top of those who
are attempting to supervise and denounce us. One has to know who they are, and
what they are planning. I thus decided to join the COMDE to be able to fight
130

against these policies from within.

The 2012 school year represented a period in which schoolteachers were pushing
the limits of these reforms and gaining experience in figuring out effective strategies to
challenge these policies from within the state. As this example illustrates, teachers are
keenly aware that some of their actions go directly against the intentions of these policies.
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Phone conversation with Esdras, 26 January 2013.
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8.4 Significance of These Data
The fact that Honduran schoolteachers are responsible for implementing policies
with which they themselves disagree prompted me to ask how they understood their own
work and approached it in the context of these new laws. While they challenged the state
on its policies of governance, they also saw the Honduran state itself as an important part
of the solution to a series of problems they identify with the country’s vast social
inequities. In fact, Honduran schoolteachers are enthusiastic supporters of respect for
state institutions and a robust legal system that establishes the same standards for all
citizens, just as they are advocates for more social investment in state services in general,
which they believe can help to alleviate the shackles of poverty.
Honduran teachers’ successful careers exemplify how the country’s public
education system can afford humble people the ability to become salaried professionals. I
found that they were reflecting upon their own experiences when assessing the
significance of the withdrawl of government support for basic state services – hence the
important anthropological question of who is responsible for implementing governing
policies on the ground. Asking the anthropological question of what kind of person has
become a front-line state agent has been a particularly productive line of enquiry in
studying the state from an ethnographic perspective (e.g., Clark 2012a, 2012b; Heyman
1999; Martínez Novo 2006; Smart 2002), although studies of this kind are still quite
limited.
Honduran schoolteachers’ persistent confidence in the state despite its post-coup
policies of governance resonate with what historical sociologist Philip Abrams identified
as the differences between a “state-system” or a “palpable nexus of practice and
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institutional structure centered in government and more or less extensive, unified and
dominant in any given society” and a “state-idea, projected, purveyed and variously
believed in in different societies at different times” (1988: 82). Here we see that
Honduran schoolteachers’ understandings of their own positions were connected with
their vested interest and belief in the idea of the state, as they developed a series of
visions for how to make this particular state system better.
Once we demystify ‘the state’ and treat it as a multi-faceted, contradictory entity
made up of myriad goals and state actors, then we can aim to study its effects through
particular ethnographic sites (see Hansen and Stepputat eds. 2001 on what these sites can
include, and compare with Mitchell 1991 on the illusive power of state effects and how
these should be our focus in studying the state). For Honduran schoolteachers, in 2012,
the state was seen as a vehicle (or means) through which on the one hand they
experienced policies that created a series of undesirable situations, and on the other,
foresaw potential solutions to these problems.
The potential solutions teachers envisioned during the 2012 school year were
developed in part through reflection on their own lived experiences and in part through
observation of what policies of governance were occurring in neighbouring ‘sister
republics.’ They looked to Nicaragua and El Salvador as examples of what is politically
possible, while recognizing the inherent differences in history and political culture.
My research participants saw winning control of the state through LIBRE as a
potential method for reversing the reforms (although not guaranteed, as Mercedes and
others alluded). They also sought solutions to their undesirable situation through existing
state resources, even under the Lobo government (such as when they convinced students’
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parents that by law their children needed to be in school, thus using the state’s legal
system as an important resource to fulfill their mandates and prevent reprimand under the
pressure to increase enrolment numbers). The myriad ways in which Honduran
schoolteachers engaged the state during 2012 contributes to our knowledge of Honduran
political culture and what it means to study the state anthropologically in neoliberal
contexts. It is toward these two arenas that I will now direct our attention.
In terms of Honduran political culture, of significance are the ways in which
teachers were consistently able to fill every possible – often very confined – political
space with daily acts of resistance to voice their subtle, or very explicit, political
manifestations. The most illuminating ethnographic example of this practice occurred
when teachers at CEB Carías Andino refused to allow local political authorities to enter
the premises of their school, and asked local police to support them in preventing anyone
politiqueando (seeking support for electoral politics) from coming into this particular
property of the Honduran state. In the process of sending this very politicized message to
these local political authorities that because of their lack of support they were not
welcome at CEB Carías Andino, these teachers consciously deviated from the logic of the
reforms (acknowledging full well that they depended upon these same authorities for
continual access to funding). As teachers reflected on how clientelist politics were not
beneficial for the Honduran population – arguing that they did not want LIBRE to engage
in these practices – they likewise chose not to fund their own school through similar
practices when politicians chose to offer money only when it was convenient for their
own purposes. It is ironic that they sent this message by way of the local police.
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Another example of how teachers were filling limited space with political action
was by announcing the betrayal of the Valle Diputado Jose Alfredo Saavedra to each
other at the very moment they stood up in public venues to shake his hand, kiss him on
the cheek, and thank him publicly. These teachers at CEB José Cecilio del Valle were
aware of the fact that it was in their best interest to remain on good terms with local
political authorities, even while they criticized their practices openly among themselves.
A third example of this type of political activism in confined spaces was seen at
the beginning of the school year when teachers at Carías Andino held a meeting with the
Sociedad de Padres de Familia to talk about what they would and would not be able to
achieve in light of these reforms. On the one hand, as I showed in Chapter 4, these
teachers held the meeting in an attempt to ward off parental criticism of their work and to
explain the economic reality in which they were working (thereby communicating to the
parents the difference between the ‘theory’ of governing policies as they are written on
paper and the ‘practice’ of these new laws once they are implemented on the ground). On
the other hand, however, telling the parents (some of whom could be with the COMDE or
CED) that the Lobo government has lied to them, and warning them that they should be
aware of what is practical and what is not in their school because of this reality of failed
promises, is an explicit critique of governing authorities and state practices in Honduras.
These daily acts of resistance illuminate the ways in which Hondurans’ culture of
popular resistance is evolving since June 2009 – not only at formal Resistencia events,
but through everyday practices. Such mundane contexts were most of the ways through
which schoolteachers were reading the political landscape in 2012 and coming to
understand the significance of these reforms.
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It was striking to see how few teachers were reading the actual laws; it would be
more accurate to say that they were invoking these new laws in discussions with their
colleagues. During my fieldwork I became a part of this conversation precisely because I
had been reading the actual legislation and my research participants were aware of this.
Teachers would often comment to their colleagues that I was surely familiar with the
laws because I had read through the actual text. This resonates with what Tara Schwegler
describes in a similar context of ethnographic research among state agents: “my
informants were not simply imparting information to me. Instead, they were looking over
my shoulder trying to read the cryptic patterns in the data that I had collected – in this
endeavor, then, the distinction between expert and student dissolved and we were
engaged in a joint inquiry” (2012: 40-41).
When I would ask teachers about particular articles or passages, they always had a
response, even though most had not themselves read the actual law. A clear example of
this was seen through teachers’ recurring argument that the new INPREMA law was
‘unconstitutional’ –something several teachers repeated to me throughout the school year.
When I would ask individual teachers to explain to me which articles of the new law
violated which articles of the current constitution, they would always respond with an
argument about how it is illegal to take away the rights of a gremio, or how the Lobo
government was elected during a coup-installed de facto government. These are
arguments that magisterio dirigentes developed and repeated during assemblies. Teachers
were thus deciphering and building on other teachers’ interpretations of the laws. The
legislation had a large presence in their conversations, understandings, and work lives,
despite the fact that they weren’t familiar with the ‘letter of the law.’

300

These recognitions are in no way intended to criticize my research participants for
not having read through the laws (indeed, how many of us are familiar with the
legislation or regulations governing our own work lives?). Rather, they are in the spirit of
understanding the pressures these teachers were facing in their everyday work routines,
and studying what they perceived to be relevant for them in their abilities to carry out
their duties under these new constraints. Teachers knew from their previous experiences
that it was not necessary to read through the laws themselves in order to understand what
the Lobo government was demanding of them. They thus sought to learn about the
reforms via word of mouth. It was understood that trusting the analyses of their
colleagues and building upon such conceptualizations of the new laws was the best way
to make their own decisions in their everyday work. Perhaps what is most striking is the
strong presence of these legislative changes in teachers’ lives despite their lack of
detailed knowledge of the laws – they were nonetheless using the laws, citing the laws,
and protesting against the laws throughout the 2012 school year.
The UNAH and UPNFM courses provide an interesting exception to this
phenomenon in the sense that it was a space in which teachers were explicitly encouraged
to read through the laws (although even then it was profoundly clear to me that Esdras
and Mercedes were integrating their own experiences as school administrators into their
class discussions among fellow teachers). While perhaps designed to create successful
entrepreneurial subjects whose self-regulation would result in the complete
implementation of these new policies, the UNAH and UPNFM university classes also
provided a space for discussion and criticism of the reforms. In this recurring social
encounter, teachers who were already involved in school administration (or those who
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aspired to become school directors) would meet with their peers and discuss together the
implications of these new laws. There is thus never a single meaning of these courses, as
the intention we might impute to them did not exhaust the actual experience teachers had
in such courses. Here we see the production of this knowledge among front-line state
agents who were coming to understand the implications of a new set of constraints and
resources. Their own understandings of the ways things work informed their everyday
practices as they went about implementing these new laws.
The dynamics inherent in the post-coup shifting strategies of governance in
Honduras can afford rich insights into Honduran political culture and the ways in which
state institutions can intervene and influence the daily lives of Hondurans. Currently in
Honduras there are other groups of state employees who are navigating through similar
neoliberal policies that aim to privatize formerly state-funded enterprises (such as health
workers at ‘public’ hospitals). There are also other groups of public intellectuals (such as
journalists) who play the important roles of interpreting polices of governance and
communicating state practices to a variety of populations, thereby serving as another
important group of everyday leaders of the Resistencia, responsible for thinking about
their own positions in society and articulating the lived experiences of a particular class
(see Gramsci 1971).
As the Resistencia and LIBRE Party continue to challenge certain policies of
governance while recognizing the potential usefulness of the state system, these areas
merit sustained ethnographic research in the post-coup political context. I recognize that
projects of this sort can have methodological difficulties, as people with any kind of
authority have “little to gain and more to lose from telling an outsider what really goes
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on; it is safer to stick to the ‘party line’ and describe practice as completely in accord
with official policies and regulations” (Smart 2002: 337; c.f., Nader 1969).
Another way to study how the state is relevant and present in the lives of
Hondurans is through observance of how individuals from various backgrounds
experience their encounters with the state by engaging public records offices of different
kinds (such as at the Registro Nacional de las Personas). It is in places such as these that
citizens learn how to “know and act accordingly, that when dealing with the state
bureaucracies they have to patiently comply with the seemingly arbitrary, ambiguous, and
always changing state requirements” (Ayuero 2012: 9). While accompanying teachers to
various kinds of bureaucratic offices it became clear to me that they (and other people) in
Honduras have an elaborate network of contacts and adept strategies when engaging
these basic services – waiting in lines and coming into contact with other state officials in
very mundane contexts. These sorts of research projects should aim to study the
knowledge Hondurans have about these state institutions to understand the everyday
effects of the Honduran state and its post-coup policies of neoliberal governance.
State practices in Honduras can change quite significantly with incoming
governments. It is apparent nonetheless that since the June 2009 coup, the governments
of Roberto Micheletti Bain (June – Dec. 2009) and Pepe Lobo (Jan. 2010 – Dec. 2013)
have maintained Honduras on the same trajectory of neoliberal state projects and
unprecedented levels of withdrawal of funding for basic public services. As
schoolteachers read the political landscape and began to selectively implement the
reforms on the ground they necessarily had to engage with aspects of these neoliberal
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policies, some of which they even found useful for meeting the basic needs of schooling
in the context of poverty.
One could read these stories as evidence that Honduran teachers have become
entrepreneurial self-regulating neoliberal subjects, loyally abiding by the intentions of the
reforms. Indeed, teachers solicited funding locally. However, these stories also illuminate
a perfect example of how people are resisting neoliberalism, how front-line state agents
are acting in ways that completely contradict the logic of neoliberalism by promoting the
idea of the state with a general confidence that if the state’s system were changed – or as
Resistencia members say, ‘re-founded’ – this would be the answer to solving Honduras’
problems with the education system. For as much as neoliberal policies are creating new
forms of authority, these insights from the Honduran education case confirm that when it
comes to delivering basic public services to a population, the authority of the state still
matters a great deal to those who engage in this kind of work (as anthropologist Aradhana
Sharma [2006: 70] so eloquently illustrates in a different neoliberal context).
This insight goes directly against the rather easy assumption that these teachers
were doing what the neoliberal policy designers were asking them to do through a
“neoliberal governmentality” (see Ferguson and Gupta 2002; and compare with Kipnis
2008). While the laws were written in a seemingly non-political style of
efficiency, teachers have seen through the “anti-politics machine” (Ferguson 1990) and
have politicized every possible aspect of these reforms – denouncing them as a neoliberal
manoeuvre made by an illegal post-coup regime. The fact that front-line state agents
work through these processes and resist neoliberal policies while selectively
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implementing them, suggests that other contexts of implementation of neoliberal policies
merit re-thinking.
All this points to the ways in which the state is considered a significant part of the
solution – the state idea is promoted even when the state system has failed to provide. If
we distinguish between the state idea and the state system, as Abrams would encourage
us to do (1988), we see that in the case of Honduras the state idea is still considered
vitally important and the state system is continually thought of as something that can be
shaped, moulded, and ‘re-founded.’ This is especially interesting when we consider the
irony that in Honduras the state has consistently proven to a range of populations that it is
not up to the given task at hand. Yet it remains vitally important. There are other
examples this phenomenon that an astute anthropology of the Latin American state has
been able to capture (see, for instance, Clark 2012a, 2012b; Krupa 2010; Nugent 2001,
1999).
Even though different Honduran governments and their distinct programs and
policies of governance have not always lived up to the expectations of the majority of the
Honduran population, the state remains enormously important in their lives and as they
imagine the range of political possibilities. Honduran schoolteachers are seeing the state
as a means through which they can participate in this larger project of resistance to
neoliberal policies in the region and still promote their own nationally-oriented projects.
All this points toward the larger historically- and ethnographically-informed research
question of why the state continues to be so important in Latin America.
From the perspective of FNRP and LIBRE supporters, and from the standpoint of
schoolteachers, the current struggle of the Honduran population is to bring their state to
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rejoin the broader project in the region to “interrupt” neoliberalism (see Goodale and
Postero 2013, eds. whose edited volume illuminates the most recent forms of significant
resistance to neoliberalism in the region). These insights demonstrate that even in
neoliberal contexts the state still remains vitally important in Latin America – either as a
mechanism to realize neoliberal projects or as a way for different populations to
successfully devise alternatives.
It can be argued that in Honduras an interruption of neoliberalism was
experienced (however briefly) during the recent government of ousted President Mel
Zelaya through an engagement with ALBA, Petrocaribe, and a rejection of the erosion of
workers’ rights in the name of transnational capital. Through their international
connectedness and roles as local intellectuals, schoolteachers see inspiration in what is
occurring in other Latin American countries and translate some of these broader political
processes into everyday Honduran contexts. Approaching these new laws from the
perspective of schoolteachers affords us the knowledge of how they have been working
against neoliberalism and struggling to expand state services that local populations seek
out. Honduran schoolteachers are fighting to make these types of state institutions more
resilient in the post-coup context, just as they are striving to make governing policies
benefit all Hondurans – not just the empresarios, the golpistas, or the oligarquía.
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Appendix B: Research Ethics Approval Form
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Appendix C: List of Acronyms
CEB
“Centro de Educación Básica” (Basic Education Centre). These are primary
schools that also offer ciclo común – the first three years of secondary schooling
(grades 6,7, and 8). They are the types of schools where I conducted research, and
whose significance I describe in Chapter 5. Teachers also refer to CEBs as simply
‘centros básicos.’
CED
“Consejo Escolares de Desarrollo” (School Development Council). These are
groups of COMDE supporters who – thanks to the Ley de Participación
Comunitaria – have the legal right to audit the work of schoolteachers. In Chapter
5 I write about Director Aníbal was approached by the CED.
COLPEDAGOGOSH
“Colegio de Pedagogos de Honduras” (College of Pedagogues of Honduras).
This is a colegio magisterial designed specifically for teachers who hold
university degrees in pedagogía or school administration.
COLPROSUMAH
“Colegio Profesional Superación Magisterial Hondureño” (Professional College
of Honduran Teacher Improvement). This is the first and largest colegio
magisterial in Honduras, and is currently designed specifically for teachers who
work in primary education.
COMDE
“Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo Educativo” (Municipal Council of Education
Development) is an organization resulting from the Ley de Participación
Comunitaria designed to supervise, audit, and denounce the behaviour of
schoolteachers. See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of what this entails and
how teachers understand the significance of the COMDE.
COPEMH
“Colegio de Profesores de Educación Media de Honduras” (College of
Secondary Education Teachers of Honduras). This is the second largest colegio
magisterial specifically designed for secondary education teachers, who hold
undergraduate degrees in the subject they teach.
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COPRUMH
“Colegio Profesional Unión Magisterial de Honduras” (Professional College of
Teacher Union of Honduras). This is a small colegio magisterial for both primary
and secondary education teachers.
FMLN
“Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional” (Farabundo Martí Front
for National Liberation). This armed revolutionary movement attempted to
overthrow the US-backed Salvadoran government of José Napoleón Duarte
during the 1980s. It subsequently formed a political party and was in power in El
Salvador at the time of this research.
FNRP
“Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular” ‘La Resistencia’” (National Front of
Popular Resistance). This is a peaceful (non-armed) nation-wide anti-coup social
and political movement that brought together previously-existing movements and
organizations from different popular sectors to oppose the 28 June 2009 military
coup. It has since broadened its agenda, calling for the ‘re-foundation’ of
Honduran state and society through constitutional reform. The FNRP is the
founder and ally of the LIBRE Party.
FOMH
“Federación de Organizaciones Magisteriales de Honduras” (Federation of
Teachers’ Organizations of Honduras). This is a committee composed of the
presidents of all six colegios magisteriales. Together they serve as the national
leaders of the magisterio. The FOMH negotiates teachers’ working conditions
with the Ministry of Education and the given government in power; they call for
paros (work stoppages) and strikes.
FSLN
“Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional ‘Sandinistas’” (Sandinista National
Liberation Front). This armed revolutionary movement successfully overthrew the
US-supported Somoza oligarchy in Nicaragua in 1979. It subsequently formed a
political party and was in power in Nicaragua at the time of this research.
INFOP
“Instituto Nacional de Formación Professional” (National Institute of
Professional Formation) is a state-managed trade school. In Chapter 5 I show how
Director Esdras convinced INFOP to offer free training to CEB Carías Andino
students and graduates to earn certificates as refrigeration technicians.
INPREMA
“Instituto Nacional de Previsión del Magisterio” (Teachers’ National Pension
Institute). This is a state-run financial institution that manages the benefits which
all schoolteachers have access to, such as, loans, insurance plans, benefits/pension
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plans. These benefits have now been significantly reduced by the new ‘General
Law of INPREMA.’
JICA
“Japan Cooperation Agency” is a Japanese development agency in Honduras that
provided volunteer mathematics teachers to the CEBs where I conducted research.
LIBRE
“Partido de Libertad y Refundación”(Freedom and Re-foundation Party). This is
the official political party that emerged from the Frente Nacional de Resistencia
Popular social and political movement in late 2011. Their 2013 presidential
candidate was Xiomara Castro de Zelaya, the wife of ousted president José
Manual Zelaya Rosales. The party is considered by some members and
adversaries alike to be of the Honduran Left.
PRICMAH
“Primer Colegio Profesional Hondureño de Maestros” (First Professional College
of Teachers). According to COLPROSUMAH members, this colegio magisterial
was formed by teachers who opposed COLPROSUMAH’s leadership and who
were aligned with the National Party during the military government of General
Oswaldo López Arellano. It is called the ‘first’ college, even though
COLPROSUMAH already existed. Most teachers with whom I worked in 2012
consider PRICPMAH to be the most corrupt of all the six colegios magisteriales.
UNAH
“Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras” (National Autonomous
University of Honduras) is the largest public university in Honduras, and the postsecondary education institution that validates degrees from other universities
(including those from the UPNFM) as consistent with national standards.
UPNFM
“Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Francisco Morazán” (Francisco Morazán
National Pedagogical University). This is the only university in Honduras
specifically designed for graduates of normal schools who seek undergraduate
degrees in a specific subject in order to teach it in secondary education classes.
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Appendix D: List of Laws
Estatuto del Docente (Teachers’ Statute)
This is a law that the magisterio considers a labour achievement as it establishes
teachers’ basic rights and obligations as professional educators. Since its initial
passing in 1982, different governments prior to the 2009 coup have sought to
dismantle aspects of this law, while teachers have fought to defend it. It has thus
been reformed many times, although the post-coup education laws represent the
most significant attempt to override most of its achievements.
“Ley de Incentivo a la Participación Comunitaria para el Mejoramiento de la Calidad de
Educación ‘Ley de Participación Comunitaria’” (Law of Incentive for Community
Participation for the Improvement of Education Quality).
This post-coup law aims to discipline teachers as workers by creating the
COMDE and the CED. While the law talks about the importance of involving
community members in education decisions, schoolteachers have already been
doing this, and thus consider this law to be a mechanism put in place by the postcoup government to control their behaviour as workers. The law was passed in
early 2011 and overrides previous legislation in the area of how teachers are
supervised.
“Ley Fundamental de Educación” (Fundamental Law of Education)
This post-coup law affects how teachers go about doing their jobs. Through
ambiguous criteria it says that Honduras will increase its academic standards and
now offer new subjects in schools. It also demands that teachers solicit funding
from municipal and departmental governments and from the private sector.
Teachers consider this law to be the principal method through which post-coup
governments are attempting to privatize and de-centralize the national public
education system. The law was passed in early 2012 and overrides previous
legislation in the area of how teachers approach their work and how the national
public education system is funded.
“Ley General del INPREMA” (General Law of INPREMA)
This post-coup law reforms the teachers’ pension institute, taking away several
financial benefits that schoolteachers had achieved by fighting to pass previous
legislation in these areas. (See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation.) The FOMH
has declared this new law unconstitutional and sought legal action to reverse it.
The law was passed in early 2012 and overrides previous legislation in the area of
teachers’ benefits with INPREMA.
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Appendix E: Graph Showing Growth in Student Enrolment
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Appendix F: Letter to Staff about Sub-Director’s New Duties
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Appendix G: Chart of Teacher Absences in Director’s Office
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Appendix H: Letter Requesting Donation for Bingo Night

333

Appendix I: Emblems of School Sponsors on Classroom
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Appendix J: Sign from Sponsors Pointing Toward School
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